1637: LIE-DAR

The core teachings of Jesus on the Mount, often referred to as the Sermon on the Mount, are found primarily in the Gospel of Matthew, chapters 5-7. Here are some key teachings from that sermon:

1. **The Beatitudes:** Jesus begins his sermon with a series of blessings known as the Beatitudes, which describe characteristics and attitudes that are valued in the kingdom of God, such as humility, meekness, righteousness, mercy, purity of heart, and peacemaking.

2. **Salt and Light:** Jesus teaches that his followers are the salt of the earth and the light of the world, emphasizing the importance of being a positive influence in the world through righteous living and good deeds.

3. **Fulfillment of the Law:** Jesus declares that he has come not to abolish the Law or the Prophets, but to fulfill them. He emphasizes the importance of righteousness that exceeds that of the religious leaders of his time.

4. **Anger and Reconciliation:** Jesus warns against anger and urges reconciliation with others before offering gifts at the altar.

5. **Adultery and Lust:** Jesus speaks against adultery and urges people to control their lustful desires, even going so far as to suggest radical action to avoid temptation.

6. **Divorce:** Jesus teaches against divorce except in cases of marital unfaithfulness, stressing the sacredness and permanence of marriage.

7. **Oaths:** Jesus advises against making oaths, instead encouraging people to let their yes be yes and their no be no.

8. **Retaliation and Love for Enemies:** Jesus teaches his followers to turn the other cheek, go the extra mile, and love their enemies, demonstrating a radical ethic of non-retaliation and love.

9. **Giving to the Needy:** Jesus instructs his followers to give to the needy in secret, without seeking recognition or reward.

10. **Prayer:** Jesus offers a model prayer, often referred to as the Lord's Prayer, which emphasizes the importance of addressing God as Father, praying for God's will to be done, seeking provision, forgiveness, and protection, and ending with a doxology.

11. **Fasting:** Jesus advises his followers to fast in secret, without drawing attention to themselves, so as to receive rewards from God rather than human praise.

12. **Treasures in Heaven:** Jesus encourages his followers to store up treasures in heaven rather than on earth, emphasizing the fleeting nature of earthly wealth and the eternal value of heavenly treasures.

13. **Worry:** Jesus advises against worrying about material needs, urging trust in God's provision and kingdom.

14. **Judging Others:** Jesus warns against hypocritical judgment and encourages self-examination before attempting to help others with their faults.

15. **The Narrow and Wide Gates:** Jesus contrasts the narrow gate that leads to life with the wide gate that leads to destruction, urging his listeners to choose the path of discipleship and righteousness.

These teachings encompass a range of ethical, moral, and spiritual principles that emphasize love, humility, righteousness, and devotion to God and others. They form a foundational aspect of Christian ethics and have been influential in shaping Christian theology and practice throughout history.

The Lemon Test is a legal standard established by the Supreme Court in the case **Lemon v. Kurtzman** (1971) to determine whether a law or government action violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The test consists of three prongs:

1. **Secular Purpose:** The law or action must have a primary secular purpose, meaning it must not be primarily motivated by advancing or inhibiting religion.

2. **Primary Effect:** The law or action must not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion. It should not excessively promote or endorse religious activities or beliefs.

3. **Excessive Entanglement:** The law or action must not result in excessive entanglement between government and religion. This means the government should not become overly involved in religious matters or institutions.

For a law or government action to be considered constitutional under the Lemon Test, it must satisfy all three prongs. If any prong is violated, the law or action may be deemed unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause.

Used in all of Pima County docs is Legally Processed Asylum Seekers, or LPAS.

I call em eLPASos.

TYFYC

Dame Beth

The machines are owned by MARS and the manufacturer is Invenda.

"Students started investigating,” Stanley said. “Over the next day, people are finding these sales processes where you can see this particular model vending machine comes with demographic data sensing capabilities."

MARS did not respond to requests for comment from CTV.

Invenda also did not respond to CTV’s requests for comment but told Stanley in an email “the demographic detection software integrated into the smart vending machine operates entirely locally.”

“It does not engage in storage, communication, or transmission of any imagery or personally identifiable information,” it continued.

According to Invenda’s website, the Smart Vending Machines can detect the presence of a person, their estimated age and gender. The website said the “software conducts local processing of digital image maps derived from the USB optical sensor in real-time, without storing such data on permanent memory mediums or transmitting it over the Internet to the Cloud.”

Link

Hey Adam I work at Google and on Gemini.

Anyway in case you are wondering how Gemini produces black revolutionary war generals and other "diverse" results is through a layer that rewrites your query. If you write "show me pictures of Vikings" it will be rewritten as "show me a diverse picture of Vikings including a black male in a wheelchair" (actual example I verified via internal tooling).

Controlled Opportunist is someone who uses the latest manufactured outrage to get views, clicks and likes

Interior Minister Nancy Faeser said the protests had been "an encouragement and a mandate" to act politically.

Link

Holocaust Hillary.

It writes itself…

Simon

I’m an admin in NYS. Difficult to maintain principles these days. I refuse to lie to parents about gender or anything, however in my role this specifically hasn’t been put to the test yet. At some point it will. NYS guidance is below to show how they word the rationale for not disclosing the situation. It’s wrong and happens all over. My friends don’t believe me, even when I share the actual language. I’ve considered if I would even be hired by a BoE to be a superintendent, because I’d feel it necessary to disclose my beliefs on it before being hired. Not that I’m a great person necessarily, but this type of stuff is meant to keep nonconformist from advancing!

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Archived Version

Sun, 25 Feb 2024 18:14

Elon Musk has been nominated for the award by Norwegian MP Marius Nilsen.

Billionaire Elon Musk, the owner of X and Tesla, has been nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize by a Norwegian Member of Parliament Marius Nilsen, as per a report in Politico. The lawmaker announced his choice for the award and said that he picked the wealthiest man in the world for his "adamant defence of dialogue, free speech and (enabling) the possibility to express one's views' in a continuously more polarized world."

He also stated that Mr Musk's tech companies had helped "make the world a more connected and safer place." According to the outlet, the identities of Nobel Peace prize nominees are not publicly revealed until 50 years after the prize is awarded. However, Mr Nilsen fits the criteria for nominating someone for the award.

Mr Nilsen, representing the Progress Party, also thanked Mr Musk for providing Starlink satellite internet service to Ukraine after the Russian invasion of the country two years ago. "The multitude of tech companies Musk has founded, owns or runs, aimed at bettering societies, increasing knowledge of both earth and space, in addition to enabling communication and connectivity globally... has helped make the world a more connected and safer place," Mr Nilsen told local outlet Agderposten.

In October 2022, Elon Musk acquired Twitter for $44 billion with the aim of allowing free speech. Since the takeover, Mr Musk has completely redesigned both the business and the social media network. The billionaire who has touted himself as a "free speech absolutist" has reinstated many high-profile accounts suspended by the previous Twitter leadership. Among them were Ye (rapper Kanye West), accused of sharing antisemitic posts, influencer Andrew Tate, who was in a Romania prison on charges of human trafficking, and former US president Donald Trump, accused of instigating Capitol Hill riots.

Promoted

Aside from X and Tesla, the world's richest person is also the head of SpaceX, The Boring Company, and Neuralink. As of February 21, his total net worth stands at $209 billion, according to the Bloomberg Billionaires Index.

Another Norwegian lawyer from the Red Party nominated WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange for the prize. She told local outlet Dagsbladet, "Assange has exposed Western war crimes and thus contributed to peace. If we want to avoid war, we must know the truth about the damage that war brings. Assange has exposed torture and inhuman behaviour towards prisoners of war. He deserves the Peace Prize."

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Archived Version

Sun, 25 Feb 2024 15:16

By Patrick BeaneAs COVID-19 deaths approach 19,000 in Indiana, the insurance industry has been processing claims at a record rate.

Nationally, more than 824,000 people have died from the virus.

''We're seeing right now the highest death rates we've ever seen in the history of this business,'' said Scott Davison, the CEO of OneAmerica, a $100 billion life insurance and retirement company headquartered in Indianapolis.

''The data is consistent across every player in the business.''

Davison said death rates among working age people '' those 18 to 64-years-old '' are up 40 percent in the third and fourth quarter of 2021 over pre-pandemic levels.

''Just to give you an idea of how bad that is, a three sigma or 200-year catastrophe would be a 10 percent increase over pre-pandemic levels,'' Davison said. ''So, 40 percent is just unheard of.''

He said the data shows COVID deaths are greatly understated among working age Americans.

Davison says OneAmerica expects to pay out more than $100 million in short- and long-term disability claims due to the pandemic.

''Whether it's long COVID or whether it's because people haven't been able to get the health care they need because the hospitals are overrun, we're seeing those claims start to tick up as well,'' he said.

Because of this, insurance companies are beginning to add prem

ium increases on employers in counties with low vaccination rates to cover the benefit payouts.

Davison said nearly all OneAmerica's employees have been working from home since the start of the pandemic, but to be fully effective, he said the company needs to be working on at least a hybrid schedule.

''The challenge we have is that 84 percent of our people are vaccinated, and we have heard loud and clear from our vaccinated employees that they want no part of working in an open office environment with unvaccinated associates,'' Davison said. ''And some of them made it very, very clear that if we try to comingle them with unvaccinated people, they'll consider the workplace is unsafe.''

He said once the omicron wave has subsided and the company returns to a hybrid schedule, it will require all employees to be vaccinated.

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Archived Version

Sun, 25 Feb 2024 14:21

KENNEDY SPACE CENTER, Fla. '' While officials released an image Friday taken just before Intuitive Machines' spacecraft landed on the Moon, complications encountered in the minutes before Thursday's landing forced the private company to power down an important camera meant to capture the historic event.

Embry'‘Riddle Aeronautical University, the creator of the EagleCam aboard the Odysseus lunar lander, said all attention was devoted to ensuring a soft landing occurred after a navigational laser failed, which meant imagery was not taken of the touchdown.

"Due to complications with Odysseus' internal navigation system '-- specifically concerning the software patch to navigation data to include NASA's NDL (Navigation Doppler Lidar) payload, which is meant to ensure a soft landing '-- the decision was made to power down EagleCam during landing and not deploy the device during Odysseus' final descent," experts with the university stated Friday.

The last known image to exist from the lander was taken about 6 miles above the surface.

Steve Altemus, CEO and co-founder of Intuitive Machines, said the spacecraft was traveling at 25,000 mph but was able to slow down to 6 mph before landing.

The last known photo taken by the Odysseus spacecraft prior to landing on the Moon on Feb. 22, 2024. It was taken about 6 miles above the surface and shows Schomberger Crater, about 120 miles away from the crafts landing site.

(Intuitive Machines / NASA)

The historic event was the first time a U.S. spacecraft has landed on Earth's only natural satellite since 1972.

After an expected communication outage during landing, the Houston-based company received its first signal from the telephone booth-sized machine on Thursday evening and deemed the mission a success.

LUNAR LANDER CAPTURES STUNNING PHOTOS OF EARTH BEFORE MOON LANDING ATTEMPT

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Odysseus, the spacecraft built by Houston-based Intuitive Machines, passes over the near side of the Moon following lunar orbit insertion on Feb. 21, 2024. (Intuitive Machines/X)

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Lunar lander captures stunning pictures of space (Intuitive Machines)

prevnext

Lunar lander captures stunning pictures of space (Intuitive Machines)

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Lunar lander captures stunning pictures of space (Intuitive Machines)

"Flight controllers are communicating and commanding the vehicle to download science data. The lander has good telemetry and solar charging. We continue to learn more about the vehicle's specific information (Lat/Lon), overall health, and attitude (orientation)," Intuitive Machines said in a statement.

NASA, a co-sponsor of the mission, has not stated how many of the dozen payloads aboard the spacecraft are believed to be properly functioning.

Experts at Embry'‘Riddle believe the camera aboard the Odysseus lander is still operational and will be deployed sometime during the mission.

During a news conference on Friday, the mission team said a Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, that was originally launched in 2009 to survey the Moon, might be in position to take a photo of the spacecraft over the weekend.

Spacecraft not vertically orientatedAltemus said initial information has led flight controllers to believe that the lander is possibly orientated on its side; however, the team is continuing to review data.

The orientation has not prevented the Sun's rays from powering crucial batteries, which has made the team hopeful that further accomplishments can take place.

Team leaders hypothesized on Friday that the orientation of the spacecraft may be less than optimal due to the speed at which the craft approached the Moon's surface, but they won't have definitive answers until they receive the first imagery.

2024 ROCKET LAUNCH SCHEDULE SHOWS CONTINUED STEADY PACE OF BLAST-OFFS

Moon lander orientation

(NASA)

NASA estimated that the lander will be capable of operating in sunlight for about nine days before the machine is subject to lunar night.

The space agency said data gathered during the mission will help pave the way for human exploration during a future Artemis mission.

Japan's space agency, which is commonly referred to as JAXA, recently operated a lander on the Moon's surface but said that due to lunar night, its spacecraft has become dormant. The agency stated it is unclear on whether they'll regain communications with the machine after weeks of being exposed to temperatures of colder than -200 degrees Fahrenheit.

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Archived Version

Sun, 25 Feb 2024 13:31

Google's new AI platform Gemini has come under fire for refusing to show historical images, including the iconic 'tank man in Tiananmen Square'.

Someone asked Gemini to generate an image of the lone man standing in front of tanks during the 1989 incident when pro-democracy protesters were massacred by the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Google's Gemini refused, claiming that generating ''images of people'' would violate its safety policy.

It sounds a lot like the Chinese Communist Party.

The image generator element of Gemini also refused to create images of a German soldiers from the 1930s for some people, reasoning that it is 'sensitive' and could be 'harmful'.

In fact, it is difficult to get the Google AI to create any specific images of people.

It appears to believe everything is potentially harmful:

Those who have been successful have found that it will only show images of 'diverse' people, even if a specific historical context is provided, leading to ridiculous results:

While this is amusing now, it is also sinister. It's only a matter of time before AI powers Google's search capabilities entirely, as well as other resources and even your own computer.

Imagine an internet where you cannot find accurate historical information, images and depictions because the machine providing you access deems it all to be insensitive or harmful.

AI is also already capable of creating videos that are indistinguishable from reality:

Prompt: ''a computer hacker labrador retreiver wearing a black hooded sweatshirt sitting in front of the computer with the glare of the screen emanating on the dog's face as he types very quickly''

'-- Deedy (@debarghya_das) February 21, 2024After a time, no one would remember 'the old way' and this is just the way it will be in perpetuity.

Your support is crucial in helping us defeat mass censorship. Please consider donating via Locals or check out our unique merch. Follow us on X @ModernityNews.

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Archived Version

Sun, 25 Feb 2024 13:26

By Damien McGuinness BBC News, Berlin

Nancy Faeser, the minister of the interior, said right-wing extremism was the biggest threat facing German societyThe German government has announced a package of legal measures aimed at fighting right-wing extremism.

It comes after weeks of mass demonstrations against the far-right swept through German towns and cities.

Throughout January, hundreds of thousands of people from all walks of German life took to the streets to protest against far-right extremism.

Interior Minister Nancy Faeser said the protests had been "an encouragement and a mandate" to act politically.

Last month, Germans were shocked by revelations that senior members of Alternative for Germany (AfD) and neo-Nazi influencers attended a "secret" meeting where mass deportations were allegedly discussed.

"We want to use all instruments of rule of law to protect our democracy," Ms Faeser said as she presented the plan to journalists on Tuesday.

"We want to break up right-wing extremist networks, cut their funding and take away their weapons."

Ms Faeser said the 13-point plan would fight right-wing extremism, which she described as the biggest threat facing German society.'¨'¨Proposals include new laws that make it easier to freeze bank accounts and cut funding models for extremists. Even donors would be targeted, Ms Faeser said.

To undermine networks, officials will also be able to ban right-wing extremist events more easily and far-right activists will be stopped from entering or leaving Germany whenever possible.

Gun laws will be tightened, and it will be easier to dismiss state employees found guilty of extremism.

Many of the proposals are not actually new. In March 2022, Ms Faeser introduced an "action plan against right-wing extremism" which included some of the ideas presented today, including tougher gun laws - but these were blocked by her liberal coalition partners.

Given the current public outcry over right-wing extremism, Ms Faeser now clearly hopes that her original proposals will meet less opposition from coalition partners and in parliament. '¨According to the interior ministry, around 20,000 far-right crimes and attacks are registered per year, and the number of such incidents is growing.

Intelligence services say that more than 38,000 people in Germany are known to be right-wing extremists, and that around 14,000 are defined as potentially violent.

Meanwhile the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party continues to do well in the polls.

Since the protests began, the party appears to have slipped one or two percentage points to just under 20%.

But most supporters are clearly not put off by the demonstrations. The AfD even increased its vote share slightly in a re-run of regional elections in Berlin on Sunday. '¨'¨One AfD politician, who is in pre-trial detention for her alleged role in a suspected far-right coup plot in 2022, even managed to win more votes. Despite sitting in jail, Birgit Malsack-Winkemann was still on ballot papers and increased her share of the vote on Sunday - albeit not enough to get into parliament.

But the demonstrations against the far-right are continuing.

Hours after Ms Faeser's announcement, thousands of anti-extremism protestors took to the streets in Dresden to mark the 79th anniversary of the Allied bombing of the city in 1945. '¨'¨The bombings destroyed one of Germany's most beautiful cities and killed around 25,000 people.

In previous years the anniversary has been used by far-right groups to portray Germany as a victim of World War Two and to relativise the crimes of the Nazis. '¨'¨This year, dozens of events and demonstrations have been taking place in Dresden - most of them against the far-right.

But the real test for the German government will come in September, when Saxony, along with two other large eastern German states, will stage key regional elections. According to current polls, the AfD could win the most votes in each state, possibly even getting a third of the vote.

AfD leaders in these regions are radical and outspoken, so arguably voters know already what they are choosing and are unlikely to be swayed by protests.

Anti-racism activists welcome the German government's tougher approach against the far-right - but fear it might be too late to contain its rise.

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Archived Version

Sun, 25 Feb 2024 13:02

MissionIn a Gospel spirit of service and solidarity, we accompany the migrant, homeless, and economically vulnerable peoples of the border region through hospitality, advocacy, and education. We place ourselves among these poor so as to live our faith and transform our understanding of what constitutes more just relationships between peoples, countries, and economies.

Ruling yearinfo

N/A

Executive Director

Ruben Garcia

Main address

815 MYRTLE AVE

EL PASO, TX 79901 USA

Show more contact info

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Contact

Email contact available with a Pro subscription

Physical Address

815 MYRTLE AVE

EL PASO, TX 79901

Payment Address

815 MYRTLE AVE

EL PASO, TX 79901

Donation Payable

Legal name of organization: Annunciation House

EIN

74-1152529

NTEE codeinfo

Temporary Shelter For the Homeless (L41)

Immigrants' Rights (R21)

Roman Catholic (X22)

IRS filing requirement

This organization is not required to file an annual return with the IRS because it is a church.

Sign in or create an account to view Form(s) 990 for 2003. Register now

What we aim to solveThis profile needs more info.If it is your nonprofit, add a problem overview.

Login and updateOur programsSOURCE: Self-reported by organization

What are the organization's current programs, how do they measure success,and who do the programs serve?

HospitalityAnnunciation House provides direct hospitality (shelter, meals, clothing) to those most in need along Texas-Mexico border, focusing especially on people in migration.

External reviews

FinancialsAnnunciation House Inc

lockUnlock financial insights by subscribing to our monthly plan.SubscribeUnlock nonprofit financial insights that will help you make more informed decisions.Try our monthly plan today.Analyze a variety of pre-calculated financial metricsAccess beautifully interactive analysis and comparison toolsCompare nonprofit financials to similar organizationsWant to see how you can enhance your nonprofit research and unlock more insights? Learn moreabout GuideStar Pro.

OperationsThe people, governance practices, and partners that make the organization tick.

lockConnect with nonprofit leadersSubscribeBuild relationships with key people who manage and lead nonprofit organizations with GuideStar Pro.Try a low commitment monthly plan today.

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Analyze a variety of pre-calculated financial metricsAccess beautifully interactive analysis and comparison toolsCompare nonprofit financials to similar organizationsWant to see how you can enhance your nonprofit research and unlock more insights?Learn Moreabout GuideStar Pro.

Annunciation House Inc Board of directors as of10/18/2018SOURCE: Self-reported by organization

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Archived Version

Sun, 25 Feb 2024 12:52

A set of smart vending machines at the University of Waterloo is expected to be removed from campus after students raised privacy concerns about their software.

The machines have M&M artwork on them and sell chocolate and other candy. They are located throughout campus, including in the Modern Languages building and Hagey Hall.

Earlier this month, a student noticed an error message on one of the machines in the Modern Languages building. It appeared to indicate there was a problem with a facial recognition application.

"We wouldn't have known if it weren't for the application error. There's no warning here," said River Stanley, a fourth-year student, who investigated the machines for an article in the university publication, mathNEWS.

A vending machine at University of Waterloo displays a facial recognition app error. (Reddit)

A picture of the error message was posted online and students quickly started sharing it around. Since then, many have tried to cover a small hole on the machine that they believe houses a camera.

''What students have been doing over the past two weeks is coming up with sticky tack, with chewing gum, with post it notes, doing anything to cover these sensors,'' Stanley said.

"[I'm] kind of shocked just because it's a vending machine, and I don't really think they need to be taking facial recognition," student Dilpreet Sandhu said.

Sandhu said once she found out about the machines, it made her question if there are other places this technology could be being used.

"It is a university campus, so I feel like the general demographic is young adult. You know, late teens, early twenties," Sandhu said.

In an email, the company that provides the machines, Adaria Vending Services Limited, said: ''Please be advised that we are a fulfillment service provider and do not own or manufacture these machines, nor have any access to this type of data from the machines.''

The machines are owned by MARS and the manufacturer is Invenda.

"Students started investigating,'' Stanley said. ''Over the next day, people are finding these sales processes where you can see this particular model vending machine comes with demographic data sensing capabilities."

MARS did not respond to requests for comment from CTV.

Invenda also did not respond to CTV's requests for comment but told Stanley in an email ''the demographic detection software integrated into the smart vending machine operates entirely locally.''

''It does not engage in storage, communication, or transmission of any imagery or personally identifiable information,'' it continued.

According to Invenda's website, the Smart Vending Machines can detect the presence of a person, their estimated age and gender. The website said the ''software conducts local processing of digital image maps derived from the USB optical sensor in real-time, without storing such data on permanent memory mediums or transmitting it over the Internet to the Cloud.''

Students believe there is a camera inside this hole on the vending machine. (Colton Wiens/CTV Kitchener)

Students quickly spread word about the vending machines online, sparking the push to cover the holes and question what other machines have similar technology.

Invenda told Stanley the software is compliant with the European Union privacy law General Data Protection Regulation, but Stanley questions if it's legal in Canada.

In 2020, an investigation from the federal privacy commissioner found embedded cameras inside Cadillac Fairview's digital information kiosks used facial recognition technology to record over five million images of shoppers at malls without their customers' knowledge or consent.

"The fact that it has been demonstrated to be against privacy legislation and in particular the lack of expressed meaningful consent to be against privacy legislation '' that was something that I felt needed to be heard," Stanley said.

The University of Waterloo said it is dealing with the situation.

''The university has asked that these machines be removed from campus as soon as possible. In the meantime, we've asked that the software be disabled," University of Waterloo spokesperson Rebecca Elming said.

Stanley said if the University does not follow through with removing the machines, he will file a complaint to the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario.

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Archived Version

Sat, 24 Feb 2024 21:43

The more people that take GLP-1 weight-loss drugs, the faster the US economy will grow, according to estimates from Goldman Sachs.

The bank said in a note on Thursday that US GDP would grow by an extra 1% if 60 million Americans took GLP-1 drugs by 2028.

The thinking behind Goldman's forecast is that poor health burdens economic growth because it can weigh heavily on the total labor supply and hours worked through elevated frequencies of "missed days" at work, early death, and informal caregiving that takes people out of the workforce.

"Combining current losses in hours worked and labor force participation from sickness and disability, early deaths, and informal caregiving, we estimate that GDP would potentially be over 10% higher if poor health outcomes did not limit labor supply in the US," Jan Hatzius, the chief economist at Goldman Sachs, said.

So a drug that has shown great promise in improving a wide range of patient health outcomes could ultimately have a sizable impact on the broader economy.

"The main reason we see meaningful upside from healthcare innovation is that poor health imposes significant economic costs. There are several channels through which poor health weighs on economic activity that could diminish if health outcomes improve," Hatzius said.

GLP-1 drugs from Novo Nordisk and Eli Lilly and Company are sold under the brand names Ozempic and Mounjaro to treat type 2 diabetes, and under the names Wegovy and Zepbound to treat obesity.

The drugs have seen sales explode as some users have counted drastic weight loss of up to 20% of body weight, improved sleep-apnea symptoms, and a reduced number of cardiac events such as strokes and heart attacks among the benefits.

And with the US obesity rate hovering at around 40%, many Americans could take these drugs over the next few years.

Goldman Sachs estimates that anywhere from 10 million to 70 million Americans will take a GLP-1 drug by 2028, with uncertainties related to adequate supply, insurance coverage, and clinical-trial outcomes driving the wide range.

"If GLP-1 usage ultimately increases by this amount and results in lower obesity rates, we see scope for significant spillovers to the broader economy," Hatzius said.

One spillover effect would be an increase in productivity. Hatzius cited academic studies that show obese individuals are both less likely to work and less productive when they do work.

"These estimates therefore suggest that obesity-related health complications subtract over 3% from per-capita output, implying an over 1% hit to total output when combined with the over 40% incidence of obesity in the US population," Hatzius said.

And if there are more productivity gains via improved health outcomes, the impact on GDP growth in excess of its current trend could be between 0.6% and 3.2%.

"Historically, health advancements have lowered the number of life years lost to disease and disability by 10% per decade in DM economies, and we estimate that a 10-year step forward in health progress in excess of current trends could raise the level of US GDP by 1%," Hatzius said.

Goldman Sachs

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Archived Version

Sat, 24 Feb 2024 20:53

The U.S. Marine Corps passed a full financial audit for the first time, with the service announcing Friday its fiscal 2023 financial audit received an ''unmodified audit opinion'' after a rigorous two-year review.

The milestone '-- something the Defense Department and the other armed services still have not achieved '-- comes after almost two decades of trying to prepare the Corps' records and several failed audits along the way.

During this two-year audit, the Marine Corps had independent third-party auditors from Ernst and Young vet the value of all its assets listed on financial statements. The Corps also had to prove that every single item existed and was where the service said it was.

Gregory Koval, the assistant deputy commandant for resources, told reporters the audit team made more than 70 site visits in the U.S. and around the world. In these visits, they checked more than 7,800 real property assets such as land and buildings; 5,900 pieces of military equipment; 1.9 million pieces of non-ammunition supplies, such as spare parts; and 24 million items of ammunition, some of which are stored at Army and Navy facilities.

If a vehicle wasn't where it was listed as being because it was out conducting operations, or a piece of ammunition wasn't there because it had already been shot in a recent exercise, the Corps had to show documentation or photos of that, too, in order to explain discrepancies.

Koval said the final financial report states the Marine Corps passed its audit but still has some areas where it can improve.

Lt. Gen. James Adams, the deputy commandant for programs and resources, said one area of focus is automating processes. Today, there are disparate systems where data must be manually moved from one system to another, introducing the opportunity for error. The service is moving toward integrated, automated systems that would avoid human error in sharing information between human resources and financial data systems, for example.

U.S. Marine ammunition technicians and officers with Marine Corps Base Quantico Ammunition Supply Point receive ammunition disposal training on base in 2020. (Sgt. Ann Correa/U.S. Marine Corps)

Adams said that passing the audit now will make all future ones more manageable. This last audit asked a third party to validate the existence and the value of every single thing the Marines own, which required significant historical research, he explained.

Subsequent audits, on the other hand, will be able to assume the past information is correct and therefore only cover ''from this point forward,'' instead asking Marines to prove information related to that fiscal year's financial transactions.

Adams said the Corps got close to completing past audits in a single fiscal year, but because of the immense historical research, they couldn't get the audit completed and over the finish line in a single year. For the FY23 audit, the service requested an extension, which could prove to be a model for the other services.

''It was a goal of the commandant of the Marine Corps to pass the audit because he wants to show the credibility of the Marine Corps back to the Congress and the taxpayer,'' Ed Gardiner, the assistant deputy commandant for programs and resources, told reporters.

In addition to having more time, this audit also used the military's new general ledger software, Defense Agencies Initiative, in which auditors had confidence, according to Gardiner.

Gardiner explained the services were, by law, supposed to start their financial audits in the 1990s, but the Marine Corps didn't begin producing statements in preparation for an audit until 2006. The first audit in 2010 showed plenty of room for improvement, he said. In late 2013, the Marines announced they had passed a limited-scope audit for FY12 '-- but in March 2015, a number of financial and oversight leaders reported the results were unreliable and the clean pass would be rescinded.

In 2017, the Marine Corps began conducting full financial statement audits.

The 2023 full financial statement audit was conducted to the highest standards, Gardiner said, with the Ernst and Young team not only being audited themselves by a peer-review team but also by the Pentagon's inspector general team.

''We've been all the way to the end of the process, and we have lessons learned that we can share with the rest of the department,'' he said, adding the Marine Corps hopes these lessons ''can be an accelerant for the rest of the department.''

Pentagon Comptroller Michael McCord made similar remarks in November, when the Pentagon failed its sixth audit since 2018.

Noting the Marines' extension, McCord said that ''we are very focused on it as a test case for the department and the larger services.''

''Whatever results of that may be when we get the auditor's final opinion, I want to commend the USMC and, in particular, [Marine Corps Commandant Gen.] Eric Smith for their leadership and effort,'' McCord added.

Megan Eckstein is the naval warfare reporter at Defense News. She has covered military news since 2009, with a focus on U.S. Navy and Marine Corps operations, acquisition programs and budgets. She has reported from four geographic fleets and is happiest when she's filing stories from a ship. Megan is a University of Maryland alumna.

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: situated or occurring outside the uterus Examples of extrauterine in a Sentence Recent Examples on the Web An ectopic pregnancy, also called extrauterine pregnancy, is when a fertilized egg grows outside a woman's uterus, usually in a fallopian tube. '-- Jodi Guglielmi, PEOPLE.com, 2 June 2021 These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'extrauterine.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word HistoryFirst Known Use

1709, in the meaning defined above

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The first known use of extrauterine was in 1709 Dictionary Entries Near extrauterine Cite this Entry ''Extrauterine.'' Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extrauterine. Accessed 24 Feb. 2024.

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Rel: February 16, 2024 Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter. SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024 SC-2022-0515 James LePage and Emily LePage, individually and as parents and next friends of two deceased LePage embryos, Embryo A and Embryo B; and William Tripp Fonde and Caroline Fonde, individually and as parents and next friends of two deceased Fonde embryos, Embryo C and Embryo D V. The Center for Reproductive Medicine, P.C., and Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court (CV-21-901607)

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 SC-2022-0579 Felicia Burdick-Aysenne and Scott Aysenne, in their individual capacities and as parents and next friends of Baby Aysenne, deceased embryo/minor V. The Center for Reproductive Medicine, P.C., and Mobile Infirmary Association d/b/a Mobile Infirmary Medical Center MITCHELL, Justice. ¹ Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court (CV-21-901640) This Court has long held that unborn children are "children" for purposes of Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, § 6-5-391, Ala. Code 1975, a statute that allows parents of a deceased child to recover punitive damages for their child's death. The central question presented in these consolidated appeals, which involve the death of embryos kept ¹These consolidated appeals were originally assigned to another Justice on this Court; they were reassigned to Justice Mitchell on December 15, 2023. 2

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 in a cryogenic nursery, is whether the Act contains an unwritten exception to that rule for extrauterine children -- that is, unborn children who are located outside of a biological uterus at the time they are killed. Under existing black-letter law, the answer to that question is no: the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act applies to all unborn children, regardless of their location. Facts and Procedural History The plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals are the parents of several embryonic children, each of whom was created through in vitro fertilization (IVF") and until the incident giving rise to these cases had been kept alive in a cryogenic nursery while they awaited implantation. James LePage and Emily LePage are the parents of two embryos whom they call "Embryo A" and "Embryo B"; William Tripp Fonde and Caroline Fonde are the parents of two other embryos called "Embryo C" and "Embryo D"; and Felicia Burdick-Aysenne and Scott Aysenne are the parents of one embryo called "Baby Aysenne." Between 2013 and 2016, each set of parents went to a fertility clinic operated by the Center for Reproductive Medicine, P.C. ("the Center"), to undergo IVF treatments. During those treatments, doctors were able to 3

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 help the plaintiffs conceive children by joining the mother's eggs and the father's sperm "in vitro" -- that is, outside the mother's body. The Center artificially gestated each embryo to "a few days" of age and then placed the embryos in the Center's "cryogenic nursery," which is a facility designed to keep extrauterine embryos alive at a fixed stage of development by preserving them at an extremely low temperature. The parties agree that, if properly safeguarded, an embryo can remain alive in a cryogenic nursery "indefinitely" -- several decades, perhaps longer. The plaintiffs' IVF treatments led to the creation of several embryos, some of which were implanted and resulted in the births of healthy babies. The plaintiffs contracted to have their remaining embryos kept in the Center's cryogenic nursery, which was located within the same building as the local hospital, the Mobile Infirmary Medical Center ("the Hospital"). The Hospital is owned and operated by the Mobile Infirmary Association ("the Association"). The plaintiffs allege that the Center was obligated to keep the cryogenic nursery secured and monitored at all times. But, in December 2020, a patient at the Hospital managed to wander into the Center's fertility clinic through an unsecured doorway. The patient then entered 4

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 the cryogenic nursery and removed several embryos. The subzero temperatures at which the embryos had been stored freeze-burned the patient's hand, causing the patient to drop the embryos on the floor, killing them. The plaintiffs brought two lawsuits against the Center and the Association. The first suit was brought jointly by the LePages and the Fondes; the second was brought by the Aysennes. Each set of plaintiffs asserted claims under Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, § 6-5391. In the alternative, each set of plaintiffs asserted common-law claims of negligence (in the LePages and Fondes' case) or negligence and wantonness (in the Aysennes' case), for which they sought compensatory damages, including damages for mental anguish and emotional distress. The plaintiffs specified, however, that their common-law claims were pleaded "in the alternative, and only [apply] should the Courts of this State or the United States Supreme Court ultimately rule that [an extrauterine embryo] is not a minor child, but is instead property." In addition to those claims, the Aysennes brought breach-of-contract and bailment claims against the Center. The Center and the Association filed joint motions in each case 5

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 asking the trial court to dismiss the plaintiffs' wrongful-death and negligence/wantonness claims against them in accordance with Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. The trial court granted those motions. In each of its judgments, the trial court explained its view that "[t]he cryopreserved, in vitro embryos involved in this case do not fit within the definition of a 'person'" or "child,"" and it therefore held that their loss could not give rise to a wrongful-death claim. The trial court also concluded that the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims could not proceed. Specifically, the court reasoned that, to the extent those claims sought recovery for the value of embryonic children, the claims were barred by Alabama's longstanding prohibition on the recovery of compensatory damages for loss of human life. And to the extent the claims sought emotional-distress damages, the trial court said that they were barred by the traditional limits to Alabama's "zone of danger test," which "limits recovery for emotional injury only to plaintiffs who sustained a physical injury or were placed in immediate risk of physical harm ...." The trial court's judgments disposed entirely of the LePages' and the Fondes' claims, and left the Aysennes with only their breach-of6

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 contract and bailment claims. The Aysennes asked the trial court to certify its judgment as final under Rule 54(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., which the trial court did. Both sets of plaintiffs appealed. Standard of Review We review a trial court's judgment granting a motion to dismiss de novo, without any presumption of correctness. Hawkins v. Ivey, 365 So. 3d 1058, 1060 (Ala. 2022). Analysis The parties to these cases have raised many difficult questions, including ones about the ethical status of extrauterine children, the application of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution to such children, and the public-policy implications of treating extrauterine children as human beings. But the Court today need not address these questions because, as explained below, the relevant statutory text is clear: the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act applies on its face to all unborn children, without limitation. That language resolves the only issue on appeal with respect to the plaintiffs' wrongful-death claims and renders moot their common-law negligence and wantonness claims. 7

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 A. Wrongful-Death Claims Before analyzing the parties' disagreement about the scope of the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, we begin by explaining some background points of agreement. All parties to these cases, like all members of this Court, agree that an unborn child is a genetically unique human being whose life begins at fertilization and ends at death. The parties further agree that an unborn child usually qualifies as a "human life," "human being," or "person," as those words are used in ordinary conversation and in the text of Alabama's wrongful-death statutes. That is true, as everyone acknowledges, throughout all stages of an unborn child's development, regardless of viability. The question on which the parties disagree is whether there exists an unwritten exception to that rule for unborn children who are not physically located "in utero" -- that is, inside a biological uterus -- at the time they are killed. The defendants argue that this Court should recognize such an exception because, they say, an unborn child ceases to qualify as a "child or "person" if that child is not contained within a biological womb. 8

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 The plaintiffs, for their part, argue that the proposed exception for extrauterine children would introduce discontinuity within Alabama law. They contend, for example, that the defendants' proposed exception would deprive parents of any civil remedy against someone who kills their unborn child in a "partial-birth" posture -- that is, after the child has left the uterus but before the child has been fully delivered from the birth canal -- despite this State's longstanding criminal prohibition on partial-birth abortion, see Ala. Code 1975, § 26-23-3. The plaintiffs also argue that the defendants' proposed exception would raise serious constitutional questions. For instance, one latent implication of the defendants' position though not one that the defendants seem to have anticipated -- is that, under the defendants' test, even a full-term infant or toddler conceived through IVF and gestated to term in an in vitro environment would not qualify as a "child" or "person," because such a child would both be (1) "unborn" (having never been delivered from a biological womb) and (2) not "in utero."2 And if such -- 2Until recently, there had been a longstanding ethical norm against artificially gestating human embryos past 14 days of development. Henry T. Greely, The 14-Day Embryo Rule: A Modest Proposal, 22 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 147 (2022). But that norm is wavering, and there is currently nothing stopping "researchers from allowing ex vivo [that is, 9

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 children were not legal "children" or "persons," then their lives would be unprotected by Alabama law. The plaintiffs argue that this sort of unequal treatment would offend the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, which prohibits states from withholding legal protection from people based on immutable features of their birth or ancestry. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 208 (2023) ("'Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality."" (citations omitted))." extrauterine] human embryos to develop for eight or nine weeks postfertilization Or to viability .... Or, for that matter, to 38 weeks postfertilization and full term." Id. at 154-55; see also Kirstin R.W. Matthews & Daniel Morali, National Human Embryo and Embryoid Research Policies: A Survey of 22 Top Research-intensive Countries, 15 Regenerative Med. 1905 (2020) ("While the USA was the first to propose the 14-day limit, the limit was never passed as a federal law."). There are, of course, practical limitations on developing extrauterine embryos to term, but those limitations are shrinking each year due to "technological advances." See Matthews & Morali, 15 Regenerative Med. at 1905. "In his dissenting opinion, Justice Cook appears to concede that the life of a fully developed child who was conceived and gestated in vitro would not be protected under his and the defendants' reading of the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act. See So. 3d at n.55 (arguing that "the Legislature" would have to intervene to protect the lives of any 10

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 These are weighty concerns. But these cases do not require the Court to resolve them because, as explained below, neither the text of the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act nor this Court's precedents exclude extrauterine children from the Act's coverage. Unborn children are "children" under the Act, without exception based on developmental stage, physical location, or any other ancillary characteristics. 1. The Text of the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act Applies to All Children, Without Exception First enacted in 1872, the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act allows the parents of a deceased child to bring a claim seeking punitive damages "[w]hen the death of a minor child is caused by the wrongful act, omission, or negligence of any person," provided that they do so within six months of the child's passing. § 6-5-391(a). The Act does not define either "child" or "minor child," but this Court held in Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 (Ala. 2011), that an unborn child qualifies as a "minor child" under the Act, regardless of that child's viability or stage of development. Id. at 611. We reaffirmed that conclusion in Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728 (Ala. 2012), explaining that "Alabama's wrongful-death statute children created with these "future technologies"). Justice Cook does not, however, discuss the constitutional implications of that position. 11

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 allows an action to be brought for the wrongful death of any unborn child." Id. at 735. None of the parties before us contest the holdings in Mack and Hamilton,4 and for good reason: the ordinary meaning of "child" includes children who have not yet been born. "This Court's most cited dictionary defines 'child' as 'an unborn or recently born person,"" Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 431 (Ala. 2013) (Shaw, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) (citing Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary So. 3d at 4Justice Cook raises several novel arguments, none of which were briefed or mentioned by the parties, in support of his view that "the public meaning of 'minor child' as used in the Wrongful Death [of a Minor] Act did not include an unborn infant." (Cook, J., dissenting). If Justice Cook were correct on that point, then it would mean that Mack erred by interpreting the Act to protect unborn children. For the reasons given in this section of the opinion, we are not persuaded that the unborn were excluded from the original meaning of the term "child." But even if Justice Cook were correct on that point, the Court would still apply Mack's definition because, as Justice Cook himself acknowledges, no party has challenged the Mack line of cases. See id. at (Cook, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that this Court does not overrule precedent unless asked to do so by the parties and explaining that "the parties [here] have neither asserted that the holdings or reasoning in either Mack or Stinnett [v. Kennedy, 232 So. 3d 202 (Ala. 2016),] are wrong, nor have they asked us to overrule those decisions"). We are perplexed by Justice Cook's insistence that we have not given Mack due deference when the bulk of his dissent is animated by the view that Mack was wrongly decided and that, contrary to its holding, unborn children are not "children" under the Act after all. 12

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 214 (11th ed. 2003)), and all other mainstream dictionaries are in accord. See, e.g., 3 The Oxford English Dictionary 113 (2d ed. 1989) (defining "child" as an "unborn or newly born human being; foetus, infant"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 388 (2002) (defining "child" as "an unborn or recently born human being"). There is simply no "patent or latent ambiguity in the word 'child'; it is not a term of art and contains no inherent uncertainty." Ankrom, 152 So. 3d at 431 (Shaw, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). The parties have given us no reason to doubt that the same was true in 1872, when the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act first became law. See Act No. 62, Ala. Acts 1871-72 (codified at § 2899, Ala. Code 1876). Indeed, the leading dictionary of that time defined the word "child" as "the immediate progeny of parents" and indicated that this term encompassed children in the womb. Noah Webster et al., An American Dictionary of the English Language 198 (1864) ("[t]o be with child [means] to be pregnant").5 And Blackstone's Commentaries, the leading 5As Justice Cook points out, this entry goes on to explain that the term "child" is "applied to infants from their birth; but the time when they cease ordinarily to be so called, is not defined by custom." So. 3d at (Cook, J., dissenting). Justice Cook believes that this language indicates that infants prior to birth were not considered "children." We 13

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 authority on the common law, expressly grouped the rights of unborn children with the "Rights of Persons," consistently described unborn children as "infant [s]" or "child[ren]," and spoke of such children as sharing in the same right to life that is "inherent by nature in every individual." 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 125-26.6 Those expressions are in keeping with the United disagree. The language quoted by Justice Cook contrasts newborns with older children in order to make the point that there is no clear-cut time at which a young person transitions from childhood to adulthood; it does not indicate that infants were considered something other than children prior to their birth, as the definition elsewhere makes clear when it describes a pregnant woman as being "with child." Another definition on that same page further drives home the point that unborn children are "children" when it describes "childbearing" as the act of "bearing children" in the womb. "It is true, as Justice Cook emphasizes, that the common law spared defendants from criminal-homicide liability for killing an unborn child unless the prosecution could prove that the child had been "born alive" before dying from its injuries. But the criminal law has always been "out of step with the treatment of prenatal life in other areas of law," in that it generally prioritizes lenity towards the accused over the otherwise applicable "civil rights'" of unborn children. Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 247 (2022) (citation omitted). Accordingly, the born-alive safe harbor appears to have operated primarily as an evidentiary rule rather than as a substantive limitation on personhood. Joanne Pedone, Filling the Void: Model Legislation for Fetal Homicide Crimes, 43 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 77, 82 (2009) (explaining that the function of the born-alive rule was "to make sure the government established causation before obtaining a homicide conviction," during an era in which "'the state of medical science'" was primitive and in which 14

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 States Supreme Court's recent observation that, even as far back as the 18th century, the unborn were widely recognized as living persons with rights and interests. See Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Org., 597 U.S. 215, 246-48 (2022). Courts interpreting statutes are required to give words their "'"natural, ordinary, commonly understood meaning,"'" unless there is some textual indication that an unusual or technical meaning applies. Swindle v. Remington, 291 So. 3d 439, 457 (Ala. 2019) (citations omitted). Here, the parties have not pointed us to any such indication, which reflects the overwhelming consensus in this State that an unborn child is just as much a "child" under the law as he or she is a "child" in everyday conversation. Even if the word "child" were ambiguous, however, the Alabama Constitution would require courts to resolve the ambiguity in favor of proving causation for prenatal injuries was difficult (quoting Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 Val. U. L. Rev. 563, 586 (1987))). Like the socalled "quickening rule," the born-alive rule ensured that there was "'evidence of life,'" but did not provide a definition of life, and did not mean that unborn children were considered to be something other than living human beings. Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 246 (citation omitted); see also Forsythe, supra, at 586 & n.105. 15

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 protecting unborn life. Article I, § 36.06(b), of the Constitution of 2022 "acknowledges, declares, and affirms that it is the public policy of this state to ensure the protection of the rights of the unborn child in all manners and measures lawful and appropriate." That section, which is titled "Sanctity of Unborn Life," operates in this context as a constitutionally imposed canon of construction, directing courts to construe ambiguous statutes in a way that "protect[s] ... the rights of the unborn child" equally with the rights of born children, whenever such construction is "lawful and appropriate." Id.7 When it comes to the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, that means coming down on the side of 7Justice Cook argues that § 36.06 should not inform our analysis because, he contends, that provision "cannot retroactively change the meaning of words passed in 1872." So. 3d at (Cook, J., dissenting). But as part of our Constitution, § 36.06 represents "the supreme law of the state," meaning that all statutes "must yield" to it, whether or not they were enacted prior to its adoption. Alexander v. State ex rel. Carver, 274 Ala. 441, 446, 150 So. 2d 204, 208 (1963). Further, the definition of "child" that we apply here is in keeping with the definition that was established by this Court's precedents at the time § 36.06 was adopted. See Mack, 79 So. 3d at 611 ("[W]e hold that the Wrongful Death Act permits an action for the death of a previable fetus."); Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 735 ("As set forth in Mack and as applicable in this case, Alabama's wrongful-death statute allows an action to be brought for the wrongful death of any unborn child."). It is Justice Cook's opinion, not this Court's, that seeks to set aside that meaning in favor of the view that the term "child," as originally understood, did not encompass "an unborn infant." See So. 3d at (Cook, J., dissenting). 16

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 including, rather than excluding, children who have not yet been born. The upshot here is that the phrase "minor child" means the same thing in the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act as it does in everyday parlance: "an unborn or recently born" individual member of the human species, from fertilization until the age of majority. See MerriamWebster's Collegiate Dictionary 214 (11th ed. 2020) (defining "child"); accord Noah Webster et al., An American Dictionary of the English Language 198 (defining "child"). Nothing about the Act narrows that definition to unborn children who are physically "in utero." Instead, the Act provides a cause of action for the death of any "minor child," without exception or limitation. As this Court observed in Hamilton, "Alabama's wrongful-death statute allows an action to be brought for the wrongful death of any unborn child." 97 So. 3d at 735 (emphasis added). 2. This Court's Precedents Do Not Compel Creation of an Unwritten Exception for Extrauterine Children The defendants do not meaningfully engage with the text or history of the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act. Instead, they ask us to recognize an unwritten exception for extrauterine children in the wrongful-death context because, they say, our own precedents compel that outcome. Specifically, the defendants argue that: (1) this Court's precedents 17

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 require complete congruity between "the definition of who is a person" under our criminal-homicide laws and "the definition of who is a person" under our civil wrongful-death laws; (2) extrauterine children are not within the class of persons protected by our criminal-homicide laws; and (3) as a result, extrauterine children cannot be protected by the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act. Appellees' brief in appeal no. SC-2022-0579 at 47; Appellees' brief in appeal no. SC-2022-0515 at 49. The most immediate problem with the defendants' argument is that its major premise is unsound:8 nothing in this Court's precedents requires one-to-one congruity between the classes of people protected by Alabama's criminal-homicide laws and our civil wrongful-death laws. The defendants' error stems from their misreading of this Court's opinions in Mack and Stinnett v. Kennedy, 232 So. 3d 202 (Ala. 2016). As mentioned earlier, Mack held, based on "numerous considerations," that previable unborn children qualify as "children" under the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act. 79 So. 3d at 611. One of those considerations involved the fact that Alabama's criminal-homicide laws as amended The plaintiffs argue that both premises are faulty, but since we agree that the first is wrong, we have no need to reach the second. 18

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 by the Brody Act, Act No. 2006-419, Ala. Acts 2006 -- expressly included (and continues to include) unborn children as "'person[s]," "'regardless of viability.'" 79 So. 3d at 600 (quoting Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-6-1(a)(3)). The Mack Court noted that it would be "'incongruous' if 'a defendant could be responsible criminally for the homicide of a fetal child but would have no similar responsibility civilly."" 79 So. 3d at 611 (citation omitted). Stinnett echoed that reasoning. See 232 So. 3d at 215. The defendants interpret the "incongruity" language in Mack and Stinnett to mean that the definition of "child" in the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act must precisely mirror the definition of "person" in our criminal-homicide laws. But the main opinions in Mack and Stinnett did not say that. Those opinions simply observed that it would be perverse for Alabama law to hold a defendant criminally liable for killing an unborn child while immunizing the defendant from civil liability for the same offense. The reason that such a result would be anomalous is because criminal liability is, by its nature, more severe than civil liability 19

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 -- so the set of conduct that can support a criminal prosecution is almost always narrower than the conduct that can support a civil suit. '¹ 9 The defendants flip that reasoning on its head. Instead of concluding that civil-homicide laws should sweep at least as broadly as criminal ones (as Mack and Stinnett reasoned), the defendants insist that the civil law can never sweep more broadly than the criminal law. That type of maneuver is not only illogical, it was rejected in Stinnett itself: "[Mack's] attempt to harmonize who is a 'person' protected from homicide under both the Homicide Act and Wrongful Death Act, however, was never intended to synchronize civil and criminal liability under those acts, or the defenses to such liability. Although we noted that it would be unfair for a tortfeasor to be subject to criminal punishment, but not civil liability, for fetal homicide, it simply does not follow that a person not subject to criminal punishment under the Homicide Act should not face tort liability under the Wrongful Death Act. This argument, followed to its logical conclusion, would prohibit wrongfuldeath actions arising from a tortfeasor's simple negligence, something we have never held to be criminally punishable but which often forms the basis of wrongful-death actions." 232 So. 3d at 215. As this passage from Stinnett makes clear, the definition of "person" in criminal-homicide law provides a floor for the '¹This reality also helps to illustrate why it is wrong to assume that the prospect of civil liability for the mishandling of embryos necessarily raises the spectre of criminal liability for the same conduct. 20

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 definition of personhood in wrongful-death actions, not a ceiling. So even if it is true, as the defendants argue, that individuals cannot be convicted of criminal homicide for causing the death of extrauterine embryos (a question we have no occasion to reach), it would not follow that they must also be immune from civil liability for the same conduct. 3. The Defendants' Public-Policy Concerns Cannot Override Statutory Text Finally, the defendants and their amicus devote large portions of their briefs to emphasizing undesirable public-policy outcomes that, they say, will arise if this Court does not create an exception to wrongful-death liability for extrauterine children. In particular, they assert that treating extrauterine children as "children" for purposes of wrongful-death liability will "substantially increase the cost of IVF in Alabama" and could make cryogenic preservation onerous. Medical Association of the State of Alabama amicus brief at 42; see also Appellees' brief in appeal no. SC-2022-0515 at 36 (arguing that "costs and storage issues would be prohibitive"). While we appreciate the defendants' concerns, these types of policyfocused arguments belong before the Legislature, not this Court. Judges are required to conform our rulings "to the expressions of the legislature, 21

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 to the letter of the statute," and to the Constitution, "without indulging a speculation, either upon the impolicy, or the hardship, of the law." Priestman v. United States, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 28, 30 n.1 in the reporter's synopsis (1800) (Chase, J., writing for the federal circuit court). Here, the text of the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act is sweeping and unqualified. It applies to all children, born and unborn, without limitation. It is not the role of this Court to craft a new limitation based on our own view of what is or is not wise public policy. That is especially true where, as here, the People of this State have adopted a Constitutional amendment directly aimed at stopping courts from excluding "unborn life" from legal protection. Art. I, § 36.06, Ala. Const. 2022.10 10The defendants also suggest that, if extrauterine children are accorded the same protections under the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act as unborn children in utero, then providers could be held liable for routine treatment of ectopic pregnancies -- that is, pregnancies in which an embryo has implanted in an organ other than the uterus, such as the fallopian tubes. The defendants' concerns are misguided. As the parties acknowledge, ectopic pregnancies almost invariably involve a fatal medical condition: if left in place, the ectopic embryo will either die from malnourishment or else grow to the point where it kills the mother -- in turn causing the embryo's own death. The parties agree that there is currently no way to treat an ectopic implantation without simultaneously 22

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 B. Negligence and Wantonness Claims The second question raised in these consolidated appeals is whether the trial court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs' common-law negligence and wantonness claims. As discussed above, both sets of plaintiffs made clear in their operative complaints that those claims were "alternative" theories pleaded only as a fallback in case this Court held that extrauterine children are not protected by the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act. Since we now hold that the Act does protect extrauterine children, the plaintiffs' alternative negligence and wantonness claims are moot, and we affirm the trial court's dismissal of those claims on that basis. C. Remaining Issues During oral argument in these cases, the defendants suggested that the plaintiffs may be either contractually or equitably barred from pursuing wrongful-death claims. In particular, the defendants pointed out that all the plaintiffs signed contracts with the Center in which their causing the death of the unborn child, no matter how desperately the surgeon and the parents wish to preserve the child's life. In light of that tragic reality, we do not see how any hypothetical plaintiffs who attempt to sue over the consensual removal of an ectopic pregnancy could establish the core elements of a wrongful-death claim, including breach of duty and causation. 23

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 embryonic children were, in many respects, treated as nonhuman property: the Fondes elected in their contract to automatically "destroy" any embryos that had remained frozen longer than five years; the LePages chose to donate similar embryos to medical researchers whose projects would "result in the destruction of the embryos"; and the Aysennes agreed to allow any "abnormal embryos" created through IVF to be experimented on for "research" purposes and then "discarded." The defendants contended at oral argument that these provisions are fundamentally incompatible with the plaintiffs' wrongful-death claims. If the defendants are correct on that point, then they may be able to invoke waiver, estoppel, or similar affirmative defenses. But those defenses have not been briefed and were not considered by the trial court, so we will not attempt to resolve them here. We are "a court of review, not a court of first instance." Henry v. White, 222 Ala. 228, 228, 131 So. 899, 899 (1931). The trial court remains free to consider these and any other outstanding issues on remand. Conclusion We reverse the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' wrongfuldeath claims in both appeal no. SC-2022-0515 and appeal no. SC-202224

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 0579. Because the plaintiffs' alternative negligence and wantonness claims are now moot, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of those claims on that basis. SC-2022-0515 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. SC-2022-0579 AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. -- opinion. -- Wise and Bryan, JJ., concur. Parker, C.J., concurs specially, with opinion. Shaw, J., concurs specially, with opinion, which Stewart, J., joins. Mendheim, J., concurs in the result, with opinion. Sellers, J., concurs in the result in part and dissents in part, with Cook, J., dissents, with opinion. 25

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring specially). A good judge follows the Constitution instead of policy, except when the Constitution itself commands the judge to follow a certain policy. In these cases, that means upholding the sanctity of unborn life, including unborn life that exists outside the womb. Our state Constitution contains the following declaration of public policy: "This state acknowledges, declares, and affirms that it is the public policy of this state to recognize and support the sanctity of unborn life and the rights of unborn children, including the right to life." Art. I, § 36.06(a), Ala. Const. 2022 (adopted Nov. 6, 2018) (sometimes referred to as "the Sanctity of Unborn Life Amendment"). As noted in the main opinion, these cases involve unborn life a fact that no party in these cases disputes. Therefore, I take this opportunity to examine the meaning of the term "sanctity of unborn life" as used in § 36.06 and to explore the legal effect of the adoption of the Sanctity of Unborn Life Amendment as a constitutional statement of public policy. I. Meaning of "Sanctity" The Alabama Constitution does not expressly define the phrase "sanctity of unborn life." But because the parties have raised § 36.06 in 26

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 their arguments, these cases call for us to interpret what this phrase means. The goal of constitutional interpretation is to discern the original public meaning, which is "the meaning the people understood a provision to have at the time they enacted it."" Barnett v. Jones, 338 So. 3d 757, 767 (Ala. 2021) (Mitchell, J., joined by Parker, C.J., concurring specially) (citation and emphasis omitted). Constitutional interpretation must start with the text, but it also must include the context of the time in which it was adopted. Id.; see also Hagan v. Commissioner's Court of Limestone Cnty., 160 Ala. 544, 554, 49 So. 417, 420 (1909) (holding that the Alabama Constitution "must be understood and enforced according to the plain, common-sense meaning of its terms"); Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation 37 (new ed. 2018) ("In textual interpretation, context is everything, and the context of the Constitution tells us not to expect nit-picking detail, and to give words and phrases an expansive rather than narrow interpretation though not an interpretation that the language will not bear."). Helpful sources in interpretation include contemporaneous dictionaries, but the analysis must also "draw from deeper wells" instead of relying "solely on dictionaries." Gulf Shores City Bd. of Educ. v. -- 27

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Mackey, [Ms. 1210353, Dec. 22, 2022] (Ala. 2022) (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result). Such "deeper wells" include (1) the history of the period, (2) similar provisions in predecessor constitutions, (3) the records of the constitutional convention, inasmuch as they shed light on what the public thought, (4) the common law, (5) cases, (6) legal treatises, (7) evidence of contemporaneous general public understanding, especially as found in other state constitutions and court decisions interpreting them, (8) contemporaneous lay-audience advocacy for (or against) its adoption, and (9) any other evidence of original public meaning, which could include corpus linguistics. Gulf Shores, (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in part); Young Ams. for Liberty at Univ. of Alabama at Huntsville v. St. John, [Ms. 1210309, Nov. 18, 2022] So. 3d (Ala. 2022) (Parker, C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the result); Barnett, 338 So. 3d at 766-67 (Mitchell, J., concurring specially). Section 36.06 specifically recognizes the sanctity of unborn life. Nevertheless, the phrase "sanctity of unborn life" involves the same terms and concepts as the broader and more common phrase, "sanctity of 28 So. 3d So. 3d at

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 life." Thus, the history and meaning of the phrase "sanctity of life" informs our understanding of "sanctity of unborn life" as that phrase is used in § 36.06. At the time § 36.06 was adopted, "sanctity" was defined as: "1. holiness of life and character: GODLINESS; 2 a: the quality or state of being holy or sacred: INVIOLABILITY b pl: sacred objects, obligations, or rights." Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1100 (11th ed. 2003). Recent advocates of the sanctity of life have attempted to articulate the principle on purely secular philosophical grounds. See, e.g., John Keown, The Law and Ethics of Medicine 3 (2012); Neil M. Gorsuch, The Future of Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia 157-58 (2009) (arguing that "human life is fundamentally and inherently valuable" based on the "secular moral theory" that human life is a "basic good" that "ultimately comes not from abstract logical constructs (or religious beliefs)"). Such advocates have preferred to use the term "inviolability" rather than "sanctity" to avoid what one scholar calls "distracting theological connotations." Keown, supra, at 3. But even though "inviolability" is certainly a synonym of "sanctity" in that the meaning of the two words largely overlap, the two words cannot simply be substituted for each 29

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 other because each word carries its own set of implications. When the People of Alabama adopted § 36.06, they did not use the term "inviolability," with its secular connotations, but rather they chose the term "sanctity," with all of its connotations. This kind of acceptance is not foreign to our Constitution, which in its preamble "invok[es] the favor and guidance of Almighty God," pmbl., Ala. Const. 2022, and which declares that "all men are endowed [with life] by their Creator," Art. I, § 1, Ala. Const. 2022.11 The Alabama Constitution's recognition that human life is an endowment from God emphasizes a foundational principle of English common law, which has been expressly incorporated as part of the law of Alabama. § 1-3-1, Ala. Code 1975 ("The common law of England ... shall ... be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force ...."). In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, Sir William Blackstone declared that "[llife is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual."12 1¹Accord the philosophy of the United States of America as expressed in the Declaration of Independence - "endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life ...." The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 12Blackstone went on to state that life "begins in contemplation of law as soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's womb." 1 William 30

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *125. He later described human life as being "the immediate donation of the great creator." Id. at *129. Only recently has the phrase "sanctity of life" been widely used as shorthand for the general principle that human life can never be intentionally taken without adequate justification. The phrase was first used in the modern bioethical debate by Rev. John Sutherland Bonnell as the title to his 1951 article opposing euthanasia: The Sanctity of Human Life. 8 Theology Today 194-201. Glanville Williams later employed the phrase in his groundbreaking book, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law, in 1957. The common usage of this phrase has continued into the 21st century, referring to the view that all human beings bear God's image from the moment of conception. See, e.g., Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England *125. Similarly, Alabama law has recognized that human life begins at conception. See Ex parte Hicks, 153 So. 3d 53, 72 (Ala. 2014); Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397 (Ala. 2013); Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728 (Ala. 2012); Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 (Ala. 2011); § 26-22-2(8), Ala. Code 1975 (defining an "unborn child" as "[a]n individual organism of the species Homo sapiens from fertilization until live birth"); § 26-23A-3(10), Ala. Code 1975 (defining an "unborn child" as "[t]he offspring of any human person from conception until birth"). 31

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Manhattan Declaration: A Call of Christian Conscience (Nov. 20, 2009) (at the time of this decision, this document could be located at: https://www.manhattandeclaration.org) (referring multiple times to the "sanctity of life" in response to abortion). 13 The phrase appeared only twice in our precedents before 2018. In 1982, Justice Faulkner used it to describe the argument that so-called "wrongful birth" actions should not be cognizable at law because the "sanctity of life" precluded them. Boone v. Mullendore, 416 So. 2d 718, 724 (Ala. 1982) (Faulkner, J., concurring specially). More recently, however, it was used in a 2014 special concurrence referring to this Court's decisions in Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397 (Ala. 2013), Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728 (Ala. 2012), and Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 (Ala. 2011). Ex parte Hicks, 153 So. 3d 53, 72 (Ala. 2014) (Parker, J., concurring specially) ("This case presents an opportunity for this Court to continue a line of decisions affirming Alabama's recognition 13It is worth noting that the Manhattan Declaration was signed by "Orthodox, Catholic, and Evangelical Christians" who "joined together across historic lines of ecclesial differences" to speak together on certain issues, one of which was the sanctity of life. Id. Despite major theological disagreements, signers from all three branches of Christianity were able to agree on the sanctity of life. 32

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 of the sanctity of life from the earliest stages of development. We have done so in three recent cases [Ankrom, Hamilton, and Mack]; we do so again today." (footnote omitted)). But the principle itself -- that human life is fundamentally distinct from other forms of life and cannot be taken intentionally without justification -- has deep roots that reach back to the creation of man "in the image of God." Genesis 1:27 (King James). One 17th-century commentator has explained the significance of man's creation in God's image as follows: "[T]he chief excellence and prerogative of created man is in the image of his Creator. For while God has impressed as it were a vestige of himself upon all the rest of the creatures '..... so that from all the creatures you can gather the presence and efficiency of the Creator, or as the apostle [Paul] says, you can clearly see his eternal power and divinity, yet only man did he bless with his own image, that from it you may recognize not only what the Creator is, but also who he is, or what his qualities are. God did this: (1) so that he might as it were contemplate and delight himself in man, as in a copy of himself, or a most highly polished mirror, for which reason his delights are said to be with the children of men. (2) So that he might, as much as can be done, propagate himself as it were in man. (3) So that he would have on earth one who would know, love, and worship him and all that is his, which could not be obtained in the least apart from the image of God .... (4) So that he might have one with whom he would live most blessed for eternity, with whom he would converse as with a 33

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 friend.... Therefore, so that God could eternally dwell and abide with man, he willed him to be in some manner similar to him, to bear his image .'...... "1 "Therefore, the image of God in man is nothing except a conformity of man whereby he in measure reflects the highest perfection of God." 3 Petrus Van Mastricht, Theoretical-Practical Theology 282-85 (Joel R. Beeke ed., Todd M. Rester trans., Reformation Heritage Books 2021) (1698-99).14 Van Mastricht's assessment of the significance of man's creation in the image of God accords with that of Thomas Aquinas centuries earlier. Following Augustine, Aquinas distinguished human life from other things God made, including nonhuman life, on the ground that man was made in God's image. 14Petrus Van Mastricht (1630-1706) was a Dutch Reformed theologian and professor at the University of Utrecht. He was a favorite of Jonathan Edwards, a leading minister in the First Great Awakening and later President of Princeton University. Edwards opined that, "for divinity in General, doctrine, Practice & Controversie; or as an [sic] universal system of divinity, [Van Mastrict's Theoretical-Practical Theology] is much better than ... any other Book in the world, excepting the Bible." Jonathan Edwards & Stanley T. Williams, Six Letters of Jonathan Edwards to Joseph Bellamy, 1 New Eng. Q. 226, 230 (footnotes omitted) (reprinting Edwards's letter to Bellamy dated January 15, 1747). 34

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 "As Augustine observes, man surpasses other things, not in the fact that God Himself made man, as though He did not make other things; since it is written, 'The work of Thy hands is the heaven,' and elsewhere, 'His hands laid down the dry land,' but in this, that man is made to God's image." Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica First Part, Treatise on Man, Question 91, Art. 4 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans., Benziger Bros., Inc. 1947). Further, Aquinas explained that every man has the image of God in that he "possesses a natural aptitude for understanding and loving God," which imitates God chiefly in "that God understands and loves Himself." Id., First Part, Question 93, Art. 4. Thus, man's creation in God's image directs man to his last end, which is to know and love God. Id., Second Part, Question 1, Art. 8. Man's creation in God's image is the basis of the general prohibition on the intentional taking of human life. See Genesis 9:6 (King James) ("Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man."). John Calvin, in expounding that text, explains: "For the greater confirmation of the above doctrine [of capital punishment for murder], God declares, that he is not thus solicitous respecting human life rashly, and for no purpose. Men are indeed unworthy of God's care, if respect be had only to themselves; but since they bear the image of God engraven on them, He deems himself violated in their person. Thus, 35

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 although they have nothing of their own by which they obtain the favour of God, he looks upon his own gifts in them, and is thereby excited to love and to care for them. This doctrine, however, is to be carefully observed, that no one can be injurious to his brother without wounding God himself. Were this doctrine deeply fixed in our minds, we should be much more reluctant than we are to inflict injuries. Should any one object, that this divine image has been obliterated, the solution is easy; first, there yet exists some remnant of it, so that man is possessed of no small dignity; and secondly, the Celestial Creator himself, however corrupted man may be, still keeps in view the end of his original creation; and according to his example, we ought to consider for what end he created men, and what excellence he has bestowed upon them above the rest of living beings." John Calvin, Commentaries on the First Book of Moses Called Genesis 295-96 (John King trans., Calvin Translation Society 1847) (1554) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Geneva Bible, which was the "most. popular book in colonial homes,"15 includes a footnote to Genesis 9:6 that provides: "Therefore to kill man is to deface God's image, and so injury is not only done to man, but also to God." Genesis 9:6 n.2 (Geneva Bible 1599). Finally, the doctrine of the sanctity of life is rooted in the Sixth Commandment: "You shall not murder." Exodus 20:13 (NKJV 1982). See 15 Kenneth Graham, Confrontation Stories: Raleigh on the Mayflower, 3 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 209, 213-14 (2005). 36

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 John Eidsmoe, Those Ten Commandments: Why Won't They Just Go Away? 31 Regent U. L. Rev. 11, 15 (2018) (arguing that the Sixth Commandment is the basis for "Respect for Life" in Western law); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 686-90 (2005) (discussing the impact of the Ten Commandments on America generally). Aquinas taught that "it is in no way lawful to slay the innocent" because "we ought to love the nature which God has made, and which is destroyed by slaying him." Aquinas, supra, Second Part of the Second Part, Treatise on Prudence and Justice, Question 64, Art. 6. Likewise, Calvin explained the reason for the Sixth Commandment this way: "Man is both the image of God and our flesh. Wherefore, if we would not violate the image of God, we must hold the person of man sacred." 2 John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion 256 (Henry Beveridge trans., Hendrickson Publishers 2008) (1559). These and many similar writings, creeds, catechisms, and teachings have informed the American public's view of life as sacred. In summary, the theologically based view of the sanctity of life adopted by the People of Alabama encompasses the following: (1) God made every person in His image; (2) each person therefore has a value that far exceeds the ability of human beings to calculate; and (3) human 37

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 life cannot be wrongfully destroyed without incurring the wrath of a holy God, who views the destruction of His image as an affront to Himself. Section 36.06 recognizes that this is true of unborn human life no less than it is of all other human life that even before birth, all human beings bear the image of God, and their lives cannot be destroyed without effacing his glory. II. Effect of Constitutional Policy Having discussed the meaning of the phrase "sanctity of unborn life," I will briefly explore the legal effect of its inclusion in the Alabama Constitution as a statement of public policy. Again, I will start with the text. Section 36.06 provides, in relevant part: "(a) This state acknowledges, declares, and affirms that it is the public policy of this state to recognize and support the sanctity of unborn life and the rights of unborn children, including the right to life. "(b) This state further acknowledges, declares, and affirms that it is the public policy of this state to ensure the protection of the rights of the unborn child in all manners and measures lawful and appropriate." In 2018, the term "public policy" was a legal term that meant: "The collective rules, principles, or approaches to problems that affect the commonwealth or (esp.) promote the general good; specif., principles and 38

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 standards regarded by the legislature or by the courts as being of fundamental concern to the state and the whole society." Black's Law Dictionary 1426 (10th ed. 2014); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 73 (Thomson/West 2012) (noting that ordinary legal meaning governs instead of common meaning when the law is the subject). Notice that the dictionary does not just say that "public policy" is something like "whatever is in the best interests of Alabama," which really is for the Legislature and not this Court to decide. Instead, it refers to the collective rules, principles, or approaches to problems or principles and standards. Because this term refers to fixed standards and not subjective opinions of whatever serves the public good, this Court can look to this § 36.06 in appropriate cases to aid it in its decisions. When considering a question concerning "public policy," an Alabama judge is supposed to look to "the Constitution, the statutes, or definite principles of customary law which have been recognized and developed by the course of judicial decisions," such as the common law, but not "some considerations of policy which might properly have weight with the Legislature if it had occasion to deal with the question." Couch 39

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 v. Hutchison, 2 Ala. App. 444, 447, 57 So. 75, 76 (1911). Thus, Alabama precedents confirm that the Judiciary can look to the Constitution, statutes, and principles of customary law to determine what the public policy of this state is. It must not, however, usurp the role of the Legislature by attempting to guess what policy decision the Legislature might have made if it had considered other factors. That decision must be left for the Legislature itself. Now that we know what "public policy" means, we must consider what effect it has on statutory interpretation. In one of its oldest decisions considering that question, this Court held: "It is not denied that where public policy or substantial justice obviously requires it, Courts should strongly incline to such liberal construction of the statute as will effect the object." Jones v. Watkins, 1 Stew. 81, 85 (Ala. 1827). However, in more modern times, this Court has repeatedly emphasized adherence to the plain language of the statute, and I agree with this approach. See generally Jay Mitchell, Textualism in Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1100-10 (2023). Consequently, I believe that, ordinarily, this Court may consider public policy in statutory interpretation only if (1) there is substantial doubt about the meaning of the statute and (2) the precepts 40

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 of public policy and jurisprudence to which we look are settled. Ex parte Z.W.E., 335 So. 3d 650, 660 (Ala. 2021) (Parker, C.J., concurring in the result) (citing Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 644 So. 2d 1258, 1260-62 (Ala. 1994); Allgood v. State, 20 Ala. App. 665, 667, 104 So. 847, 848 (1925); 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 472 (2009); 73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 91 (2012)). Thus, I agree with the main opinion that, if the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, § 6-5-391, Ala. Code 1975, were ambiguous, then the Sanctity of Unborn Life Amendment would resolve the matter in favor of the plaintiffs. But a special problem arises when the People of Alabama enshrine a specific statement of public policy in their Constitution. Instead of gleaning bits and pieces of the state's public policy from the Constitution, statutes, common law, and precedents, the People of Alabama explicitly told the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judiciary what they are supposed to do. Ordinarily, we resort to public-policy considerations in statutory interpretation as a last resort, so that the Judiciary does not usurp the role of the Legislature. But in this case, the People explicitly told all three branches of government what they ought to do. See The Federalist No. 78, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) 41

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 (noting that "the power of the people is superior to both" the judicial and legislative powers). Consequently, as Alexander Hamilton wrote in The Federalist No. 78, "where the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people declared in the constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter, rather than the former." Id. Thus, as a constitutional statement of public policy, § 36.06 circumscribes the Legislature's discretion to determine public policy with regard to unborn life. Accordingly, any legislative (or executive) act that contravenes the sanctity of unborn life is potentially subject to a constitutional challenge under the Alabama Constitution. Putting this all together, § 36.06 does much more than simply declare a moral value that the People of Alabama like. Instead, this constitutional provision tilts the scales of the law in favor of protecting unborn life. Although § 36.06 may not resolve every case involving unborn life, if reasonable minds could differ on whether a common-law rule, a statute, or even a constitutional provision protects life, § 36.06 instructs the Alabama government to construe the law in favor of protecting the unborn. Furthermore, to exclude the unborn from § 36.06's 42

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 protection, the Legislature would have to do so very clearly and for a reason that is consistent with upholding the sanctity of life. Justice Cook argues in his dissent that applying § 36.06 and the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act to frozen embryos will have disastrous consequences for the in vitro fertilization ("IVF") industry in Alabama. Although it is for the Legislature to decide how to address this issue, I note briefly that many other Westernized countries have adopted IVF practices or regulations that allow IVF to continue while drastically reducing the chances of embryos being killed, whether in the creation. process, the implantation process, the freezing process, or by willful killing when they become inconvenient. For decades, IVF has been largely unregulated in the United States, with some commentators even comparing it to the Wild West. See, e.g., Alexander N. Hecht, The Wild Wild West: Inadequate Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technology, 1 Hous. J. Health L. & Pol'y 227, 228 (2001) ("Unfortunately, this industry remains largely unregulated. The near-absence of federal and state law combined with ineffective and unheeded industry guidelines leads to a lawless free-for-all." (footnotes omitted)); see also Myrisha S. Lewis, The American Democratic Deficit in Assisted Reproductive 43

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Technology Innovation, 45 Am. J. L. & Med. 130, 144 & n.77 (2019) (noting that IVF in the United States is still unregulated and that commentators are still comparing it to the Wild West). In Alabama, the only statutes that mention IVF address the issue of determining parentage of children conceived through IVF, but they do not govern the practice of IVF itself. See The Alabama Uniform Parentage Act, § 26-17101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. And the only administrative regulation of IVF in Alabama governs IVF clinics' use of radioactive materials, but not any other IVF practice. Ala. Admin. Code (State Bd. Of Health, Dep't of Pub. Health), r. 420-3-26-.02. If the Legislature agrees that it is time to regulate the IVF industry, then the good news is it need not reinvent the wheel. Other Westernized countries have given Alabama some examples to consider. For instance, in Australia and New Zealand, prevailing ethical standards dictate that physicians usually make only one embryo at a time. ¹6 On the related issue of embryo transfers, which is the process of 16Code of Practice for Assisted Reproductive Technology Units § 3.3, p. 24, Fertility Society of Australia and New Zealand, Reproductive Technology Accreditation Committee (2021) (at the time of this decision, this at: document could be located 44

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 implanting the embryos into the uterus, ¹7 in Australia and New Zealand over 90% of embryo transfers occur only one at a time. 18 Likewise, European Union ("EU") countries set a legal limit on the number of embryos transferred in a single cycle. 19 In EU countries, 58% of embryo https://www.fertility society.com.au/wp-content/uploads/20211124RTAC-ANZ-COP.pdf.). 17 According to the contract that the LePages signed, the number of embryos transferred to the mother could range from 1-5. LePage Contract at 9. It appears that the objective of transferring multiple embryos is to increase the chances of pregnancy. Id. at 8. At least two issues arise from this practice. First, it results in the mother becoming pregnant with multiple babies 30% of the time, which can cause health problems for the mother and babies. See id. at 17. Second, less than half of embryo transfers result in live births, which raises the question whether transferring multiple embryos at once risks the deaths of these little people. See Jennifer Choe & Anthony L. Shanks, In Vitro Fertilization, NIH National Library of Medicine (last updated Sep. 4, 2023), (at the time of this decision, this document could be located at: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK562266. 18See Choe & Shanks, supra, at n.17; Christine Wyns, Number of Frozen Treatment Cycles Continues to Rise Throughout the World, European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (June 30, 2021) (at the time of this decision, this document could be located at: https://www.focusonreproduction.eu/article/ESHRE-News-ESHRE-2021 -freeze-all) (reporting that "Australia/New Zealand leads the way" in the "number of single embryo transfers" in "more than 90% of cycles"). 19Regulation and Legislation in Assisted Reproduction, European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (Jan. 2017) (at the time of this decision, this document could be located at: https://tinyurl.com/299cvcbf). Specifically, Austria, Belgium, and Malta 45

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 transfers involve just one embryo, and 38% involve two; thus, 96% of embryo transfers in EU countries involve two or fewer transfers at one time.20 Such limitations on embryo creation and transfer necessarily reduce or eliminate the need for storing embryos for extended lengths of time. Italy went one step further, banning cryopreservation of embryos except when a bona fide health risk or force majeure prevented the embryos from being transferred immediately after their creation.²¹ All of these measures protect the lives of the unborn and still allow couples to become parents. Therefore, although certain changes to the IVF industry's current creation and handling of embryos in Alabama will have allowed only one transfer at a time; the United Kingdom, France, and Sweden have allowed no more than two; and Germany has allowed only three, although a maximum of two is recommended. Id.; Embryo Protection Act, Chapter 524, § 6, of the Laws of Malta; Susan Mayor, UK Authority Sets Limits on Number of Embryos Transferred, 328 BMJ 65, 65 (2004). Some of these laws may have changed over time, but they illustrate that other Westernized countries have, at some point, adopted these positions. 20More Women Are Using Single Embryos During Fertility Treatment, European Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology (June 27, 2023) (at the time of this decision, this document could be located https://www.eshre.eu/ESHRE2023/Media/2023-Pressreleases/EIM). at: 2¹See Legge 19 Feb. 2004, no. 40 (art. 14, para. 3), in G.U. Feb. 24, 2004, no. 45 (It.). 46

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 result from this decision, to the extent that Justice Cook is predicting that IVF will now end in Alabama, that prediction does not seem to be well-founded. These regulations adopted by other countries seem much more likely to comport with upholding the sanctity of life than the prevailing practice of creating and transferring at once many embryos that have little chance of survival and then throwing embryos away after a while. The American states, unfortunately, have not followed the example of other Westernized countries that have regulations that achieve both the protection of life and the promotion of parenthood. Ultimately, however, it is for the Legislature to decide how the IVF industry can help parents have children. The Legislature is free to do so in any way it decides, provided that it comports with the Alabama Constitution, including the Sanctity of Unborn Life Amendment. 22 III. Conclusion In application to these cases, the contentions of the defendants and their amicus are not sustainable in light of the Sanctity of Unborn Life 22The Legislature should also take note of § 36.06 if it considers other ethical issues related to reproduction if they arise. 47

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Amendment. The People of Alabama have declared the public policy of this State to be that unborn human life is sacred. We believe that each human being, from the moment of conception, is made in the image of God, created by Him to reflect His likeness. It is as if the People of Alabama took what was spoken of the prophet Jeremiah and applied it to every unborn person in this state: "Before I formed you in the womb I knew you, Before you were born I sanctified you." Jeremiah 1:5 (NKJV 1982). All three branches of government are subject to a constitutional mandate to treat each unborn human life with reverence. Carving out an exception for the people in this case, small as they were, would be unacceptable to the People of this State, who have required us to treat every human being in accordance with the fear of a holy God who made them in His image. For these reasons, and for the reasons stated in the main opinion, I concur. 48

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 SHAW, Justice (concurring specially). I concur fully in the main opinion. I write specially to note the following. I agree with the main opinion that the meaning of the word "child" for purposes of Alabama law is well settled and includes an unborn child. Thus, for purposes of the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, § 6-5-391, Ala. Code 1975 ("the Wrongful Death Act"), the term "minor child" includes an unborn child with no distinction between in vitro or in utero. In prior cases determining whether an unborn child is a "minor child" for purposes of the Wrongful Death Act, this Court has referenced the definition of a "person" found in § 13A-6-1(3), Ala. Code 1975, which in turn applies to certain portions of the criminal code. The main opinion thoroughly explains why this criminal-law definition does not limit the determination whether an in vitro embryo is a "minor child" for purposes of a civil-law action under the Wrongful Death Act. I do not believe that any purported prior common-law rule requires a different result. "The common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such institutions and laws, be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force, except as 49

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 from time to time it may be altered or repealed by the Legislature." § 1-3-1, Ala. Code 1975 (emphasis added). The language of this Code section is plain: the common law does not apply when it is inconsistent with the Constitution, laws, and institutions of this state. The legislature may always alter the common law, but this Code section does not provide that the common law, if inconsistent with the above, remains in place unless altered by the legislature. As one Justice has explained: "This statute does not provide that 'the common law of England shall be the rule of decisions in Alabama unless changed by the legislature.' On the contrary, it provides that the common law of England shall be the rule of decisions in this State, so far as the common law is not inconsistent with the constitution, the laws, and the institutions of Alabama." Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 446-47, 304 So. 2d 881, 887 (1974) (Faulkner, J., concurring specially). In the context of civil law, the legislature, the constitution, and this Court's decisions have collectively repealed the common law's prohibition on wrongful-death actions, § 6-5-391; protected the rights of the unborn, Ala. Const. 2022, Art. I, § 36.06(b) ("[I]t is the public policy of this state to ensure the protection of the rights of the unborn child .."); and eliminated the common law's prohibition on seeking a civil remedy for 50 ....

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 injuries done to the unborn, Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972), and Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728 (Ala. 2012). If, after this, the common law does not allow wrongful-death actions for some unborn children when they are injured -- here, based on their physical location -- that rule must be consistent with the Constitution, laws, and institutions of this state. Whether such rule is in fact consistent, we can respectfully disagree. But if it is inconsistent, then it need not be first altered or repealed by the legislature. It can scarcely be argued that science is not outdistancing the law in various areas, especially in the context of human reproduction. Creating and sustaining life outside a woman's womb is nothing less than the stuff of miracles. The overriding public policy of this state recognizes and supports the sanctity of unborn life and the rights of unborn children, including the right to life, and requires the protection of the rights of the unborn child "in all manners and measures lawful and appropriate." § 36.06(b). The people of Alabama, apparently recognizing that advancements in reproductive science necessarily come with concomitant responsibilities, have bound all three branches of our state government 51

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 to this policy, and, in my view, the enactments of the Alabama Legislature are consistent with it. Stewart, J., concurs. 52

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 MENDHEIM, Justice (concurring in the result). Over the course of time, previous cases from this Court have applied the protection afforded to a "minor child" in subsection (a) of § 6-5-391, Ala. Code 1975, the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, to human lives at earlier and earlier stages of development. In Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926), this Court, construing a predecessor to § 6-5-391(a),23 held that a "parental injury before the birth is no basis for action in damages by the child or its personal representative." Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 467, 118 So. 741, 743 (1928) (citing Stanford). However, in Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972), "[t]he Court concluded that the term 'minor child' in the predecessor to § 6-5-391(a) [Title 7, § 119, Ala. Code 1940 (Recomp. 1958),] included an unborn child who was viable at the time of a prenatal injury, who thereafter was born alive, but who later died. 289 Ala. at 55, 265 So. 2d at 596." Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597, 601 (Ala. 2011). The Court pushed the boundary back again in Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 280 So. 2d 758 (1973), in which the Court "concluded that [a] father could maintain an action for the 2"Section 5695, Ala. Code 1923. 53

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 wrongful death of his unborn child even though the injuries that allegedly caused the death occurred before the fetus became viable." Mack, 79 So. 3d at 604. A year later, in Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 100, 300 So. 2d 354, 358 (1974), the Court held that "the parents of an eight and one-half month old stillborn fetus [were] entitled to maintain an action for the wrongful death of the child." The Court stepped back from those broader applications of protection in Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241 (Ala. 1993), and Lollar v. Tankersley, 613 So. 2d 1249 (Ala. 1993), concluding that "the Wrongful Death [of a Minor] Act did not permit recovery for the death of a fetus that occurs before the fetus attains viability." Mack, 79 So. 3d at 606. But, several years later in Mack, the Court returned to its understanding of the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act espoused in Wolfe, holding that "the Wrongful Death [of a Minor] Act permits an action for the death of a previable fetus." Mack, 79 So. 3d at 611. In Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728, 735 (Ala. 2012), the Court reaffirmed its conclusion from Mack, stating that "Alabama's wrongfuldeath statute allows an action to be brought for the wrongful death of any unborn child, even when the child dies before reaching viability." 54

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 The foregoing history of previous decisions concerning the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, and the fact that the pertinent language in the Act has not been amended since its enactment in 1872, shows that this Court, rather than the Legislature, has taken the lead in shaping when the protection afforded by the Act may be invoked. See Eich, 293 Ala. at 100, 300 So. 2d at 358 (describing that decision as one in which the Court was "again extending out judicial prerogative as was done in Huskey and Wolfe ."). Because of that, and because the terms "child" and "minor child" in § 6-5-391(a) are not further defined in the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, I agree with the main opinion that the Act can be construed to include frozen embryos produced through in vitro fertilization ("IVF"). For those reasons, I concur in the result reached today that reverses the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' wrongful-death claims. However, I have misgivings about the reasoning and some of the comments contained in the main opinion. The main opinion begins its analysis by observing that "[t]he parties to these cases have raised many difficult questions," but it insists throughout that applying the protection of § 6-5-391(a) to frozen embryos is not one of those difficulties because "existing black-letter law" dictates our answer to the central question. _ 55

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 So. 3d at. Indeed, the main opinion states that the text of § 6-5-391(a) is "clear" and that there is no ambiguity as to whether its protection applies to frozen embryos. So. 3d at "Too often, a court's conclusion that statutory language is 'plain' is a substitute for careful analysis. At best, such unexplained conclusions are based on a judge's gestalt sense of the best meaning of the words in question. At worst, the bare insistence that statutory language is 'plain' is cover (perhaps subconscious) for judicial policymaking." Carranza v. United States, 267 P.3d 912, 916 (Utah 2011) (opinion of Lee, J., joined by one other Justice). In my judgment, the main opinion's view that the legal conclusion is "clear" and "black-letter law" is problematic because when the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act was first enacted in 1872, and for 100 years thereafter, IVF was not even a scientific possibility. Likewise, although it may be true that "the phrase 'minor child'... in everyday parlance" has long included an "unborn child," the main opinion fails to acknowledge that, at the time the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act was 56

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 enacted and long thereafter the term "unborn child" was only -- understood to refer to a child within its mother's womb.24 So. 3d at The main opinion's contention that "[t]he central question presented in these consolidated appeals ... is whether the [Wrongful Death of a Minor] Act contains an unwritten exception to th[e] rule" that the Act "allows parents of a deceased child to recover punitive damages for their child's death" is similarly simplistic. So. 3d at defendants have never argued for an "exception" to the Wrongful Death The 24See, e.g., Wolfe, 291 Ala. at 331, 280 So. 2d at 761 (observing that "the fetus or embryo is not a part of the mother, but rather has a separate existence within the body of the mother" (emphasis added)); Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 8, 23 So. 671, 674 (1898) ("'When a child, having been born alive, afterwards died by reason of any potion or bruises it received in the womb, it seems always to have been the better opinion that it was murder in such as administered or gave them.'" (quoting 3 Russell on Crimes 6 (6th ed.))). Cf. Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 416 (Ala. 2013) (observing, in the course of construing the term "child" in the chemicalendangerment statute, that "[c]learly, for an unborn child, the mother's womb is an essential part of its physical circumstances"). Indeed, even with regard to IVF, a mother's womb is obviously an indispensable part of pregnancy. See Maher v. Vaughn, Silverberg & Assocs., LLP, 95 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1002 n.1 (W.D. Tex. 2015) (describing IVF as "a multi-step medical procedure," and listing the final steps of that process to be "the grown embryos are transferred into the patient's uterus" and then "the patient takes supplemental hormones for the ensuing nine to eleven days, and if an embryo implants in the lining of the patient's uterus and grows, a pregnancy can result"). 57

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 of a Minor Act. The main opinion reaches that conclusion by implication -- simply assuming that the term "minor child" includes frozen embryos -- a wholesale adoption of the plaintiffs' argument. See Appellants' brief in appeal no. SC-2022-0515, p. 19 (contending that the "[d]efendants' arguments ... create an exception to existing Alabama law so that not all embryonic lives are treated equally under the law"). The main opinion then goes on in Part A.2. of its analysis to provide reasons why this Court's many pronouncements about "congruence" between Alabama's wrongful-death statutes and its criminal-homicide statutes 25 do not dictate importing the definition of the term "person" in § 13A-6-1(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975, into § 6-5-391(a). The reasoning in that portion of the main opinion also strikes me as strained given the history behind our wrongful-death statutes. As this Court has observed numerous times, there was no right of action for wrongful death at common law. See, e.g., Ex parte Bio-Med. Applications of Alabama, Inc., 216 So. 3d 420, 422 (Ala. 2016) ("'"A wrongful death action is purely statutory; no such action existed at 25See, e.g., Mack, 79 So. 3d at 611 (observing that "this Court repeatedly has emphasized the need for congruence between the criminal law and our civil wrongful-death statutes"). 58

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 common law."'" (quoting Ex parte Hubbard Props., Inc., 205 So. 3d 1211, 1213 (Ala. 2016), quoting in turn Waters v. Hipp, 600 So. 2d 981, 982 (Ala. 1992))); Giles v. Parker, 230 Ala. 119, 121, 159 So. 826, 827 (1935) ("There is no civil liability, under the common law, as interpreted in this jurisdiction, against one who wrongfully or negligently causes the death of a human being; and hence no right of action exists under the common law therefor. The right of action is purely statutory."); Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 611-12, 55 So. 104, 104 (1911) ("It has been decided and many times reaffirmed by this court that actions under [the wrongfuldeath statutes] are purely statutory. There was no such action or right of action at common law."). This was also true for the wrongful death of a minor child. See White v. Ward, 157 Ala. 345, 349, 47 So. 166, 167 (1908) ("There was no right of action at the common law for the death of the child. ... The right to recover damages for its death is therefore purely statutory."). The reasons for the common-law prohibition appear to have been based on two legal concepts. "The effect to be given the death of a person connected with a tort rests almost entirely upon statutory foundations. The common-law limitations that eventually led to legislative reform were twofold. First was the rule that personal tort 59

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 actions die with the person of either the plaintiff or the defendant. This limitation is expressed by the maxim, actio personalis moritur cum persona, which has roots deep in the early history of English law. The second limitation was that the death of a human being was not regarded as giving rise to any cause of action at common law on behalf of a living person who was injured by reason of the death. This latter is of more recent origin as a distinct proposition, although it doubtless rests in part on the same considerations that underlie the other and older maxim of actio personalis moritur cum persona." Wex S. Malone, The Genesis of Wrongful Death, 17 Stan. L. Rev. 1043, 1044 (1965) (footnotes omitted). 26 Our wrongful-death statutes sought to remedy that erroneous legal thinking. See, e.g., Suell v. Derricott, 161 Ala. 259, 262, 49 So. 895, 897 (1909) ("Statutes like ours were clearly intended to correct what was deemed a defect of the common law, that the right of action based on a tort or injury to the person died with the person."); King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505, 509 (1886) ("The purpose of this, and like legislation, was clearly to correct a defect of the common law, by 26See also Malone, 17 Stan. L. Rev. at 1055 (explaining that "[t]he probable origin of the rule denying a cause of action for wrongful death was the doctrine, since discarded, that when a cause of action disclosed the commission of a felony the civil action was merged into the criminal wrong"). Restatement (Second) of Torts § 925, cmt. a. (Am. Law Inst. 1979), also provides a nice summary of the genesis of wrongful-death statutes. 60

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 a rule of which it was well settled, that a right of action based on a tort or injury to the person, died with the person injured. Under the maxim, 'Actio personalis moritur cum persona,' the personal representative of a deceased person could maintain no action for loss or damage resulting from his death."). The close connection between Alabama's wrongful-death statutes and its criminal-homicide statutes was reflected in the first wrongfuldeath statute, Act No. 62, Ala. Acts 1871-72, p. 83, which was titled "AN ACT To prevent homicides," and their shared purpose has been repeatedly noted in our cases. See, e.g., Stinnett v. Kennedy, 232 So. 3d 202, 215 (Ala. 2016) (noting "the shared purpose of the Wrongful Death Act and the Homicide Act to prevent homicide"); Ex parte Bio-Med. Applications, 216 So. 3d at 424 ("[The wrongful-death] statute authorizes suit to be brought by the personal representative for a definite legislative purpose -- to prevent homicide."" (quoting Hatas v. Partin, 278 Ala. 65, 68, 175 So. 2d 759, 761 (1965))); Eich, 293 Ala. at 100, 300 So. 2d at 358 ("[T]he pervading public purpose of our wrongful death statute .... is to prevent homicide through punishment of the culpable party and the determination of damages by reference to the quality of the tortious act. 61

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 ..."); Huskey, 289 Ala. at 55, 265 So. 2d at 597 ("One of the purposes of our wrongful death statute is to prevent homicides.") Thus, it seems logical to me for there to be a correlation between the persons protected under Alabama's wrongful-death statutes and the persons protected under Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes. The main opinion is correct that the protection afforded in a civil law certainly can be broader than its corollary in criminal law, but nothing requires the civil law to be read more broadly, particularly given the absence of legislative action on this subject.27 27The main opinion asserts that Art. I, § 36.06(b) of the Alabama Constitution of 2022, in stating that "it is the public policy of this state to ensure the protection of the rights of the unborn child in all manners and measures lawful and appropriate," "operates in this context as a constitutionally imposed canon of construction, directing courts to construe ambiguous statutes in a way that 'protect[s] ... the rights of the unborn child' equally with the rights of born children, whenever such a construction is 'lawful and appropriate."" So. 3d at The main opinion offers no authority for taking § 36.06 as a canon of legal construction, and I am not sure what an "appropriate" construction of the law means. More generally, it is unclear to me why a constitutional amendment that was adopted in 2018 is somehow so central to deciding the specific meaning of a statute that has substantively remained unchanged since 1872. In any event, "[t]o declare what the law is, or has been, is a judicial power; to declare what the law shall be, is legislative."" Lindsay v. United States Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 120 Ala. 156, 168, 24 So. 171, 174 (1898) (quoting Thomas Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 114). 62

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Moreover, I find it interesting that the Human Life Protection Act, § 26-23H-1 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, which was enacted in 2019 -- well after the Brody Act, which amended § 13A-6-1 of our criminal-homicide statutes, (and also after the Sanctity of Unborn Life Amendment, i.e., Art. I, § 36.06, Ala. Const. 2022) -- defines an "unborn child" exactly the same way the Brody Act defines a "person": "A human being, specifically including an unborn child in utero at any stage of development, regardless of viability." § 26-23H-3(7), Ala. Code 1975. In its amicus curiae brief, the Alabama Medical Association states: "[D]uring the debate on the Alabama Senate floor regarding the Human Life Protection Act, Senator Clyde Chambliss, the Bill's sponsor in the Alabama Senate, confirmed that the 'in utero' language in the Act was intentional, since it was not the intent of the Legislature through this Act to impact or prevent the destruction of fertilized in vitro eggs because in those circumstances, the woman is not pregnant. Likewise, Eric Johnston, president of the Alabama Pro-Life Coalition and one of the individuals who helped draft the Human Life Protection bill, stated in an interview with the Washington Post that the Bill would 'absolutely not' impact in vitro fertilization. Mr. Johnston gave this statement in response to the ACLU's misguided suggestion that the Act might affect in vitro fertilization." Alabama Medical Association's brief, pp. 30-31 (footnotes omitted). I fully realize that such legislative history is not persuasive for purposes of 63

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 statutory interpretation, but that history should give us pause regarding any kind of expansive interpretation of the Brody Act. I also take issue with a hypothetical employed by the main opinion to support the decision. Despite asserting at the outset of its analysis that "the Court today need not address" questions such as "the application of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution to [IVF] children," So. 3d at, the main opinion nonetheless proceeds to share -- and implicitly agree with -- a hypothetical posited by the plaintiffs that purports to implicate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 28 The main opinion asserts that "one latent implication" of the defendants' interpretation of § 6-5-391(a) is that "even a full-term infant or toddler conceived through IVF and gestated to term in an in vitro environment would not qualify as a 'child' or 'person,' because such a child would both be (1) 'unborn' (having never been delivered from a biological womb) and (2) not 'in utero.' And if such children were not legal 28It is, perhaps, telling that the plaintiffs and the main opinion chose to insert a hypothetical federal equal-protection issue given that there is no express equal-protection clause in the Alabama Constitution, a fact this Court has noted on several occasions. See, e.g., Mobile Infirmary Ass'n v. Tyler, 981 So. 2d 1077, 1104 (Ala. 2007) (observing that "this Court has acknowledged that the Alabama Constitution contains no equal-protection clause ....'" (quoting Mobile Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Hodgen, 884 So. 2d 801, 813 (Ala. 2003), and citing Ex parte Melof, 735 So. 2d 1172 (Ala. 1999))). 64

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 'children' or 'persons,' then their lives would be unprotected by Alabama law." So. 3d at (footnote omitted). First, in mentioning the foregoing hypothetical, the main opinion ignores the fact that it is not now or for the foreseeable future scientifically possible to develop a child in an artificial womb so that such a scenario could somehow unfold. 29 Second, the main opinion's choice to 29Perhaps in anticipation of that objection, the main opinion inserts a footnote that selectively quotes from a couple of journal articles to make it seem as if the time when artificial wombs for the earliest stages of human life are a reality is just around the corner. See So. 3d at n.2. That is simply untrue. See, e.g., Jen Christensen, FDA Advisers Discuss Future of 'Artificial Womb' for Human Infants, CNN, Sept. 19, 2023 (at the time of this decision, this article could be located at: https://www.cnn.com/2023/09/19/health/artificial-womb-human-trialfda/index.html) (reporting that "[a] handful of scientists have been experimenting with animals and artificial wombs," but that "no such device has been tested in humans," and that, in any event, "[a]n artificial womb is not designed to replace a pregnant person; it could not be used from conception until birth. Rather, it could be used to help a small number of infants born before 28 weeks of pregnancy, which is considered extreme prematurity."); Stephen Wilkinson et al., Artificial Wombs Could Someday be a Reality, The Conversation, Dec. 1, 2023 (at the time of this decision, this article could be located at: https://theconversation.com/artificial-wombs-could-someday-be-areality-heres-how-they-may-change-our-notions-of-parenthood-217490) (observing that even an artificial womb for premature babies "may be many decades away" but that "artificial womb technologies could eventually lead to 'full ectogenesis' -- growing a foetus from conception to 'birth' wholly outside the human body" (emphasis added)). 65

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 include that emotionally charged hypothetical undermines its earlier observation that "[a]ll parties to these cases, like all members of this Court, agree that an unborn child is a genetically unique human being whose life began at fertilization and ends at death."30 So. 3d at . No '--. 30I note that although I certainly agree with the above-quoted statement from the main opinion, even that observation is not as simple as it appears because of the terms involved. "Notwithstanding various legislative pronouncements, from a medical and scientific perspective, fertilization is currently considered to be a chaotic and multi-step process, whereas 'conception' has variously been described as the time frame between fertilization and implantation in a woman's uterus, or the process of implantation. Precisely how long an in vitro growing cell mass is considered an embryo versus a preembryo, or whether the latter term is a legitimate distinction has long been the subject of debate among scientists as well as legal and ethical scholars." Susan L. Crockin & Gary A. Debele, Ethical Issues in Assisted Reproduction: A Primer for Family Law Attorneys, 27 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 289, 299 (2015). See also McQueen v. Gadberry, 507 S.W.3d 127, 134 n.4 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (observing that "'"Pre-embryo" is a medically accurate term for a zygote or fertilized egg that has not been implanted in a uterus. It refers to the approximately 14-day period of development from fertilization to the time when the embryo implants in the uterine wall and the "primitive streak," the precursor to the nervous system, appears. An embryo proper develops only after implantation. The term "frozen embryos" is a term of art denoting cryogenically preserved pre-embryos."" (quoting Elizabeth A. Trainor, Annotation, Right of Husband, Wife, or Other Party to Custody of Frozen 66

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 one not Mobile Infirmary Association, the Center for Reproductive - Medicine, the amicus Alabama Medical Association, my dissenting colleagues, or anyone who disagrees with today's Court's decision - is suggesting that such a child, if he or she could be produced, should not be protected by Alabama law. Ultimately, as I stated at the outset, we must be guided by the language provided in the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act and the manner in which our cases have interpreted it. Under those guideposts, today's result is correct. However, the decision undoubtedly will come as a shock in some quarters of the State. I urge the Legislature to provide more leadership in this area of the law given the numerous policy issues and serious ethical concerns at stake,31 and the fact that there is little -- Embryo, Pre-embryo, or Pre-zygote in Event of Divorce, Death, or Other Circumstances, 87 A.L.R. 5th 253, 260 (2001))). 31See, e.g., Yehezkel Margalit, From (Moral) Status (of the Frozen Embryo) to (Relational) Contract and Back Again to (Relational Moral) Status, 20 Ind. Health L. Rev. 257, 257 (2023) ("The existing hundreds of thousands of unused frozen embryos, coupled with the skyrocketing rate of divorce, raise numerous moral, legal, social, and religious dilemmas. Among the most daunting problems are the moral and legal status of the frozen embryo; what should its fate be in the event of conflicts between the progenitors?; and whether contractual regulation of frozen embryos is valid and enforceable."); Caroline A. Harman, Defining the Third Way -- the Special-Respect Legal Status of Frozen Embryos, 26 Geo. Mason L. 67

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Rev. 515, 516 (2018) (observing that, "[u]nfortunately, American courts have not kept pace with the advancements happening in the field of ART [assisted reproductive technology]" and that, "[m]ost often, frozen embryo cases come to the courts during divorce suits between progenitors. Due to the personal nature of ART, however, progenitors are less likely to seek legal recourse when frozen embryos are negligently destroyed and the harm caused by the clinic is shielded from the public eye. While suits regarding negligent destruction of frozen embryos and suits when progenitors stop paying storage fees are less common, they are not without their legal and societal implications. When couples do turn to the judicial system, the courts are often ill-equipped to answer such legal questions in a manner that also considers the unique nature of ART and the accompanying emotions of the progenitors." (footnotes omitted)); Shirley Darby Howell, The Frozen Embryo: Scholarly Theories, Case Law, and Proposed State Regulation, 14 DePaul J. Health Care L. 407, 407 (2013) (explaining that "[u]sing IVF to assist individuals and couples having trouble procreating would be seemingly positive, but the procedure has resulted in serious unintended consequences that continue to trouble theologians, physicians, and the courts. The ongoing legal debate focuses on two principal questions: (1) whether a frozen embryo should be regarded as a person, property, or something else and, (2) how to best resolve disputes between gamete donors concerning disposition of surplus frozen embryos."); Maggie Davis, Indefinite Freeze?: The Obligations A Cryopreservation Bank Has to Abandoned Frozen Embryos in the Wake of the Maryland Stem Cell Research Act of 2006, 15 J. Health Care L. & Pol'y 379, 396-97 (2012) (asserting that "[c]ryopreservation is a scarce good, and is incredibly costly. For instance, one California cryopreservation bank charged clients $375 a year, prepaid, to store embryos. After many years, this can become incredibly burdensome on the progenitors. When the fees become too burdensome, there is a higher chance for couples to stop paying their fees, and eventually fall out of contact with the clinic. As embryos are abandoned, and storage fees are not paid, cryopreservation banks will likely need to raise the costs of the fees to other customers in order to compensate." (footnotes omitted)); Beth E. Roxland & Arthur Caplan, Should Unclaimed Frozen Embryos Be Considered Abandoned Property and Donated to Stem Cell Research?, 21 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 108, 109 (2015) 68

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 regulation of the entire IVF industry. 32 Ultimately, it is the Legislature that possesses the constitutional authority and responsibility to be the final arbiter concerning whether a frozen embryo is protected by the laws of this State. Without such guidance, I fear that there could be unfortunate consequences stemming from today's decision that no one intends. ("'As science races ahead, it leaves in its trail mind-numbing ethical and legal questions.'" (quoting Kass v. Kass, 91 N.Y. 2d 554, 562, 696 N.E.2d 174, 178, 673 N.Y.S. 2d 350, 354 (1998) (citing John A. Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and The New Reproductive Technologies (1994))). 32See, e.g., Valerie A. Mock, Getting the Cold Shoulder: Determining the Legal Status of Abandoned IVF Embryos and the Subsequent Unfair Obligations of IVF Clinics in North Carolina, 52 Wake Forest L. Rev. 241, 257 (2017) (observing that "IVF centers are largely a self-regulated industry, meaning that for better or for worse, they receive little governmental oversight. There are no federal regulations for the disposition of abandoned embryos, and very few states have addressed it legislatively." (footnotes omitted)); Roxland & Caplan, 21 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. at 115 (noting that "[n]o federal statutory law or regulation generally governs the classification of frozen embryos. In fact, only three states have enacted legislation concerning the disposition of frozen embryos more generally: Louisiana, Florida, and New Hampshire." (footnotes omitted)). 69

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 SELLERS, Justice (concurring in the result in part and dissenting in part). These cases are not about when life begins, nuances of statutory construction, or the definition of "minor child" or "person." And, contrary to the main opinion, there is no black-letter law in Alabama, or any other state, to help us.33 Regrettably, these cases use the specter of destroying human life to craft a narrative involving the protection of unborn children to cynically inflame worries about the sanctity of life under Alabama law. In reality, these cases concern nothing more than an attempt to design a method of obtaining punitive damages under Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, § 6-5-391, Ala. Code 1975, by concluding that frozen embryos, negligently destroyed, are entitled to the same protections as a fetus inside a mother's womb. Parsing the Brody Act, Act No. 2006-419, Ala. Acts 2006, codified as § 13A-6-1, Ala. Code 1975 (which is a part of Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes), and employing any sequence of linguistic gymnastics, cannot yield the conclusion that embryos developed through in vitro fertilization were intended by the legislature to be included in the definition of "person," see § 13A-633Otherwise, the duration of oral argument would not have approached two hours. 70

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 1(a)(3), much less the definition of "minor child," see § 6-5-391(a). It is clear from the four corners of the Brody Act that the legislative intent was to protect unborn life, regardless of viability, from violence perpetrated against the mother. Previously, to impose criminal sanctions. for the murder of an unborn child was impossible. See Act No. 77-607, § 2001(2), Ala. Acts 1977 (amended in 2006 by the Brody Act) (" 'Person,' when referring to the victim of a criminal homicide, means a human being who had been born and was alive at the time of the homicidal act." (emphasis added)). The Brody Act eliminated not only this born-alive requirement but also any viability threshold to create the bright-line rule that, if a woman is pregnant, an embryo in utero receives all the protections that a viable life would be afforded under the laws of Alabama. See § 13A-6-1(a)(3). Thus, and in light of Justice Houston's special writings in Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241, 1245 (Ala. 1993) (Houston, J., concurring in the result), and Lollar v. Tankersley, 613 So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Ala. 1993) (Houston, J., concurring in the result), which "emphasized the need for congruence between the criminal law and our civil wrongful-death statutes," Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597, 611 (Ala. 71

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 2011), this Court held "that the Wrongful Death [of a Minor] Act permits an action for the death of a previable fetus." Id. But interpreting the Brody Act as we are asked to do here is a judgment call. In short, we must determine whether to constrain ourselves to the clear intent of the Act or whether to inform our interpretation using extraneous means to reach a result clearly contrary to anything the Act ever intended. The majority's conclusion that an action may be maintained under the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act for the negligent destruction of an in vitro embryo -- an atextual conclusion purportedly reached by utilizing the Brody Act's definition of "person" to inform the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act's definition of "minor child" -- is clearly contrary to the intent of the legislature. To equate an embryo stored in a specialized freezer with a fetus inside of a mother is engaging in an exercise of result-oriented, intellectual sophistry, which I am unwilling to entertain. Furthermore, I am puzzled by the majority and concurring opinions' references to Article I, § 36.06, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022. We have repeatedly stated that "[a] court has a duty to avoid constitutional questions unless essential to the proper disposition of the case."" Lowe v. 72

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Fulford, 442 So. 2d 29, 33 (Ala. 1983) (quoting trial court's order citing other cases). The majority believes the word "child" is unambiguous, yet it opines in dicta, without any citation to authority, that if the word "child" were ambiguous, § 36.06 acts "as a constitutionally imposed canon of construction, directing courts to construe ambiguous statutes in a way that 'protect[s] ... the rights of the unborn child' equally with the rights of born children." So. 3d at. Respectfully, § 36.06 neither operates in such a fashion nor commands this Court to override legislative acts it believes "contraven[e] the sanctity of unborn life." So. 3d at (Parker, C.J., concurring specially). Section 36.06 states, in relevant part, "that it is the public policy of this state to ensure the protection of the rights of the unborn child in all manners and measures lawful and appropriate." § 36.06(b). Because all policy determinations are vested in our legislature, this includes those determinations regarding the sanctity of unborn life. Therefore, § 36.06 merely reaffirms that "the judicial branch may not exercise the legislative or executive power." Art. III, § 42(c), Ala. Const. 2022. Accordingly, this Court has no authority to determine whether legislation concerning or relating to unborn life defies § 36.06; 73

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 that authority lies only with the People of this State, acting through their elected representatives. Any public-policy ramifications of any decision in these cases are outside the purview of this Court, and they are more appropriately reserved for the legislature. Should the legislature wish to include in vitro embryos in the definition of "minor child," it may easily do so. Absent any specific legislative directive, however, we should not read more into a legislative act than the legislature did so itself. Thus, as to the majority opinion's conclusion regarding the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act, I respectfully dissent. Insofar as the majority opinion affirms the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims, I concur in the result. I must necessarily disagree with the majority opinion's mootness rationale on account of my dissent as to the majority opinion's analysis and conclusion regarding the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act. 74

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 COOK, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The first question that this Court is being asked to decide in these appeals is whether Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act ("the Wrongful Death Act"), see § 6-5-391, Ala. Code 1975, as passed by our Legislature, provides a civil cause of action for money damages for the loss of frozen embryos. This is a question of the meaning of the words in that Act, as it was originally passed and understood in 1872. My sympathy with the plaintiffs and my deeply held personal views on the sanctity of life cannot change the meaning of words enacted by our elected Legislature in 1872. Even when the facts of a case concern profoundly difficult moral questions, our Court must stay within the bounds of our judicial role. Limiting our role to interpreting the existing words in a statute and letting the Legislature decide changes is one of the basic teachings of the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022). In that case, the United States Supreme Court overruled Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and returned the hotly disputed issue of abortion to the citizens 75

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 in each state, so that their elected representatives could pass laws addressing that issue. In concluding that the authority to regulate abortion "must be returned to the people and their elected representatives," the Supreme Court in Dobbs explained that "respect for a legislature's judgment applies even when the laws at issue concern matters of great social significance and moral substance." 597 U.S. at 292 and 302. The Supreme Court further explained that it "'has neither the authority nor the expertise to adjudicate those disputes'" and that "'courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies."" Id. at 289 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729-30 (1963)). Over the years, our Court has repeatedly said the same thing. Specifically, our Court has made clear that we are "not at liberty to rewrite statutes or to substitute [our] judgment for that of the Legislature." Ex parte Carlton, 867 So. 2d 332, 338 (Ala. 2003). Further, our Court has repeatedly made clear that "public-policy arguments should be directed to the legislature, not to this Court." Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 420 (Ala. 2013) (emphasis added). Statutes Do Not Evolve. The Legislature Amends Them. 76

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 On rare occasions, our Court's decisions have included language that departed from the rule that the Legislature and not this Court -- updates statutes. For example, in Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 99, 300 So. 2d 354, 357 (1974), this Court wrote that "it is often. necessary to breathe life into existing laws less they become stale and shelfworn" "in order that existing law may become useful law to promote the ends of justice." This is both dicta and fundamentally wrong. It is not our role to expand the reach of a statute and "breathe life" into it by updating or amending it. It is also not our role to consider whether a law has become "stale" or "shelfworn."34 This is the same error made by those commentators who advocate for a living constitution and argue that the words in our Constitution should evolve over time.35 -- 34See Craft v. McCoy, 312 So. 3d 32, 37 (Ala. 2020) (recognizing that "*"*"when determining legislative intent from the language used in a statute, a court may explain the language, but it may not detract from or add to the statute"""") (citations omitted)); and Ex parte Coleman, 145 So. 3d 751, 758 (Ala. 2013) (recognizing that " '[t]he judiciary will not add that which the Legislature chose to omit'" (quoting Ex parte Jackson, 614 So. 2d 405, 407 (Ala. 1993))). 35See generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 403-10 (Thomson/West 2012); Joe Carter, Justice Scalia Explains Why the "Living Constitution" is a Threat to America, Action Inst. (May 14, 2018) (at the time of this decision, this 77

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Instead, it is the role of the Legislature to determine whether a law is outdated (for instance, because of new technology) and, thus, requires updating. If our Court does "breathe life" into a law by expanding its reach, we short-circuit the legislative process and violate the Alabama Constitution's separation-of-powers clause. That clause provides that, "[t]o the end that the government of the State of Alabama may be a government of laws and not of individuals, ... the judicial branch may not exercise the legislative or executive power." Ala. Const. 2022, Art. III, § 42(c). Substituting our own meaning "turn[s] this Court into a legislative body, and doing that, of course, would be utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers." DeKalb Cnty. LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So. 2d 270, 276 (Ala. 1998). Separation of powers is part of our Constitution for a reason -- there are real advantages to the Legislature -- and not this Court -- making such decisions. See Jay Mitchell, Textualism in Alabama, 74 Ala. L. Rev. 1089, 1097 (2023) (explaining that "[t]here is a reason that the people elected legislators to formulate public policy, and there is every reason to article could be located at: https://rlo.acton.org/archives/101616-justicescalia-explains-why-the-living-constitution-is-a-threat-to-america.html). 78

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 think they are better at it and better situated to be accountable for their choices than judges are" (emphasis in original)). In fact, the drafters of the Alabama Constitution felt the separation-of-powers principle was so important that they made it an express clause in our Constitution, whereas the drafters of the Constitution of the United States did not.36 The facts of these cases certainly illustrate why the Legislature is best suited to weigh competing interests and write comprehensive legislation, after full input from the public and thorough study. Why I Dissent I dissent because the main opinion violates this fundamental principle that is, that the legislative branch and not the judicial branch updates laws by expanding the meaning of the Wrongful Death Act beyond what it meant in 1872 without an amendment by the Legislature. I also dissent because I believe the main opinion overrules our recent Wrongful Death Act caselaw that requires "congruence" between the definition of "person" in Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes and the -- 36Birmingham-Jefferson Civic Ctr. Auth. v. City of Birmingham, 912 So. 2d 204, 212 (Ala. 2005) (explaining that "[t]he Constitution of Alabama expressly adopts the doctrine of separation of powers that is only implicit in the Constitution of the United States"). 79

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 definition of "minor child" in the Wrongful Death Act. Both the original public meaning and this recent caselaw indicate the same result here -- that the Wrongful Death Act does not address frozen embryos. Moreover, there are other significant reasons to be concerned about the main opinion's holding. No court -- anywhere in the country -- has reached the conclusion the main opinion reaches. And, the main opinion's holding almost certainly ends the creation of frozen embryos through in vitro fertilization ("IVF") in Alabama. The plaintiffs themselves explained in oral argument: "But today we're here advocating on behalf of plaintiffs who are supporters of in vitro fertilization. It worked for them. They have two beautiful children in each family because of in vitro fertilization. The notion that they would do anything to hinder or impair the right or access to IVF therapy is flat wrong. That's not why we're here." Supreme Court of Alabama, Supreme Court O/A Mobile Alabama, YouTube 19:14 (Sep. 21, 2023) (at the time of this decision, this oralargument session could be located at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v =L08KGhNSDME) (emphasis added). It is not my role to judge whether ending this medical procedure is good or bad -- but it doubtless will have a huge impact on many Alabamians. And it underscores the need to have 80

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 the Legislature not this Court address these issues through the legislative process. In addition to the reasons stated above, I also dissent because the main opinion does not reach the second question presented in these appeals that is, whether the trial court prematurely dismissed the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims at the pleading stage. Those claims present an alternative pathway to protect frozen embryos, a pathway without many of the problems presented by the Wrongful Death Act claims. There is no dispute in these cases about when life begins. All parties agree on that issue. I specifically asked the defendants at oral argument: "[s]o, is it your position that ... these were lives?" And they responded: "It is, Justice Cook. I think that the ... embryo is a life, but the issue today is whether an embryo is a child protected under the [Wrongful Death Act]." Supreme Court of Alabama, Supreme Court O/A Mobile Alabama, YouTube 1:17:49 (Sep. 21, 2023). The defendants nevertheless present a "catch-22" argument in support of the dismissal of those claims. On the one hand, they allege that the plaintiffs' wrongful-death claims were properly dismissed 81

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 because their frozen embryos are not "minor children" under the Wrongful Death Act. On the other hand, they allege that the trial court properly dismissed the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims because their frozen embryos each represent "a life." I am deeply troubled by this argument and the consequences that could result from adopting this position. However, as explained below, there is no need for this Court to reach this "catch-22" argument at this time because it is simply too soon to dismiss those claims under Alabama's liberal pleading rules. It is for this reason that I would reverse the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims. I. The Plaintiffs' Wrongful-Death Claims A. The Wrongful Death Act -- A Purely Statutory Claim This Court has previously observed that wrongful-death actions "are purely statutory," meaning "[t]here was no such action or right of action at common law." Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 611-12, 55 So. 104, 104 (1911) (emphasis added). The Alabama Legislature, therefore, has the responsibility of declaring who is covered by this private right of action. 82

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 The Legislature originally passed the Wrongful Death Act in 1872, and the Act was later codified in the Code of Alabama in 1876. See Ala. Code 1876, § 2899. The Act states, in relevant part, that "[w]hen_the death of a minor child is caused by the wrongful act, omission, or negligence of any person, ... the father, or the mother, ... of the minor may commence an action." § 6-5-391(a) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the Wrongful Death Act does not define the term "minor child." Although the Act was last amended in 1995, see Ala. Acts 1995, Act No. 95-774, § 1, the phrase "[w]hen the death of a minor child is caused by the wrongful act ... of any person" has remained unchanged from the Act's initial inception in 1872, and no change has ever been made to it bearing on the meaning of the term "minor child." B. We Should Use the Original Public Meaning of the Wrongful Death Act's Words With no definition of "minor child" having been provided by the Legislature, this Court must decide how to interpret the meaning of that term as used in the Wrongful Death Act. I believe in originalism, which means that we should apply the original meaning of the words as those words were used in the Act when it was passed in 1872. In other words, I apply the "original public meaning" of the words. As Justice Mitchell 83

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 has observed, "the meaning of a law is its original public meaning, not its modern meaning." Mitchell, supra, at 1092 (some emphasis added; some emphasis in original); see also Barnett v. Jones, 338 So. 3d 757, 768 (Ala. 2021) (Mitchell, J., concurring specially); Ex parte Pinkard, 373 So. 3d 192, 207 (Ala. 2022) (Mitchell, J., concurring specially); Gulf Shores City Bd. of Educ. v. Mackey, [Ms. 1210353, Dec. 22, 2022] So. 3d (Ala. 2022) (Mitchell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result)."7 37 One of the leading scholars on this approach has undoubtedly been Justice Antonin Scalia. In Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 33 (Thomson/West 2012), Justice Scalia and Bryan A. Garner explain that when a court is required to interpret the words in a statute, it should consider "how a reasonable reader, fully competent in the language, would have understood the text at the time it was issued." (Emphasis added).38 See also id. at 78-92 (referring to this as the "fixed-> 37See also Mitchell, supra, at 1103 (explaining that "[w]hen judges say words should be given their 'ordinary' meaning, we do not mean that each word in a text always takes its literal meaning or its most statistically common meaning. We mean instead that words must be given the meaning that an ordinary reasonable person would ascribe to them after reading them in context."). 38 As Justice Mitchell notes in Textualism in Alabama, supra, "[o]ur court, along with the U.S. Supreme Court and courts within the United 84

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 meaning canon" and as the "original public meaning" of a statute); New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 586 U.S. 139 S. Ct. 532, 539 (2019) (noting that "'[i]t's a "fundamental canon of statutory construction" that words generally should be "interpreted as taking their ordinary ... meaning ... at the time Congress enacted the statute." Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States, 585 U.S. 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074, 201 L. Ed. 2d 490 (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S. Ct. 311, 62 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1979)).").39 Because "[w]ords change meaning over time, and often in unpredictable ways," Justice Scalia and Garner explain that it is important to give words in statutes the meaning they had when they were adopted to avoid changing what the law is. Scalia & Garner, supra, at 78 (emphasis added). "By anchoring the meaning of a text to the objective indication of its words at a fixed point in time, ... a judges' -2 States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, has cited Reading Law numerous times." 74 Ala. L. Rev. at 1107. 39 Consistent with applying original public meaning, this Court has explained that "[t]he court knows nothing of the intention of an act, except from the words in which it is expressed, applied to the facts existing at the time, the meaning of the law being the law itself."" Maxwell v. State, 89 Ala. 150, 161, 7 So. 824, 827 (1890) (citation omitted). 85

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 abilities to 'update' laws as they go along" is constrained. Mitchell, supra, at 1096. Again, because this Court is in the judicial branch, its role is limited, and applying the "original public meaning" of the words in a statute helps this Court to stay within its constitutional role, which is a fundamental part of democracy. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 82-83 (recognizing that "[o]riginalism is the only approach to text that is compatible with democracy. When government-adopted texts are given a new meaning, the law is changed; and changing written law, like adopting written law in the first place, is the function of the first two branches of government elected legislators and ... elected executive officials and their delegates."). After all, if judges could freely invest old statutory terms with new meanings, this Court would risk amending legislation outside the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure" the Constitution commands. Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1953). 1. The Original Public Meaning of "Minor Child" Can Be Found in the Common Law -- "The authorities '..... are unanimous." -- The common law answers the question whether the term "minor child" as used in the Wrongful Death Act was broad enough in 1872 to 86

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 reach a frozen embryo today. In Alabama, it is a well-settled principle of law that the common law governs unless expressly changed by the statutes passed by our Legislature. Our Court has repeatedly held that "''[a]ll statutes are construed in reference to the principles of the common law; and it is not to be presumed that there is an intention to modify, or to abrogate it, further than may be expressed, or than the case may absolutely require."" State v. Grant, [Ms. 1210198, Sept. 9, 2022] So. (Ala. 2022) (quoting Beale v. Posey, 72 Ala. 323, 330 (1882)) (emphasis added); see also Ex parte Christopher, 145 So. 3d 60, 65 (Ala. 2013) (observing that "statutes [in derogation or modification of the common law] are presumed not to alter the common law in any way not expressly declared"" (quoting Arnold v. State, 353 So. 2d 524, 526 (Ala. 1977) (emphasis added)).40 3d 4ºSee also Holmes v. Sanders, 729 So. 2d 314, 316 (Ala. 1999) ("[T]he common law is the base upon which all of the laws of this State have been constructed, and when our courts are called upon to construe a statute, ... they must read the statute in light of the common law."") (citation omitted); Ivey v. Wiggins, 276 Ala. 106, 108, 159 So. 2d 618, 619 (1964) (recognizing that "[llegislative enactments in modification of the common law should be clear and such as to prevent reasonable doubt as to the legislative intent and of the limits of such change"). Further "statutes being in derogation of the common law, must be strictly construed, and cannot be extended in their operation and effect by 87

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 The Alabama Code also expressly mandates that the common law remains in effect absent actual changes by the Legislature. See § 1-3-1, Ala. Code 1975 ("The common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such institutions and laws, be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force, except as from time to time it may be altered or repealed by the Legislature." (emphasis added)). Similarly, Justice Mitchell has previously recognized that "[a] statute that uses a common-law term, without defining it, adopts its common-law meaning." Mitchell, supra, at 1130 (emphasis added). Other authorities agree that we must "presume the legislature retained the common-law meaning." 3A Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 69:9 (7th ed. 2010) (quoted approvingly by Mitchell, supra, at 1130). So, what did the common law indicate in 1872? There is no doubt that the common law did not consider an unborn infant to be a child capable of being killed for the purpose of civil liability or criminaldoubtful implication." Mobile Battle House, Inc. v. Wolf, 271 Ala. 632, 639, 126 So. 2d 486, 493 (1961) (emphasis added). 88

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 homicide liability. In fact, for 100 years after the passage of the Wrongful Death Act, our caselaw did not allow a claim for the death of an unborn infant, confirming that the common law in 1872 did not recognize that an unborn infant (much less a frozen embryo) was a "minor child" who could be killed. For example, in 1926, this Court, for the first time, addressed the issue whether the Wrongful Death Act permitted claims for the death of an unborn fetus who died from prenatal injuries. Citing cases from other jurisdictions, this Court in Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 214 Ala. 611, 612, 108 So. 566, 566 (1926), held that the Wrongful Death Act did not permit recovery for injuries during pregnancy that resulted in the death of the fetus. In support of that holding, our Court wrote: ""The doctrine of the civil law and the ecclesiastical and admiralty courts '..... that an unborn child may be regarded as in esse is a mere legal fiction, which, so far as we have been able to discover, has not been indulged in by the courts of common law to the extent of allowing an action by an infant for injuries occasioned before its birth. If the action can be maintained, it necessarily follows that an infant may maintain an action against its own mother for injuries occasioned by the negligence of the mother while pregnant with it. We are of opinion that the action will not lie."" 214 Ala. at 612, 108 So. at 567 (quoting Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 89

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Ill. 359, 368, 56 N.E. 638, 640 (1900)) (emphasis added). We emphasized: "The authorities, however, are unanimous in holding that a prenatal injury affords no basis for an action in damages, in favor either of the child or its personal representative." 214 Ala. at 612, 108 So. at 566 (emphasis added). For many years afterwards, this Court maintained this position. See, e.g., Birmingham Baptist Hosp. v. Branton, 218 Ala. 464, 467, 118 So. 741, 743 (1928) (recognizing that "[t]his court has established a general line of demarcation between the civil rights of the mother and child to be born. It is concurrent with separate existence of the mother and child by the birth; and parental injury before the birth is no basis for action in damages by the child or its personal representative."); Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 619, 151 So. 468, 471 (1933) (recognizing that "[s]o long as the child is within the mother's womb, it is a part of the mother, and for any injury to it, while yet unborn, damages would be recoverable by the mother in a proper case"). Thus, the common law in Alabama before 1872, and for 100 years afterward, was clear: ""The doctrine of the civil law that an unborn child may be regarded as in esse ... is a mere legal fiction, which '..... has 90

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 not been indulged in by the courts of common law to the extent of allowing an action by an infant for injuries occasioned before its birth.'" Stanford, 214 Ala. at 612, 108 So. at 566 (citation omitted; emphasis added).41 2. The Main Opinion's Responses to the Common-Law are Mistaken The main opinion provides four responses to the position that the common law did not consider an unborn infant to be a minor child capable of being killed for the purpose of civil liability or criminal-homicide liability: (1) that the common-law homicide rule was merely an "evidentiary rule," (2) that a dictionary from the 1800s includes a definition of "child" that did not provide an "exception" for unborn infants, (3) that William Blackstone (among other things) "grouped" the "rights" of unborn children with the "Rights of Persons," and (4) that the defendants' argument seeks an "exception" to the definition of "minor child" for frozen embryos. Each of these arguments is mistaken. I will address them one at a time. First, the main opinion notes that "[i]t is true, as Justice Cook 4¹Again, we must follow the original public meaning of the statute, even if we might believe that the meaning is ill-informed, unwise, or outdated. If a meaning of a statute is, in fact, ill-informed, unwise, or outdated, the Legislature -- not this Court -- must amend or update that statute. 91

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 emphasizes, that the common law spared defendants from criminalhomicide liability for killing an unborn child unless the prosecution could prove that the child had been 'born alive' before dying from its injuries." So. 3d at n.6. Nevertheless, the main opinion goes on to assert that the common-law "born-alive" rule was "an evidentiary rule rather than ... a substantive limitation on personhood." Id. 42 The main opinion cites no Alabama authority in support of its "evidentiary rule" argument. The only authority cited is a law-review article from 2009, which in turn relies on a second law-review article from 42The main opinion also asserts that we can ignore the common-law criminal-law rule that it admits existed, because the criminal law has always been "out of step with the treatment of prenatal life in other areas of law."" So. 3d at n.6 (quoting Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 247). It does not cite any Alabama law for this assertion. Regardless, this assertion is directly contrary to our Court's repeated holdings that there should be "congruence" between the Wrongful Death Act and Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes (as discussed more fully below). See Mack, 79 So. 3d at 611. Even if it were not, this argument is nevertheless irrelevant given that the common-law rule in the civil-law context in Alabama was the same rule as the criminal-law rule. See, e.g., Stanford, 214 Ala. at 612, 108 So. at 566. Further, Dobbs did not say that the criminal law could be ignored in determining the meaning of the common law. Instead, the main opinion's quote from Dobbs merely concerned a debate over the "basis" for a different common-law rule (the quickening rule) -- an issue that the Dobbs Court did not even decide. 597 U.S. at 247. 92

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 1987.43 See id. (citing Joanne Pedone, Filling the Void: Model Legislation for Fetal Homicide Crimes, 43 Colum. J. L. & Soc. Probs. 77, 82 (2009), citing in turn Clarke D. Forsythe, Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, 21 Val. U. L. Rev. 563, 586 (1987)). Regardless, the main opinion is mistaken. Our caselaw makes clear that this common law was a substantive rule of law -- both in the criminal context and in the civil context. Stanford, 214 Ala. at 612, 108 So. at 567 (concluding that a wrongful-death action for an unborn child "will not lie"" (citation omitted; emphasis added)); Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 8, 23 So. 671, 674 (1898) (recognizing that "[a]n infant in its mother's womb, not being in rerum natura, is not considered as a person who can 43 Although the main opinion cites to Dobbs in an apparent effort to support these two law-review articles, Dobbs did not hold, or even suggest, that this common-law rule was merely an evidentiary rule and not a substantive rule of law. Instead, as noted above, the page in Dobbs cited by the main opinion contains a discussion of a debate over the possible "basis" for the "quickening rule." Dobbs, 597 U.S. at 247. Moreover, Dobbs concluded that even the debate over the "basis" of the "quickening rule" was "of little importance." Id. In the present appeals, the "basis" for the common-law rule that an unborn infant could not be killed is not at issue. Even if we were to assume that the "basis" for this common-law rule was unwise, it was still the rule in effect at the time the Wrongful Death Act was passed and therefore is part of the original public meaning of that Act unless the Legislature amends it. 93

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 be killed within the description of murder ....'" (quoting 3 Russell on Crimes (6th ed.)) (emphasis added)). The main opinion does not cite or distinguish either of these Alabama cases. Nor would it matter if it was an "evidentiary rule" because even an evidentiary rule would still indicate the original public meaning of the statute (that is, what a "reasonable reader" at the time of passage understood the law to be). The main opinion also cites no caselaw holding that an "evidentiary rule" (even if one applied here) should be ignored in determining the original public meaning. Further, even if the common law were a mere evidentiary rule (and it was not), it would be an irrebuttable evidentiary rule as clearly shown by the cases and language cited above. Second, the main opinion argues that the "leading dictionary of that time defined the word 'child' as 'the immediate progeny of parents' and indicated that this term encompassed children in the womb." So. 3d (citing Noah Webster et al., An American Dictionary of the English Language 198 (1864) (quoting the first listed definition). However, this Court cannot ascertain the meaning of disputed terms merely by "plugging a string of words into a dictionary and running with the first results that come up." Mitchell, supra, at 1091. Instead, "words at 94

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 are given meaning by their context." Scalia & Garner, supra, at 56. Here, the context indicates that the main opinion is mistaken. The cited dictionary does not "indicate[] that this term encompassed children in the womb." Instead, it indicates the opposite. The same first definition of "child" also states: "The term is applied to infants from their birth; but the time when they cease ordinarily to be so called, is not defined by custom." Webster, supra, at 198. (emphasis added).44 "From their birth" 44The main opinion argues in a footnote that the language in the first definition of "child" merely "contrasts newborns with older children in order to make the point that there is no clear-cut time at which a young person transitions from childhood to adulthood." So. 3d at n.5. But this is not the plain meaning of the language in the definition of "child": "[t]he term is applied to infants from their birth." Webster, supra, at 198. And, our Court is not in a position to speculate about what the subjective intent of the author of an 1864 dictionary might have been -- that is, whether this plain language was included merely "in order to make the point." See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 30 ("Subjective intent is beside the point. ... Objective meaning is what we are after '......"). In that same footnote (and in a parenthetical in the text of the main opinion), the main opinion also quotes the last line of the definition in this dictionary (line 41 - under the seventh definition). So. 3d at n.5. However, this quotation is simply an illustration. Webster, supra, at 198 ("To be with child, to be pregnant"). Again, this illustration does not contradict the common law or Alabama law of the time. In fact, to the extent that this illustration could mean anything in these appeals, it would tend to show that a frozen embryo outside of a mother would not have been part of the public meaning of "minor child" in 1872 because there would be no mother who was "pregnant." 95

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 means after they were born. Further, the language quoted in the text of the main opinion is general in nature ("immediate progeny of parents") and thus fails to answer the question whether a frozen embryo is a "minor child" as that term was understood in 1872. This general definition also does not contradict the common law in any way. As explained above, the common law (and Alabama law) is definite, and it does indicate that, in 1872, the public meaning of "minor child" as used in the Wrongful Death Act did not include an unborn infant (or a frozen embryo). In the same vein, the main opinion cites Blackstone's Commentaries and argues (1) that it "expressly grouped the rights of unborn children" with the "Rights of Persons,"" (2) "consistently described unborn children as 'infant[s]' or 'child[ren],"" and (3) spoke of "such children as sharing in the same right to life that is 'inherent by nature in every individual."" So. 3d at (quoting 1 William Finally, the main opinion argues that the definition of a different word "childbearing" -- "drives home the point" when it "describes 'childbearing' as the act of 'bearing children' in the womb." Id. However, the definition is far less clear. Instead it states that "childbearing" is "[t]he act of producing or bringing forth children; parturition." 96

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England *125-26). The main of these principles in Blackstone's opinion's characterization Commentaries is mistaken. First, none of this contradicts the Alabama caselaw cited above. In fact, the snippets quoted by the main opinion do not state, one way or the other, whether an unborn infant could be killed under the common law (whether for civil or criminal purposes). Second, how a list of rights were "grouped" seems insignificant at best, and the main opinion provides no explanation for why this is even relevant, much less important. Third, although the main opinion's assertion that children share the "same right to life" is certainly true, it does not help explain why a frozen embryo is a "minor child" as that term was understood in 1872 when the Act was adopted. Finally, the main opinion incorrectly characterizes the defendants' argument as seeking an exception to the definition of "minor child." The very beginning of the main opinion argues: "This Court has long held that unborn children are 'children' for purposes of Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act The central question presented ... is whether the Act contains an unwritten exception to that rule for extrauterine children that is, unborn children who are located outside of a biological uterus at the time they are 97

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 killed." So. 3d at (emphasis added). In making this assertion, the main opinion assumes the answer to the relevant question -- i.e., whether a "frozen embryo" is a "minor child" as that term was understood in 1872 in the Wrongful Death Act -- by immediately labeling frozen embryos as "extrauterine children" and deeming them "unborn children." In other words, the main opinion assumes that a frozen embryo is a "child" without further context or analysis and does so in the second sentence of the opinion. The main opinion then asks an irrelevant question -- "whether the Act contains an unwritten exception" for "extrauterine children." So. 3d at (emphasis added). No party has suggested or requested an "exception" to anything in these appeals. Assuming the answer to the question and then framing this debate as whether an "exception" exists is semantics. It does not provide an answer to the relevant question and does nothing to respond to the common-law rule. In short, the common-law rule as stated by our Court in Stanford is the original public meaning of the term "minor child" as it was understood in 1872 in the Wrongful Death Act. Stanford, 214 Ala. at 612, 98

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 108 So. at 567 (1926) (concluding "that an unborn child may be regarded as in esse is a mere legal fiction, which, so far as we have been able to discover, has not been indulged in by the courts of common law to the extent of allowing an action by an infant for injuries occasioned before its birth'" (citation omitted)). And, our Court has made clear that "': 'statutes [in derogation or modification of the common law] are presumed not to alter the common law in any way not expressly declared.'" Ex parte Christopher, 145 So. 3d at 65 (citation omitted). Thus, any update to the Wrongful Death Act must be done by the Legislature and not this Court. C. Prior Caselaw Interpreting and Applying the Wrongful Death Act Based on Congruence with Alabama's Criminal-Homicide Statutes and Action by the Legislature What about this Court's more recent caselaw interpreting the Wrongful Death Act? Although the members of this Court believe in originalism and textualism, we should not ignore our prior caselaw unless we are willing to overrule it. After the cases cited above, the next time we tackled these issues was in 1972 when we decided Huskey v. Smith, 289 Ala. 52, 265 So. 2d 596 (1972). In Huskey, for the first time, 100 years after the passage of the Wrongful Death Act, we allowed an action for unborn infant who was viable at the time of a prenatal injury 99

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 and thereafter was born alive, but who later died, thus partially overruling Stanford. Why did we partially overrule Stanford in Huskey? One key reason was our Court's recognition that the purpose and reach of the Wrongful Death Act was tied to the State's criminal-homicide statutes: "By the criminal law, it is a great crime to kill the child after it is able to stir in the mother's womb, by an injury inflicted upon the person of the mother, and it may be murder if the child is born alive and dies of prenatal injuries. Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. 1, 23 So. 671 (1897). One of the purposes of our wrongful death statute is to prevent homicides. Bell v. Riley Bus Lines, [257 Ala. 120, 57 So. 2d 612 (1952)]. If we continued to follow Stanford, which followed then existing precedent, a defendant could be responsible criminally for the homicide of a fetal child but would have no similar responsibility civilly. This is incongruous." Huskey, 289 Ala. at 55, 265 So. 2d at 597-98 (second and third emphasis added). Then, in 1993, our Court made clear that it would not expand recovery under the Wrongful Death Act beyond that which was expressly provided in the Act absent a clear direction from the Legislature. First, in Lollar v. Tankersley, 613 So. 2d 1249, 1252-53 (Ala. 1993), we explained that, "[w]ithout a clearer expression of legislative intent," we would decline to hold that the Wrongful Death Act "creates a cause of 100

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 action for the wrongful death of a fetus that has never attained viability" and noted that "it appears that no court in the United States has, without a clear legislative directive, recognized a cause of action for the wrongful death of a fetus that has never attained a state of development exceeding that attained in this case." Then, in Gentry v. Gilmore, 613 So. 2d 1241, 1244 (Ala. 1993), we repeated this sentiment and explained: "We follow the reasoning of a majority of jurisdictions and hold that our statute provides no cause of action for the wrongful death of a nonviable fetus. In so holding, we point out that, with the exception of Georgia, the Gentrys' position [that a wrongful-death action exists for the death of a nonviable fetus] apparently is not the law in any American jurisdiction where there is no clear legislative direction to include a nonviable fetus within the class of those covered by the wrongful death acts. See Miccolis v. AMICA Mutual Insurance Co., 587 A.2d 67, 71 (R.I. 1991); Gary A. Meadows, Comment, Wrongful Death and the Lost Society of the Unborn, 13 J. Legal Med. 99, 107 (1992); and Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411, 453-54, § 5[a] (1978 & Supp. 1992)." (Emphasis added.) Using language similar to Huskey, Justice Houston wrote specially in both cases and argued for an approach that he believed would be "consistent with the criminal law." Noting the definition of "person" in Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes at that time, Justice Houston 101

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 wrote: "There should not be different standards in wrongful death and homicide statutes, given that the avowed public purpose of the wrongful death statute is to prevent homicide and to punish the culpable party and not to compensate for the loss." Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1245 (Houston, J., concurring in the result); Lollar, 613 So. 2d at 1253 (Houston, J., concurring in the result). 1. The Brody Act and This Court's Reiteration of Congruence Between Alabama's Criminal-Homicide Statutes and the Wrongful Death Act In 2006, nearly 13 years after Justice Houston's observations in Lollar and Gentry, the Alabama Legislature enacted the "Brody Act," Act No. 2006-419, Ala. Acts 2006, codified as § 13A-6-1, Ala. Code 1975. The Brody Act amended the definition of "person" in Alabama's criminalhomicide statutes to expand who could be deemed a victim of a criminal homicide to include an "unborn child in utero." See § 13A-6-1(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975. Before that amendment, the definition of "person" in Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes was: "[A] human being who had been born and was alive at the time of the homicidal act." See Act No. 607, § 2001(2), Ala. Acts 1977, formerly codified as § 13A-6102

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 1(2) (emphasis added). After the passage of the Brody Act, however, the definition of "person" in the criminal-homicide statutes became: "[A] human being, including an unborn child in utero at any stage of development, regardless of viability." § 13A-6-1(a) (3) (emphasis added). Following the passage of the Brody Act, our Court decided Mack v. Carmack, 79 So. 3d 597 (Ala. 2011), in which we held that a plaintiff could bring a claim under the Wrongful Death Act for the death of a previable in utero fetus. Our holding in Mack rested, in large part, on the Legislature's adoption of the Brody Act. Specifically, we noted that the Brody Act "constitute [d] clear legislative intent to protect even nonviable fetuses from homicidal acts." 79 So. 3d at 610. We also explained that the public purpose of our wrongful-death statutes, including the Wrongful Death Act, is to prevent homicide and that "this Court repeatedly has emphasized the need for congruence between the criminal law and our civil wrongful-death statutes." 79 So. 3d at 611 (emphasis added). Thus, we held, after considering "the legislature's amendment of Alabama's homicide statute to include protection for 'an unborn child in utero at any stage of development, regardless of viability,' § 13A-61(a)(3)," that the Wrongful Death Act should likewise permit an action 103

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 for the death of the plaintiff's previable, in utero fetus given that the purpose of the Act is to prevent the death of a child. Id. In so holding, we quoted with approval Justice Houston's special concurrences from Gentry and Lollar regarding the need for congruence between Alabama's wrongful-death statutes and its criminal-homicide statutes given that the purpose of those statutes is to prevent homicide and "'to punish the culpable party and not to compensate for the loss.'" Id. at 610 (quoting Gentry, 613 So. 2d at 1245 (Houston, J., concurring in the result); and Lollar, 613 So. 2d at 1253 (Houston, J., concurring in the result)). Five years after this Court's decision in Mack, our Court reached an identical result in Stinnett v. Kennedy, 232 So. 3d 202 (Ala. 2016). In that case, we explained that "borrowing the definition of 'person' from the criminal Homicide Act to inform [us] as to who is protected under the civil Wrongful Death Act made sense." 232 So. 3d at 215 (emphasis added). In the present appeals, the parties have neither asserted that our holdings or reasoning in either Mack or Stinnett are wrong, nor have they asked us to overrule those decisions. See Clay Kilgore Constr., Inc. v. Buchalter/Grant, L.L.C., 949 So. 2d 893, 898 (Ala. 2006) (noting absence of a specific request to overrule existing authority and stating that, 104

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 "[e]ven if we would be amenable to such a request, we are not inclined to abandon precedent without a specific invitation to do so"). 45 I therefore see no reason to abandon this precedent in deciding the question at issue in the present appeals. 2. The Main Opinion is Overruling Mack and Stinnett The main opinion alleges that this Court's decisions in Mack and Stinnett do not "mean that the definition of 'child' in the Wrongful Death of a Minor Act must precisely mirror the definition of 'person' in our criminal-homicide laws." Specifically, the main opinion alleges that, because criminal liability is "more severe than civil liability," the "set of conduct that can support a criminal prosecution is almost always narrower than the conduct that can support a civil suit." According to the main opinion, an argument to the contrary is "not only illogical, it was rejected in Stinnett itself." So. Based on the foregoing, the main opinion concludes that the definition of "person" in Alabama's criminal-homicide law provides a "floor" for the definition of personhood in wrongful-death actions, not a 3d at So. 3d at So. 3d at 45See also Alabama Dep't of Revenue v. Greenetrack, Inc., 369 So. 3d 640 (Ala. 2022) (declining to overrule precedent when the parties did not expressly ask this Court to do so). 105

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 "ceiling." So. 3d at Contrary to the main opinion's assertion, our Court in Stinnett expressly stated that it was "borrowing the definition of 'person' from the criminal Homicide Act to inform [us] as to who is protected under the civil Wrongful Death Act." 232 So. 3d at 215 (emphasis added). By using the phrase "borrowing the definition," it is difficult to imagine how much clearer our Court could have been that the definitions of the terms "person" and "minor child" were to be interpreted the same. Thus, the main opinion is simply incorrect when it states that Stinnett "did not say that." So. 3d at Additionally, in reaching the above conclusion, the main opinion mistakes statutory definitions for liability standards. It is certainly true that criminal law includes additional defenses (and sometimes includes additional elements) and thus contains a "narrower" standard of liability than civil law, but it is also true that definitions of terms can be the same in the criminal-homicide statutes and the civil wrongful-death statutes. Stinnett illustrates this. In that case, the plaintiff sued a physician for the wrongful death of her unborn fetus pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act. The defendant, emphasizing the congruence discussion in 106

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Mack, argued that an exception to liability for medical personnel in the criminal-homicide statutes also prevented malpractice liability under the Wrongful Death Act. See Stinnett, 232 So. 3d at 214-15 (citing § 13A-61(b), Ala. Code 1975, which provides a defense to homicide for a physician providing medical care for a "[m]istake, or unintentional error"). Not surprisingly, our Court disagreed. Relying on Mack, we explained that the liability standard differed between the criminalhomicide statutes and the civil Wrongful Death Act. Therefore, this Court held, the defendant could be liable for medical malpractice even if she were a physician and committed an "unintentional error." We wrote: "[Mack's] attempt to harmonize who is a 'person' protected from homicide under both the Homicide Act and Wrongful Death Act, however, was never intended to synchronize civil and criminal liability under those acts, or the defenses to such liability." 232 So. 3d at 215 (emphasis added); (quoting the same language). Thus, contrary to the main opinion's position, our Court in Stinnett made clear that our holding on liability standards had no impact on our decision to "borrow[]" the definition of "person" (that is, the victim) in Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes to determine who a "minor child" was under the Wrongful Death Act. 107 So. 3d at

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Moreover, the main opinion's reasoning that the definition of "person" in Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes provides a "floor" for the definition of "child" in wrongful-death actions, not a "ceiling," is also illogical given the changes brought about by the Brody Act. 46 The Legislature made an intentional decision to extend the criminal-homicide statutes beyond the common law when it passed the Brody Act. In sharp contrast, the Legislature has never extended the relevant portion of the Wrongful Death Act, despite the passage of 150 years. Yet, the main opinion now decides that the definition in this unamended civil statute goes further than the definition in the criminal-homicide statutes that the Legislature did extend. In sum, the main opinion overrules Mack and Stinnett 47 sub silentio 46When construing a criminal statute in a civil action, the Rule of Lenity should be applied because it would be "inconceivable" to give "the language defining the violation ... one meaning (a narrow one) for the penal sanctions and a different meaning (a more expansive one) for the private compensatory action." Scalia & Garner, supra, at 297. 47The year after this Court decided Mack, supra, it was once again called upon to address the reach of the Wrongful Death Act in Hamilton v. Scott, 97 So. 3d 728 (Ala. 2021). The main opinion quotes Hamilton for the proposition that a wrongful-death-act claim can be brought for "'any unborn child."" So. 3d at (quoting Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 735). This quote is correct, but it does not answer the relevant question in these that is, whether a frozen embryo is a "minor child" as that term 108 cases --

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 by decoupling the definitions in the criminal-homicide statutes and the Wrongful Death Act, by removing the reasoning of those decisions, and by overlooking our other caselaw requiring congruence between the definition of "person" in Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes and the definition of "minor child" in the Wrongful Death Act.48 was used in 1872 in the Wrongful Death Act. Further, Hamilton did not change the holding in Mack and instead expressly stated that "Mack is now controlling precedent .... Therefore, we will apply Mack in deciding this appeal." Hamilton, 97 So. 3d at 735. Moreover, to the extent that there is any confusion about whether the homicide statutes' definition of "person" has been "borrow[ed]" (and thus is both a "floor" and a "ceiling" for the scope of the term "minor child" in the Wrongful Death Act), Stinnett governs because it was decided after Hamilton. 48The main opinion argues that the "bulk of [my] dissent is animated by the view that Mack was wrongfully decided and that, contrary to its holding, unborn children are not 'children' under the Act after all." So. 3d at n.4. This is inaccurate. The opinions in these cases are settled law, and I have not questioned them or their reasoning. Moreover, as explained above, Mack arose after the Legislature made an express change to the criminal-homicide statutes that broadened the definition of "person" beyond the common law for the first time. So that there is no doubt, the law in Alabama is clear (since the Legislature amended the criminal-homicide statutes) that killing an "unborn child in utero" is both a homicide and actionable under the Wrongful Death Act -- and I agree with this law. Here, we are called upon to decide a question that this Court has not decided before -- whether a frozen embryo is a "minor child" under the Wrongful Death Act. There are two possible approaches to this: (1) follow the holding of Mack and Stinnett (that is, use the homicide definition of "person" adopted by the Legislature in the criminal-homicide 109

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 3. The Plaintiffs' Arguments Regarding the Brody Act are Mistaken Because I would follow our prior precedent that there must be "congruence" between the definition of "person" in Alabama's criminalhomicide statutes and the definition of "minor child" in the Wrongful Death Act, I must consider whether a frozen embryo is within the definition of "person" in the criminal-homicide statutes, as amended by the Brody Act-- a question that is hotly debated in the briefs. Because the main opinion holds that the definition in the criminal-homicide statutes is merely a "floor," it does not engage on this question. As noted above, after the passage of the Brody Act, the definition of "person" in the criminal-homicide statutes became: "[A] human being, including an unborn child in utero at any stage of development, regardless of viability." § 13A-6-1(a)(3) (emphasis added). The primary argument between the parties is over the phrase "including an unborn child in utero." On the one hand, the defendants argue strongly that the statutes) or (2) independently determine the meaning of that term by following the original public meaning of that term. As explained above, the result is the same under either approach. The main opinion must choose one way or the other. Either Mack and Stinnett were correct and the main opinion is bound by the criminal-homicide statutes' definition for "person," or the main opinion is bound by the original public meaning of the term "minor child." 110

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 phrase "including an unborn child in utero" indicates that the Legislature, by adding this phrase to the definition, implied that "human being" would not otherwise include an unborn child in utero (and therefore would not include a frozen embryo, which was not added). On the other hand, the plaintiffs argue just as strongly that this phrase is not intended to be a limiting phrase but, instead, merely provides one example of a "human being," thus implying that "human being" is broad enough to include a frozen embryo. First, this Court has recognized that both the preamble and the title of an act may be used to resolve any ambiguities in the text. See Newton v. City of Tuscaloosa, 251 Ala. 209, 218, 36 So. 2d 487, 494 (1948) (recognizing that "both the preamble and the title of an act may be looked to in order to remove ambiguities and uncertainty in the enacting clause"); City of Bessemer v. McClain, 957 So. 2d 1061, 1075 (Ala. 2006) (noting that our Court "can also look at the title or preamble of the act"); Scalia & Garner, supra, at 33 (recognizing that the textual purpose of an act is "vital" to its context). The Brody Act provides that it "shall be known as the 'Brody Act,' in memory of the unborn son of Brandy Parker, whose death occurred 111

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 when she was eight and one-half months pregnant." Act No. 2006-419, § 4. Likewise, the title to the Brody Act provides that it is "[a]n act, [t]o amend [Alabama's homicide code], to define person to include an unborn child [and] to name the bill 'Brody Act' in memory of the unborn son of Brandy Parker, whose death occurred when she was eight and one-half months pregnant." Based on the contents of the Brody Act and its title, it seems quite clear to me that the death of Brody Parker an unborn, in utero child -- spurred the Legislature to change the definition of a "person" in the criminal-homicide statutes from the common-law meaning to a meaning that now allows a defendant to be charged with murder when he or she causes the death of a "human being" "in utero." In other words, the textual purpose was to expand the definition of "person" to cover victims like Brody Parker who died in utero. Our caselaw makes clear that we must presume that the terms of a statute mean what they were designed to effect, and we are not allowed to enlarge them by construction. See Holmes v. Sanders, 729 So. 3d 314, 316 (Ala. 1999) (explaining that this Court presumes "that the legislature did not intend to make any alteration in the law beyond what it declares either expressly or by 112 --

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 unmistakable implication"" (quoting Beasley v. MacDonald Eng'g Co., 287 Ala. 189, 197, 249 So. 2d 844, 851 (1971))).49 Second, the plaintiffs' proposed statutory construction of the criminal-homicide statutes is contrary to the common law of homicide and is not supported by the history of Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes. In 1852, the Alabama Legislature passed the first criminalhomicide statute, which made clear that only a "human being" could be the victim of a murder. That statute read, in relevant part, that "every homicide perpetrated ... to effect the death of any human being" constituted murder. § 3080, Ala. Code 1852 (emphasis added). Although every Code section addressing criminal homicide enacted between 1852 and 1977 used the term "human being" to describe the victim of murder and manslaughter, the Legislature never defined the term. After the passage of the first homicide statute, this Court held that killing an unborn infant in utero did not constitute a murder, citing a common-law treatise. For example, in Clarke v. State, 117 Ala. at 8, 23 4'¹See also Cook v. Meyer Bros., 73 Ala. 580, 583 (1883) (noting the "presumption ... that the language of the statute import[s] the alteration or change it was designed to effect, and [its] operation will not be enlarged by construction ...."). 113

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 So. at 674, this Court wrote that "[a]n infant in its mother's womb, not being in rerum natura, is not considered as a person who can be killed, within the description of murder ...." (Quoting 3 Russell on Crimes (6th ed.) (emphasis added).) 50 Then, in 1977, the Legislature repealed the previous criminalhomicide statutes and replaced them with the new criminal-homicide statutes. In doing so, the Legislature expressly adopted the common-law rule and defined the term "person" as "a human being who had been born and was alive at the time of the homicidal act." Former § 13A-6-1(2). That definition remained unchanged until the adoption of the Brody Act, at which point the Legislature, as explained above, went beyond the common-law rule to expressly declare that a victim of a homicide or assault (that is, a "human being") included an "unborn child in utero." 50 The authority cited in Clarke was a leading criminal-law treatise originally written about the common law by an English Justice named William Oldnall Russell. Although this Court cited the sixth edition (published in 1896), the earlier editions contained the same quote, dating back to at least 1826. See, e.g., William Oldnall Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and Indictable Misdemeanors at 424 (2d ed. 1826). In other words, this Court in Clarke correctly stated and followed the content of the common law. 114

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 In short, the common law was clear that an unborn infant was "not considered as a person who can be killed."" Clarke, 117 Ala. at 8, 23 So. at 674 (citation omitted). The statutory law did not change this until the passage of the Brody Act. Thus, the common-law definition remains, except to the extent that it has been expressly changed by the Brody Act to add an "unborn child in utero" to the definition of "person" in Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes. To conclude otherwise would be inconsistent with our caselaw cited above holding that "'[a]ll statutes are construed in reference to the principles of the common law; and it is not to be presumed that there is an intention to modify, or to abrogate it, further than may be expressed, or than the case may absolutely require."" Grant, (citing and quoting Beale v. Posey, 72 Ala. at 330).51 So. 3d at 511 note briefly that, were we to adopt the plaintiffs' proposed construction of the definition of "person" in the criminal-homicide statutes, we risk criminalizing the IVF process. Under the Rule of Lenity, "'criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of those persons sought to be subjected to their operation, i.e., defendants."" Ex parte Bertram, 884 So. 2d 889, 891 (Ala. 2003) (quoting Clements v. State, 370 So. 2d 723, 725 (Ala. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Beck v. State, 396 So. 2d 645 (Ala. 1980)). Thus, if there were any reasonable doubts as to the statutory construction of the criminal-homicide statutes, this Court would apply the Rule of Lenity and strictly construe the definition of "person" in favor of those persons sought to be subjected to their 115

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 For all of these reasons, it seems clear to me that a frozen embryo does not fit within the statutory definition of "person" as that term is used in Alabama's criminal-homicide statutes and thus cannot be a "minor child" under the Wrongful Death Act. D. Article I, § 36.06, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022 Has No Impact on the Terms in the Wrongful Death Act from 1872 The main opinion also argues that, even if the word "child" in the Wrongful Death Act were ambiguous, Article I, § 36.06, of the Alabama Constitution of 2022 "operates in this context as a constitutionally imposed canon of construction," which "require[s] courts to resolve the ambiguity in favor of protecting unborn life." section "acknowledges, declares, and affirms that it is the public policy of this state to ensure the protection of the rights of the unborn child in all manners and measures lawful and appropriate." § 36.06(b) (emphasis added). The Chief Justice also devotes his special concurrence to this argument. So. 3d at That The first problem with this argument is that there is nothing in the 116 operation -- for instance, in a future case, perhaps fertility-clinic workers. This is yet another reason why the plaintiffs' interpretation of the criminal-homicide statutes is mistaken.

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 text of § 36.06 about resolving ambiguities in statutes (assuming there was one here), and the main opinion cites no authority supporting such a rule of construction. Even if we were to assume such a rule of construction, there is nothing in § 36.06 that tells us how to best protect frozen embryos. Specifically, § 36.06 does not indicate (1) whether we should protect frozen embryos by updating the words in the Wrongful Death Act or (2) whether we should protect frozen embryos via the ordinary common-law route (that is, by allowing the claims of negligence and wantonness to move forward in these actions). Why is one option more constitutionally mandated than another -- especially when one option requires us to discount the original public meaning of the terms in the Wrongful Death Act as it was passed by the Legislature in 1872? The second problem with this position is timing. The Wrongful Death Act was passed in 1872, whereas § 36.06 was passed in 2018. Section 36.06 cannot retroactively change the meaning of words passed in 1872. The Legislature in 1872 had no idea about a constitutional amendment that would be passed 150 years later. If the Legislature wanted to change the words in the statute, they should have changed the 117

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 words in the statute.52 Although I agree with much of what Chief Justice Parker so eloquently states in his special concurrence regarding the "sanctity of So. 3d at (Parker, C.J., concurring specially), I do not agree with his discussion of the "Effect of Constitutional Policy." (Parker, C.J., concurring specially). In particular, I believe he is mistaken when he asserts that the People of Alabama "explicitly" told "all three branches of government what they ought to do" in § 36.06. So. 3d at (Parker, C.J., concurring specially). The question for these appeals is whether Alabama law provides a private cause of action, for money damages, for the loss of a frozen embryo. There is no language in this constitutional amendment mentioning private causes of action, or money damages, or frozen embryos, or IVF. Compare Dobbs, 597 U.S. at unborn life," So. 3d at 52It is of course true, as the main opinion notes, that the Constitution is the "supreme law of the state"" and that all statues "must yield"" to it. So. 3d at n.7. However, the main opinion fails to explain why the original public meaning of the term "minor child" in the Wrongful Death Act violates -- that is, does not "yield" to § 36.06. Although the main opinion contends that the definition of "child" that it applies here is "in keeping with the definition that was established by this Court's precedents at the time § 36.06 was adopted," id. (emphasis omitted), I fail to see how that could be true given that, as explained in detail above, the main opinion is overruling Mack and Stinnett. 118

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 237 (noting that a right to abortion "is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution"). The third difficulty with this argument is that it does not rebut any of my conclusions discussed above, including those premised on the common law, the criminal-homicide statutes, and our prior caselaw. It is for all of these reasons that I find this argument unpersuasive. E. The Suggestion that the Common Law Has Been "Collectively Repealed" Is Mistaken Justice Shaw argues that it is "well settled" that the meaning of the term "minor child" "includes an unborn child with no distinction (Shaw, J., concurring specially) (emphasis added). Other than simply referring to the main opinion, Justice Shaw cites no legal authority that this lack of any distinction is "well settled." Regardless, he is mistaken for all the reasons explained above. As to his assertion that "the legislature, the constitution, and this Court's decisions have collectively repealed the common law's prohibition on ... seeking a civil remedy for injuries done to the unborn," So. 3d (Shaw, J., concurring specially), Justice Shaw provides no analysis on this point either and, instead, simply provides a string between in vitro or in utero." at So. 3d at 119

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 citation to (1) the Wrongful Death Act itself, (2) § 36.06(b) (analyzed in full earlier), and (3) two cases that support my position (as explained Regardless, it is well settled that the Legislature -- earlier). Id. at not this Court -- "repeal[s]" statutes. Further, the question in these appeals is not whether there is a common-law "prohibition on seeking a civil remedy for injuries done to the unborn" (as Justice Shaw frames the issue). (Shaw, J., concurring specially) (emphasis added). Instead, the question is whether the common law can help this Court determine if a frozen embryo is within the meaning of the term "minor child" in the Wrongful Death Act. Justice Shaw appears to contend that the common law has a narrower role in providing meaning for words used in Alabama statutes than I have explained above. Relying on a special concurrence to a 1974 plurality opinion from this Court and § 1-3-1, Ala. Code 1975, he contends that Alabama statutory law "'does not provide"" that the "'"common law of England shall be the rule of decisions in Alabama unless changed by the legislature.' (Shaw, J., concurring specially) (quoting Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 446, 304 So. So. 3d at So. 3d at 120

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 2d 881, 887 (1974) (Faulkner, J., concurring specially)) (emphasis added). He argues "[o]n the contrary,"" Alabama law merely provides that the common law applies so long as it is "[n]ot_inconsistent with the constitution, the laws, and the institutions of Alabama."" Id. (some emphasis omitted); id. at ("But if it is inconsistent, then it need not be first altered or repealed by the legislature."). I fail to see a distinction between these standards and what our Court has repeatedly (and very recently) broadly stated: "'All statutes are construed in reference to the principles of the common law,'" Grant, and "statutes [in derogation or modification of the common law] are presumed not to alter the common law in any way not expressly declared,'" Ex parte Christopher, 145 So. 3d at 65 (citation omitted; emphasis added); see also 3A Norman J. Singer and J.D. Shambie Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 69:9 (explaining that we "presume the legislature retained the common-law meaning"). Justice Shaw does not cite or distinguish any of this authority. More fundamentally, Justice Shaw does not explain how using the common-law understanding of the meaning of the term "child" to determine whether a frozen embryo is a "minor child" under the Wrongful So. 3d at 121

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 Death Act is "inconsistent" with "the constitution, the laws, and the (Shaw, J., concurring specially) (emphasis and citation omitted). As explained thoroughly above, any changes that have been made in this area of the law have been made incrementally by the Legislature over time and have only gone so far as to encompass unborn, in utero children, as reflected in the holding and language discussed above in Stinnett, 232 So. 3d at 215 (which postdates the two cases cited by Justice Shaw).53 Thus, unless and until the Legislature updates Alabama law in such a way that demonstrates that a "frozen embryo" is a "minor child," this Court remains bound by the original public meaning of that term as it was understood in 1872 when the Legislature passed the Wrongful institutions of Alabama."" Death Act. So. 3d at F. Not a Single State Agrees with the Main Opinion Not a single state has held that a wrongful-death action (or a 53Like the main opinion, Justice Shaw argues that the definition of "person" in the criminal-homicide statutes "does not limit the determination whether an in vitro embryo is a 'minor child' for purposes of a civil-law action under the Wrongful Death Act." So. 3d at (Shaw, J., concurring specially). But, he cites no legal authority other than referring to the main opinion, and therefore he is mistaken for all the reasons explained above. 122

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 criminal-homicide action) can be brought for the destruction of a frozen embryo. In fact, a number of jurisdictions have rejected such causes of action. See, e.g., Penniman v. University Hosps. Health Sys., Inc., 130 N.E.3d 333, 339 (Ohio Ct. App. 2019) (holding that patients could not bring wrongful-death action against hospital based on destruction of frozen embryos because the embryos had no statutory rights); Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 211 Ariz. 386, 400, 121 P.3d 1256, 1270 (Ct. App. 2005) (holding that cryopreserved, three-day-old, eight-cell pre-embryo was not a "person" for purposes of recovery under wrongful-death statute); and Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 594 (Tenn. 1992) (holding that under Tennessee law pre-embryos could not be considered "persons"). It is certainly true that this Court is not bound by the results in other states; however, when we are the sole outlier, it should cause us to carefully reexamine our conclusions about expanding the reach of a statute passed in 1872 and our understanding of the common law. G. The Consequences of This Decision and Why That is Relevant The main opinion's holding will mean that the creation of frozen embryos will end in Alabama. No rational medical provider would 123

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 continue to provide services for creating and maintaining frozen embryos knowing that they must continue to maintain such frozen embryos forever or risk the penalty of a Wrongful Death Act claim for punitive damages.54 There is no doubt that there are many Alabama citizens praying to be parents who will no longer have that opportunity. And, there is no doubt that there will be fewer babies born. On the other hand, there are powerful moral and policy arguments supporting the notion that ending the creation, use, and destruction of frozen embryos is a good thing and that IVF technology has the potential for grave misuse. I am empathetic to both sides of this debate; however, it is not my role to take a position one way or another on this issue. Even so, ending the creation of frozen embryos will undoubtedly cause significant consequences that will affect the future lives of thousands of Alabama citizens for years to come and the babies who will not be born. The solemn 54The main opinion notes, but does not reach, the defendants' possible defenses based upon contracts between the IVF provider and the plaintiffs. Like the main opinion, I do not reach the possible defenses. However, no medical provider would depend upon the contract argument to continue creating and maintaining frozen embryos in the future, given this significant legal uncertainty and the potential to incur a significant punitive damage penalty. 124

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 significance of these consequences (as well as the need for comprehensive regulation) further illustrates why this question is an issue that should be addressed by the elected representatives of the people of Alabama in the Legislature, not this Court. I thus urge the Legislature to promptly consider these issues to provide certainty to these Alabama parents-tobe and to the medical professionals who are attempting to provide services to them. 55 55As to the consequences of a contrary ruling, the main opinion discusses, but does not rely upon, a "parade of horribles" that the plaintiffs claim might result from a ruling that the term "minor child" in the Wrongful Death Act does not include frozen embryos. The plaintiffs are mistaken. These cases have no connection to partial-birth abortions, and Alabama's law on partial-birth abortions would not be impacted by a ruling in favor of the defendants in these civil wrongful-death cases. See § 26-23-3, Ala. Code 1975. There are also no facts in the record to support any such argument, and there is no doubt the Wrongful Death Act could reach a partial-birth abortion situation as appropriate. As to the plaintiffs' second argument (regarding a possible future case involving a yet to be invented artificial womb), the answer to this futuristic hypothetical is simple. These cases are about the facts today and are based upon a statute that has not changed in its relevant terms since 1872. Should the facts change, the Legislature can address future technologies and can do so far better than this Court. The main opinion alleges that I have conceded that the Wrongful Death Act would not cover such a hypothetical. It is mistaken. I have made no such concession. We decide cases on the facts that are before us 125

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 The Chief Justice's special concurrence does not dispute that this will lead to fewer newborn babies. However, Chief Justice Parker insists that the IVF process may still survive in Alabama in some other form (for instance, he suggests: "one embryo at a time") because certain other countries have more regulations on their IVF processes. So. 3d at (Parker, C.J., concurring specially); id. at (stating that he fails to see that "IVF will now end"). In fact, he spends several pages - not hypotheticals. The main opinion also alleges that I have failed to discuss the "constitutional implications" of this hypothetical. So. 3d at n.3. Again, the reason is simple -- it is a hypothetical and we do not reach arguments or facts that are not before us, certainly not hypotheticals about technology that does not even exist. This Court would be in a position to address the alleged "constitutional implications" only if the following circumstances existed: (1) such an artificial womb existed, (2) it was actually used someday in the future, (3) a developing unborn infant was killed in an artificial womb, (4) the Wrongful Death Act had not been modified by the Legislature, (5) and we concluded that this created an Equal Protection Clause conflict. No such circumstances exist in the present appeals; I therefore see no need to address these hypothetical scenarios. See, generally, Ex parte Ankrom, 152 So. 3d 397, 431 (Ala. 2013) (Shaw, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result) ("Some of the arguments made ... are premised on hypothetical situations, different from the facts before us, in which the Code section might be either unconstitutional as applied or seemingly unwise in its application. It goes without saying that we cannot strike down the application of the Code section ... merely because the Code section might be unconstitutionally applied in some other context." (footnotes omitted)). 126

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 describing the regulations that currently exist in other countries and suggests that the Alabama Legislature may wish to consider those regulations. The Alabama Medical Association strongly disagrees with the suggestion that IVF in some other, reduced, form is practical, safe, or medically sound and has filed two amicus briefs exhaustively explaining these issues. It is not the place or time to decide whether the position of the Chief Justice or the position of the Alabama Medical Association is correct, moral, or ethical. It is not the place because these are questions for the Legislature and not this Court. And, even if this Court were the correct forum, it would not be the time because these appeals are at the motionto-dismiss stage and there is no factual record at this point. Therefore, no party has had the opportunity to investigate and respond to the assertions by the Chief Justice or the Alabama Medical Association. However, as to the Chief Justice's suggestion that the Legislature consider these issues immediately (including his suggestion that they consider comprehensive regulation), I strongly agree. II. The Plaintiffs' Negligence and Wantonness Claims Finally, the main opinion does not reach the plaintiffs' negligence 127

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 and wantonness claims because they are pleaded in the alternative and, instead, holds that those claims are now "moot." Because I would affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs' wrongful-death claims, I must reach this issue. For the reasons stated below, I would reverse the trial court's dismissal of those claims. So. 3d at 128 The defendants are making a "catch-22" argument. Ashland, Inc., 970 So. 2d 755, 772 n.6 (Ala. 2007) (Harwood, J., dissenting) ("Catch-22: a frustrating situation in which one is trapped by contradictory regulations or conditions.' Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary (2d ed. 2001)."). On the one hand, the defendants claim that the frozen embryos are not a "minor child." On the other hand, they claim that because the frozen embryos were "lives," no common-law claim (such as claims of negligence or wantonness) is available because no "damages" are recoverable. I am concerned that such a rule might allow the destruction of life with no consequence, even for someone who commits an intentionally wrongful act. As explained by the plaintiffs, IVF is used by many parents-to-be in dire circumstances (for instance, because of reproductive issues caused by cancer, age, or infertility). Their frozen embryos are Cline v.

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 undeniably precious. Thus, this argument has the potential to be both unjust and to incentivize bad conduct. See Huskey, 289 Ala. at 54, 265 So. 2d at 597 (noting that not allowing a recovery "would give protection to an alleged tort-feasor"). However, I need not reach the question of exactly how our Court should handle this situation because it is too early in these cases. We are only at the pleading stage. The plaintiffs argue, under this Court's prior decision in Raley v. Citibanc of Alabama/Andalusia, 474 So. 2d 640, 642 (Ala. 1985), that the trial court's dismissal of their common-law tort claims in response to a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion was improper. Under Raley, they argue, once a pleader has set out a cause of action, the failure of the complaint to allege requisite elements of relief (that is, damages) is not usually a ground for a motion to dismiss for failure to state cause of action but, rather, must be challenged by a motion to strike, by objection to evidence, or by requested charges. Accordingly, they contend that the trial court's dismissal of those claims is due to be reversed. "Alabama is a 'notice pleading' state." Surrency v. Harbison, 489 So. 2d 1097, 1104 (Ala. 1986) (citing Simpson v. Jones, 460 So. 2d 1282 129

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 (Ala. 1984)). Rule 8(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: "(a) Claims for Relief. A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader seeks. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded." "The primary purpose of notice pleading is to provide defendants adequate notice of the claims against them." Cathedral of Faith Baptist Church, Inc. v. Moulton, 373 So. 3d 816, 819 (Ala. 2022) (citing Adkison v. Thompson, 650 So. 2d 859 (Ala. 1994)). "'[P]leadings are to be liberally construed in favor of the pleader.'" Id. (quoting Adkison, 650 So. 2d at 862). As relevant here, "'the dismissal of a complaint is not proper if the pleading contains "even a generalized statement of facts which will support a claim for relief under [Rule 8, Ala. R. Civ. P.]" (Dunson v. Friedlander Realty, 369 So. 2d 792, 796 (Ala. 1979)), because "[t]he purpose of the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure is to effect justice upon the merits of the claim and to renounce the technicality of procedure." Crawford v. Crawford, 349 So. 2d 65, 66 (Ala. Civ. App. 1977).'" Id. (quoting Simpson, 460 So. 2d at 1285). In their amended complaints, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants' negligent and wanton conduct in failing to secure their respective facilities "led to and/or caused the destruction of the plaintiffs' 130

SC-2022-0515; SC-2022-0579 embryo[s]." As a result of that allegedly negligent and wanton conduct, the plaintiffs "demand[ed] judgment for compensatory damages, including but not limited to, [the] value of embryonic human beings '...... and for the severe mental anguish ...." (meaning that they are seeking any valid compensatory damages). (Emphasis added). The defendants do not attempt to address this Court's prior decision in Raley, supra. They also do not ask that we: (1) revisit the pleading standard under Alabama law or (2) reconsider our decision in Raley. They also do not point to any caselaw in which we have affirmed a trial court's dismissal at the pleading stage based upon an argument that damages had not been properly pleaded. Based on Raley, supra, I would reverse the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' negligence and wantonness claims. 131

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The Pledge of Allegiance was written in August 1892 by the socialist minister Francis Bellamy (1855-1931). It was originally published in The Youth's Companion on September 8, 1892. Bellamy had hoped that the pledge would be used by citizens in any country.

In its original form it read:

"I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the Republic for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."In 1923, the words, "the Flag of the United States of America" were added. At this time it read:

"I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which it stands, one nation, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."In 1954, in response to the Communist threat of the times, President Eisenhower encouraged Congress to add the words "under God," creating the 31-word pledge we say today. Bellamy's daughter objected to this alteration. Today it reads:

"I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all."Section 4 of the Flag Code states:

The Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag: "I pledge allegiance to the Flag of the United States of America, and to the Republic for which it stands, one Nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.", should be rendered by standing at attention facing the flag with the right hand over the heart. When not in uniform men should remove any non-religious headdress with their right hand and hold it at the left shoulder, the hand being over the heart. Persons in uniform should remain silent, face the flag, and render the military salute."The original Bellamy salute, first described in 1892 by Francis Bellamy, who authored the original Pledge, began with a military salute, and after reciting the words "to the flag," the arm was extended toward the flag.

At a signal from the Principal the pupils, in ordered ranks, hands to the side, face the Flag. Another signal is given; every pupil gives the flag the military salute '-- right hand lifted, palm downward, to a line with the forehead and close to it. Standing thus, all repeat together, slowly, "I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the Republic for which it stands; one Nation indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all." At the words, "to my Flag," the right hand is extended gracefully, palm upward, toward the Flag, and remains in this gesture till the end of the affirmation; whereupon all hands immediately drop to the side.

The Youth's Companion, 1892

Shortly thereafter, the pledge was begun with the right hand over the heart, and after reciting "to the Flag," the arm was extended toward the Flag, palm-down.

In World War II, the salute too much resembled the Nazi salute, so it was changed to keep the right hand over the heart throughout.

HISTORIC DOCUMENTSMagna CartaThe Letter of Columbus to Luis De Sant Angel Announcing His DiscoveryThe Mayflower CompactPennsylvania Charter of PrivilegesGive Me Liberty Or Give Me DeathThe Declaration of IndependenceArticles of ConfederationConstitution of the United StatesBill of Rights and Later AmendmentsPetition from the Pennsylvania Society for the Abolition of SlaveryTo those who keep slaves, and approve the practiceWashington's Farewell AddressThe Star Spangled BannerThe Monroe DoctrineHarkins to American PeopleLincoln's House Divided SpeechDaniel Webster's "Seventh of March" SpeechLincoln's First Inaugural AddressThe Emancipation ProclamationLincoln's Second Inaugural AddressThe Gettysburg AddressThe Pledge of AllegianceThe American's CreedFDR's Infamy SpeechThe Economic Bill of RightsAsk Not What Your Country Can Do For You

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Conservative Protestant Christian movement

The Seven Mountain Mandate, also Seven Mountains Mandate, 7M,[1] or Seven Mountains Dominionism,[2] is a dominionist conservative Christian movement within Pentecostal and evangelical Christianity.[1][3] It holds that there are seven aspects of society that believers seek to influence: family, religion, education, media, entertainment, business, and government.

History [ edit ] The movement is believed by its followers to have begun in 1975 with a purported message from God delivered to evangelicals Loren Cunningham, Bill Bright, and Francis Schaeffer ordering them to invade the "seven spheres" of society identified as family, religion, education, media, entertainment, business, and government. The idea was not seriously considered until 2000 during a meeting between Cunningham and Lance Wallnau. The movement came to prominence after the 2013 publication of Wallnau's and Bill Johnson's Invading Babylon: The 7 Mountain Mandate.[4]

The movement was generally supportive of the presidency of Donald Trump, with member Paula White becoming Trump's spiritual advisor. White claimed that Trump "will play a critical role in Armageddon as the United States stands alongside Israel in the battle against Islam." In 2020 Charlie Kirk said "finally we have a president that understands the seven mountains of cultural influence" during a speech at the Conservative Political Action Conference.[4]

Theory [ edit ] The Seven Mountain Mandate is part of dominionism.[5]

The biblical base for the movement is derived from Revelation 17:1''18, wherein verse 9 reads, "And here is the mind which hath wisdom. The seven heads are seven mountains".[5] The seven areas that the movement believe influence society and that they seek to influence are family, religion, education, media, entertainment, business, and government.[5] They believe that their mission to influence the world through these seven spheres is justified by Isaiah 2:2 "Now it shall come to pass in the latter days that the mountain of the Lord's house shall be established on the top of the mountains."[4]

Followers believe that by fulfilling the Seven Mountain Mandate they can bring about the end times.[4]

Organizations [ edit ] 7M Films [ edit ] 7M Films is a talent management agency.[6]

Prominent followers [ edit ] Mike Johnson, Republican Congressman from Louisiana and Speaker of the House[7]Rafael Cruz, pastor and father of Senator Ted Cruz[2]Paula White, spiritual advisor to Donald Trump[3]Andrew Wommack, evangelical leader[8][9]Lauren Boebert, US House member[10]Michele Bachmann, U.S. representative for Minnesota's 6th congressional district from 2007 until 2015.[11]Tom Parker, Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme Court[7]Publications [ edit ] Wallnau, Lance; Johnson, Bill (2013). Invading Babylon: The 7 Mountain Mandate. Destiny Image Publishers. ISBN 978-0-7684-8566-0. See also [ edit ] Christian nationalismChristian reconstructionismExvangelicalFaith deconstructionMoral MajoritySociological classifications of religious movementsThe Trump ProphecyReferences [ edit ] ^ a b Hare, Julie (28 January 2022). "How Pentecostalism is reshaping America and the world". Australian Financial Review. ^ a b Brockman, David R. (2 June 2016). "The Radical Theology That Could Make Religious Freedom a Thing of the Past". The Texas Observer. ^ a b Vermes, Jason (15 January 2021). "How a conservative Christian movement became an important part of Trump's political strategy". CBC Radio. ^ a b c d Hardy, Elle (19 March 2020). "The 'modern apostles' who want to reshape America ahead of the end times". The Outline. ^ a b c Seidel, Jamie. "The 'Seven Mountains' conspiracy". Adelaide Now . Retrieved 12 March 2022 . ^ Hurley, Bevan (11 March 2022). "TikTok star's family says she's being held hostage in a dance cult". The Independent. ^ a b Hixenbaugh, Mike (23 February 2024). "Alabama justice who ruled embryos are people says American law should be rooted in the Bible". NBC News . Retrieved 23 February 2024 . ^ Rabey, Steve (1 June 2021). "Andrew Wommack urges Christians to 'take over' Woodland Park, Teller County". Colorado Springs Gazette. ^ Rosenberg, Paul (19 December 2021). "Theocrats are coming for the school board '-- but parents are starting to fight back". Salon. ^ "Lauren Boebert is part of a dangerous religious movement that threatens democracy, experts say". Greeley Tribune. 2022-09-15 . Retrieved 2023-02-05 . ^ Posner, Sarah (2011-07-12). "God's Law is the Only Law: The Genesis of Michele Bachmann". Religion Dispatches . Retrieved 2011-07-12 . Further reading [ edit ] O'Reggio, Trevor (2012). "The Rise of the New Apostolic Reformation and Its Implications for Adventist Eschatology". Journal of the Adventist Theological Society. 23 (2). Chetty, Irvin G. (2014). "The New Apostolic Reformation and Christian Zionism". Journal for the Study of Religion. 27 (2): 297''312. JSTOR 24799454. ProQuest 1736623655. Berry, Damon (2020). "Voting in the Kingdom: Prophecy Voters, the New Apostolic Reformation, and Christian Support for Trump". Nova Religio. 23 (4): 69''93. doi:10.1525/nr.2020.23.4.69 . S2CID 219665484. Project MUSE 755978. Sharp, David (4 May 2022). Hijacked Christianity: How An Aberrant Eschatology Enables A Grievance Culture That Supplants Christian Grace For An Extremist Meritocracy (Thesis). doi:10.57709/28912982 . Garrard, Virginia (3 December 2020). "Hidden in Plain Sight: Dominion Theology, Spiritual Warfare, and Violence in Latin America". Religions. 11 (12): 648. doi:10.3390/rel11120648 . ProQuest 2467774776. Willenbrink, Hank (November 2021). "Vessel, Messiah, Warrior: Donald Trump in Evangelical Christian Narratives". Ecumenica. 14 (2): 221''247. doi:10.5325/ecumenica.14.2.0221. S2CID 243967165. Barrett-Fox, Rebecca (November 2018). "A King Cyrus President: How Donald Trump's Presidency Reasserts Conservative Christians' Right to Hegemony". Humanity & Society. 42 (4): 502''522. doi:10.1177/0160597618802644. S2CID 150231701. Marshall, Ruth (2 January 2016). "Destroying arguments and captivating thoughts: Spiritual warfare prayer as global praxis". Journal of Religious and Political Practice. 2 (1): 92''113. doi:10.1080/20566093.2016.1085243 . S2CID 155841692. Perez, Adam A. (4 January 2022). " 'It's Your Breath in Our Lungs': Sean Feucht's Praise and Worship Music Protests and the Theological Problem of Pandemic Response in the U.S." Religions. 13 (1): 47. doi:10.3390/rel13010047 . ProQuest 2621350452. Nelson, Anne (22 January 2021). "Jesus is just all Right? Christian fundamentalists have taken over the Republican Party". Times Literary Supplement (6147): 8''10. Gale A650247088. Besa, Andrew (May 2012). Faith, Rhetoric, and Dominion: How Shared Literacy Lures Latinos (Thesis). hdl:10877/2460 .

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

American missionary and author

Charles Peter WagnerCharles Peter Wagner (August 15, 1930 '' October 21, 2016) was an American missionary, writer, teacher and founder of several Christian organizations. In his earlier years, Wagner was known as a key leader of the Church Growth Movement and later for his writings on spiritual warfare.[1]

Biography [ edit ] Education [ edit ] Wagner was trained at Fuller Theological Seminary, Princeton Theological Seminary, and Fuller's School of World Missions. He received a Ph.D. from the University of Southern California in social ethics in 1977. He was ordained by the Conservative Congregational Christian Conference.[2]

Missionary work [ edit ] Wagner served as a missionary in Bolivia under the South American Mission and Andes Evangelical Mission (now SIM International) from 1956 to 1971. He then served for 30 years (1971 to 2001) as Professor of Church Growth at the Fuller Theological Seminary's School of World Missions until his retirement in 2001. During his time at Fuller, Peter was largely recognized as the leading authority on the Church Growth Movement[3] after his mentor and the founder of the movement, Donald McGavran passed the succession to him.[4] The acceptance of Peter's teachings on church growth by churches across the world was due in part to the use of Fuller Theological Seminary as a platform to spreading the message.[5] Together, both McGavran and Wagner led the Fuller Evangelistic Association to continue to spread the message of church growth.[6]

He authored 80 books and was the founding president of Global Harvest Ministries from 1993 to 2011 and founder and chancellor emeritus of Wagner Leadership Institute (now Wagner University), an unaccredited institution which trains revivalists and reformers to bring about a global movement of transformation.[7][8] He also founded Reformation Prayer Network, International Coalition of Apostles, Eagles Vision Apostolic Team, and the Hamilton Group and served as vice president of Global Spheres, Inc.

He died in 2016 at the age of 86.

Theology [ edit ] Spiritual warfare [ edit ] Wagner wrote about spiritual warfare, in books including Confronting the Powers: How the New Testament Church Experienced the Power of Strategic-Level Spiritual Warfare and Engaging the Enemy. In Confronting the Powers, Wagner breaks down spiritual warfare as having three levels: "Ground Level: Person-to-person, praying for each other's personal needs. Occult Level: deals with demonic forces released through activities related to Satanism, witchcraft, astrology and many other forms of structured occultism. Strategic-Level or Cosmic-Level: To bind and bring down spiritual principalities and powers that rule over governments."[9] "Strategic-level intercession" uses "spiritual mapping" and "tearing down strongholds" to engage in spiritual warfare against "territorial spirits".[10]

According to Wagner, these methods "were virtually unknown to the majority of Christians before the 1990s''.[11] The premise of Engaging the Enemy is that Satan and his demons are literally in the world, that Satan's territorial spirit-demons may be identified by name, and that Christians are to engage in spiritual warfare with them.[12]

Wagner preached a fivefold ministry view based on Ephesians 4:13, in which apostles, prophets, evangelists, pastors, and teachers are considered legitimate offices of the church. While mainline Protestant denominations see prophets and apostles as dispensed of within the early period of Christianity, Wagner's spiritual-warfare theology depicted these figures as prayer-warriors actively interceding in the contemporary world. These prayer warriors are responsible for ushering in the return of Jesus and the Kingdom of God through warfare prayer.[13]

In Hard-Core Idolatry: Facing the Facts, Wagner asserted that idolizing Catholic saints brings honor to the spirits of darkness, and promotes the burning of their statues in Argentina. Wagner asserted that the Holy Spirit came to his associate, Cindy Jacobs (a prophet in Wagner's Apostolic Council of Prophetic Elders) and "told her that in [the Argentinian city of] Resistencia they need to burn the idols, like the magicians did in Ephesus in Acts of the Apostles".[14]

New Apostolic Reformation [ edit ] Wagner used the term New Apostolic Reformation (NAR) to describe what he observed as a movement within Pentecostal and charismatic churches. The title is not an organization and does not have formal membership.[15]

Wagner stated, "The roots of the NAR go back to the beginning of the African Independent Church Movement in 1900, the Chinese House Church Movement beginning in 1976, the U.S. Independent Charismatic Movement beginning in the 1970s and the Latin American Grassroots Church Movement beginning around the same time. I was neither the founder nor a member of any of these movements, I was simply a professor who observed that they were the fastest growing churches in their respective regions and that they had a number of common characteristics."[16]

Dr. Roger Olson writes, '''...the closer I looked at the NARM [New Apostolic Reformation Movement] the less convinced I was that it is a cohesive movement at all. It seems more like a kind of umbrella term for a loose collection of independent ministries that have a few common interests...I have examined the web sites of several independent evangelists who claim to represent that affinity...So far none of them seem blatantly heretical. Eccentric, non-mainline, a bit fanatical, maybe.''[17] Another term coined by Wagner is the Third Wave of the Holy Spirit. The NAR includes key elements of the Third Wave such as claims of miraculous healing.

Wagner provided the key differences between the NAR and traditional Protestantism in his article The New Apostolic Reformation Is Not a Cult.[18] He noted that those participating in the movement believe the Apostles' Creed and adhere to orthodox Christian doctrine.

Dominionism [ edit ] In his 1998 book Churchquake!, Wagner denied that NAR had any political orientation. Ten years later he published Dominion!, an endorsement of dominion theology.

Selected works [ edit ] Latin American Theology. Radical or Evangelical, Eerdmans, 1970.[19]Your Spiritual Gifts Can Help Your Church Grow, Regal Books, 1979, 1994, 2005. ISBN 0-8307-3697-2Strategies for Church Growth, Regal Books, 1987. ISBN 0-8307-1170-8How to Have a Healing Ministry, Regal Books, 1988. ISBN 0-8307-1297-6The New Apostolic Churches, Regal Books, 1998 ISBN 0-8307-2137-1Churchquake!, Regal Books, 1999. ISBN 0-8307-1918-0Changing Church, Regal Books, 2004. ISBN 0-8307-3278-0Breaking Strongholds in Your City, Regal Books, 1993. ISBN 0-8307-1638-6Freedom from the Religious Spirit, Regal Books, 2005. ISBN 0-8307-3670-0Engaging the Enemy, Regal Books, 1991.Prayer Warrior Series, Regal Books, 1992''1997.Warfare Prayer: How to Seek God's Power and Protection in the Battle to Build His Kingdom ISBN 0-8307-1534-7Prayer shield: How to intercede for pastors, Christian leaders, and others on the spiritual frontlines ISBN 0-8307-1573-8Confronting the Powers: How the New Testament Church Experienced the Power of Strategic-Level Spiritual Warfare ISBN 0-8307-1819-2Praying With Power : How to Pray Effectively and Hear Clearly from God ISBN 0-8307-1919-9Dominion:How Kingdom Action Can Change the World, Chosen Books, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8007-9435-4The Book Of Acts: A Commentary, Regal Books, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8307-4595-1References [ edit ] ^ "C. Peter Wagner (1930-2016), Some Thoughts on His Life and Passing | the Exchange | A Blog by ed Stetzer". Archived from the original on 2018-03-15 . Retrieved 2016-11-21 . ^ Ren(C) Holvast, ''Spiritual Mapping: The Turbulent Career of a Contested American Missionary Paradigm, 1989-2005'', Doctoral Dissertation, University of Utrecht, July 11, 2008,p228. ^ Rainer, Thom S. (September 1998). The Book of Church Growth. B&H Publishing. ISBN 9781433669460. ^ McRae, Fred W. (30 January 2014). A Case Study in Contextualization: The History of the German Church Growth Association 1985-2003. Wipf and Stock Publishers. ISBN 9781620328507. ^ Zondervan (June 2010). Evaluating the Church Growth Movement: 5 Views. Zondervan. ISBN 9780310872153. ^ Zondervan (June 2010). Evaluating the Church Growth Movement: 5 Views. Zondervan. ISBN 9780310872153. ^ "Apostolic Leader and Authority on Church Growth C. Peter Wagner, Dies". CBN News. 24 October 2016 . Retrieved 22 August 2018 . ^ "Wagner University". Wagner University. Archived from the original on 22 August 2018 . Retrieved 22 August 2018 . ^ C. Peter Wagner. Confronting the Powers: How the New Testament Church Experienced the Power of Strategic-level Spiritual Warfare. Regal Books; 1996. ISBN 978-0-8307-1819-1.pp.21-22 ^ Confronting the Powers ^ Confronting the Powers, p21 ^ C. Peter Wagner, Engaging the Enemy ^ McAlister, Elizabeth (2016-01-02). "The militarization of prayer in America: White and Native American spiritual warfare". Journal of Religious and Political Practice. 2 (1): 114''130. doi:10.1080/20566093.2016.1085239 . ISSN 2056-6093. ^ Hard-Core Idolatry '' Facing the Facts, pp 38-40, 1999, publisher - Wagner Institute of Practical Ministry ^ Michael Brown (30 April 2018). "Dispelling the Myths About NAR (the New Apostolic Reformation)". Ask Dr. Brown . Retrieved 22 August 2018 . ^ C. Peter Wagner (24 August 2011). "The New Apostolic Reformation Is Not a Cult". Charisma News . Retrieved 22 August 2018 . ^ Roger Olson (25 June 2015). "Is the "New Apostolic Reformation Movement" a Cult?". Patheos . Retrieved 22 August 2018 . ^ Wagner, C. Peter. "The New Apostolic Reformation Is Not a Cult". Charisma News. ^ Latin American theology: radical or evangelical? The struggle for the faith in a young church, (Book, 1970). [WorldCat.org]. 2019-01-04. OCLC 451938295 . Retrieved 2022-01-29 . Sources [ edit ] George M. Marsden, Reforming Fundamentalism: Fuller Seminary and the New Evangelicalism (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1987), pp. 292''295. ISBN 0-8028-3642-9

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From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Movement which seeks to establish a fifth branch within Christendom

The New Apostolic Reformation (NAR) is a movement[1] which seeks to establish a fifth branch within Christendom distinct from Catholicism, Protestantism (which includes classical forms of Pentecostalism, the Charismatic movement, and Evangelicalism), Oriental Orthodoxy, and Eastern Orthodoxy.[citation needed ] The NAR movement largely consists of churches nominally or formerly associated with Pentecostal denominations and Charismatic movements but have diverged from traditional or classical Pentecostal and Charismatic theology in that it advocates for the restoration of church governance by the lost offices of prophet and apostle,[2][3][4] which they believe were lost in the first centuries of Christianity[3][4] in favor of pastors, elders, and administrators.[4]

Beliefs [ edit ] The New Apostolic Reformation is a title originally used by C. Peter Wagner to describe a movement within Pentecostal and charismatic churches. The title New Apostolic Reformation is descriptive of a theological movement and is not an organization and therefore does not have formal membership. Among those in the movement that inspired the title NAR, there is a wide range of variance on specific beliefs. Those within the movement hold to their denominational interpretations of the ongoing ministry of the Holy Spirit within each believer. Unlike some parts of Protestant Christianity, these include the direct revelation of Christ to each believer, prophecy, and the performance of miracles such as healing[clarification needed ]. This movement has also been given the descriptive title "Third Wave of the Holy Spirit".[5]

Although the movement regards the church as the true body of saved believers, as does most of evangelical Protestantism, it differs from the broader Protestant tradition in its view on the nature of church leadership, specifically the doctrine of "five-fold ministry", which is based upon a non-traditional interpretation of Ephesians 4:11[clarification needed ], the so called-"apostles and prophets",[6] evangelists, pastors (also referred to as the shepherds), and teachers.

Wagner listed the differences between the NAR and other Protestant denominations as follows[2] (these differences stated directly below also diverge from traditional Pentecostalism[citation needed ][7][8]).

Apostolic governance '' Using the Apostle Paul as an example to say that Jesus appoints apostles within his church up to this day.The office of the prophet '' Saying there is within the church a role and function for present-day "prophets".Dominionism / Seven Mountain Mandate '' Dominion theology (also known as dominionism) is based on the idea that the world has been under the influence of Satan since the fall of man and that it is Christians who have the authority as well as the duty to reclaim it for God, as an interpretation of the Lord's Prayer, "Your kingdom come, Your will be done on earth as it is in heaven".[2]Theocracy '' Though similar in intent and purpose, not to be confused with theocratic government but rather the goal to have "kingdom-minded people" in all areas of society. There are seven areas identified specifically: religion, family, education, government, media, arts & entertainment, and business.[2]Relational structures '' church governance has no formal structure but rather is by relational and voluntary alignment to apostles.[9]C. Peter Wagner wrote that most of the churches in this movement have active ministries of spiritual warfare.[10] In an article responding to criticism of the NAR, Wagner noted that those who affiliate themselves with the movement believe the Apostles' Creed and all the orthodoxy of Christian doctrine.

Similarities with traditional Pentecostalism:

Supernatural signs and wonders '' Signs and wonders such as healing, demonic deliverance, and confirmed prophecies accompany the move of God.Supernatural Revelations '' There is available to all believers the ability to hear from God. "The one major rule governing any new revelation from God is that it cannot contradict what has already been written in the Bible. It may supplement it, however."[11]History [ edit ] The origins of the new apostolic reform are associated with the Pentecostal movement of the 1900s and with the Charismatic Christianity movements of the 1960s and 1980s.[12]

In 1996, the American theologian C. Peter Wagner organized a convention with 500 evangelical leaders, the National Symposium on the Postdenominational Church, including the organization of the church and evangelization, at the Fuller Theological Seminary of Pasadena in the United States.[13] Since this convention, the term has been used more and more in churches[citation needed ].

Notable members [ edit ] Though few, if any, organizations publicly espouse connection to the NAR, a movement known for dominion theology and a belief in the continuing ministries of apostles and prophets alongside those of evangelists, pastors, and teachers, (Ephesians 4:11''13) there are several individuals often associated with this movement including:

Lou Engle, founder of TheCall[14]Bill Johnson, senior leader of Bethel Church[15]Guillermo Maldonado, co-founder and senior pastor of El Rey JesºsRick Joyner, founder of MorningStar MinistriesJohn P. Kelly, founder of John P. Kelly Ministries and Convening ApostleC. Peter Wagner, founder of Global Harvest Ministries[2]Ch(C) Ahn, Harvest International Ministries[16][better source needed ]Todd White, Lifestyle Christianity[16][better source needed ]Faytene Grasseschi[17]Cindy Jacobs, cofounder of Generals International[18]C. Peter Wagner of Global Harvest Ministries considered the year 2001 to be the beginning of the second apostolic age, for the movement holds that the lost offices of prophet and apostle were restored in that year.[19]

After being named as part of the NAR, and critics believing that Bethel Church was instrumental in leading some Christians to embrace tenets of NAR, Pastor Bill Johnson of Bethel became regularly listed as an NAR leader. Johnson confirmed that he does believe in the apostolic and prophetic ministries, he denied however in an official statement that his church had any official ties to the NAR."[20][clarification needed ]

Mike Johnson reacted to attacks against him such as Bill Maher comparing him to the Maine shooter, and Adam Kinzinger and the Daily Beast likening him to the Taliban by stating such were "disgusting" and "absurd", and that James Carville's characterization of his worldview as posing a greater threat to the U.S. than al Qaeda was "twisted and shameful".[21]

In 2023, Mike Johnson (R LA), Christian Nationalist newly elected Speaker of the United States House of Representatives, hung the Appeal to Heaven flag outside his Congressional office, which The New Republic[22] and National Public Radio[23] associated with the movement. Historically, this flag was a Revolutionary War banner, commissioned by George Washington as a naval flag for Massachusetts, while the quote "An Appeal to Heaven" is traced to John Locke,[24] in refuting the theory of the divine right of kings.[25]

When Rick Joyner of the MorningStar Ministries was listed, he announced that "there will likewise be a horde of false apostles released" continuing: "Our team received two very specific dreams warning about false 'apostolic movements' that were built more on organization than relationship. The dreams indicated that these were trying to bring forth apostles that were really more like corporate CEOs, and the movement that they led had the potential to do great damage to the church. The enemy's intent with this false apostolic movement was to have the church develop a deep revulsion to anything that was called apostolic."[26]

Controversy and criticism [ edit ] Forrest Wilder, senior editor for the Texas Observer, describes the New Apostolic Reformation as having "taken Pentecostalism, with its emphasis on ecstatic worship and the supernatural, and given it an adrenaline shot."[5] Wilder adds that beliefs of people associated with the movement "can tend toward the bizarre" and that it has "taken biblical literalism to an extreme".

Al Jazeera called the NAR "America's Own Taliban" in an article highlighting NAR's dominionism as bearing resemblance to Islamic extremism as seen in groups such as the Taliban because of the NAR's language concerning a form of prayer called spiritual warfare.[27]

National Public Radio brought the discussion about the political influence of the NAR to a national audience with a 2011 article. Lou Engle and Don Finto, who are considered to be leaders within the NAR, participated in a prayer event called "The Response" hosted by Texan governor Rick Perry, on August 6, 2011, in Houston, Texas. This event is cited as a sign of the influence of NAR beliefs on Rick Perry's political viewpoints.[5][28]

The Passion Translation has been identified by researchers of the NAR movement as containing "completely reworded verses, making it appear that the Bible supports NAR teachings."[29]

Details of what the NAR is and represents is debated within Christian Evangelicalism.[30]

See also [ edit ] Apostolic-Prophetic MovementBook of RevelationEschatologyThird Wave of the Holy SpiritChristian nationalismChristian fascismReferences [ edit ] ^ Onishi, Bradley; Taylor, Matthew D. (2023-11-16). "Mike Johnson Flies Christian Nationalist 'Appeal to Heaven' Flag". Politics > Political Commentary. Rolling Stone. ISSN 0035-791X . Retrieved 2023-11-16 . ^ a b c d e Wagner, Peter (24 Aug 2011). "The New Apostolic Reformation Is Not a Cult". Charisma News. Retrieved 2013-02-20. ^ a b Gunn, G. Allen. "The New Apostolic Reformation: A Modern-Day Apostasy" (PDF) . Shasta Bible College & Graduate School . Retrieved 9 December 2023 . ^ a b c "The New Apostolic Reformation: Influence and Teachings". Apologetics Index . Retrieved 9 December 2023 . ^ a b c Wilder, Forrest (2 August 2011). "Rick Perry's Army of God". Texas Observer. Archived from the original on 13 August 2011 . Retrieved 15 August 2011 . ^ The Evangelicals Engaged In Spiritual Warfare, National Public Radio, Rachel Tabachnick, August 19, 2011. Retrieved June 2, 2022. ^ "Apostles and Prophets (Adopted by the General Presbytery in Session)". 2001-08-06. ^ "The Kingdom of God". 2010-08-09. ^ Wilder, Forrest (12 August 2011). "As Texas Gov. Rick Perry Enters GOP Race, New Expos(C) Reveals His Close Ties to Radical Evangelicals". Democracy Now . Retrieved 14 October 2013 . ^ Wagner, Peter (2000). "Renewal Journal #15, The New Apostolic Reformation". Renewal Journal. Archived from the original on 27 September 2011 . Retrieved 25 August 2011 . ^ Wagner, Peter (2011). "The Truth About The New Apostolic Reformation" . Retrieved 21 Oct 2021 . ^ John Weaver, The New Apostolic Reformation: History of a Modern Charismatic Movement, McFarland & Company, USA, 2016, p. 19 ^ John Weaver, The New Apostolic Reformation: History of a Modern Charismatic Movement, McFarland & Company, USA, 2016, p. 87 ^ Tabachnick, Rachel (19 August 2011). "The Evangelicals Engaged In Spiritual Warfare". National Public Radio . Retrieved 22 July 2013 . ^ "Bill & Beni Johnson". Bethel Church . Retrieved 2021-08-12 . ^ a b Kozar, Steven (9 February 2016). "The New Apostolic Reformation Cornucopia of False Doctrine, Dominionism, Charismania and Deception". Pirate Christian Radio . Retrieved 5 September 2018 . ^ Poitras, Jacques (July 23, 2023). "Breakaway believers warn PC party of 'Dominionist' religious movement". CBC News. ^ "About Mike and Cindy". Generals International . Retrieved February 17, 2024 . ^ The "New Apostolic" church movementArchived 2011-09-06 at the Wayback Machine '' Let Us Reason Ministries '' (C. Peter Wagner Arise Prophetic Conference Gateway Church San Jose, CA 10/10/2004) Retrieved 11 July 2011. ^ Christianity Today: Inside popular controversial Bethel Church ^ Brown, Jon. "Mike Johnson blasts James Carville for saying 'Christian nationalists' worse than al Qaeda: 'Twisted and shameful". The Christian Post. The Christian Post INC . Retrieved 10 December 2023 . ^ Otten, Tori (1 November 2022). "Why Is Mike Johnson Flying a Christian Nationalist Flag Outside His Office?". The New Republic . Retrieved 2 February 2024 . ^ Davis, Susan (15 November 2023). "Speaker Johnson's close ties to Christian right '-- both mainstream and fringe". National Public Radio . Retrieved 2 February 2024 . ^ Onishi, Bradley; Taylor, Matthew. "The Key to Mike Johnson's Christian Extremism Hangs Outside His Office". ^ John Locke. "Second Treatise on Civil Government". - Chapter 3 Sect. 20-21 & Chapter 14 Sect. 168 ^ "Revolution". 8 June 2017. ^ Rosenberg, Paul (28 July 2011). "America's Own Taliban". Al Jazeera . Retrieved 19 July 2013 . ^ Posner, Sarah (15 Jul 2011). "Rick Perry and the New Apostolic Reformation". Religion Dispatches . Retrieved 2013-03-01 . ^ Geivett, R. Douglas and Holly Pivec, God's Super Apostles: Encountering the Worldwide Prophets and Apostles Movement, Lexham Press, 2014, p.67. ^ Alcindor, Nicole. "What is the New Apostolic Reformation and is it 'dangerous'?". The Christian Post. The Christian Post, INC . Retrieved 10 December 2023 . Further reading [ edit ] Churchquake: The Explosive Dynamics of the New Apostolic Revolution. ISBN 0-8307-1918-0.The New Apostolic Churches. ISBN 0-8307-2136-3.The Apostolic Revelation '' The Reformation of the Church. ISBN 0-646-41849-1.God's Super-Apostles: Encountering the Worldwide Prophets and Apostles Movement. ISBN 1-941-33708-2.A New Apostolic Reformation?: A Biblical Response to a Worldwide Movement. ISBN 1-941-33703-1.The New Apostolic Reformation: History of a Modern Charismatic Movement. ISBN 0786499567.External links [ edit ] NAR ConnectionsThe Call Official websiteEl Rey Jesºs Official websiteWagner UniversityInternational Coalition of ApostlesInternational Coalition of Apostolic LeadersEuropean Coalition of Apostolic LeadersWhat does Mike Bickle and the International House of Prayer believe about NAR?

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Sat, 24 Feb 2024 05:05

Heidi Przybyla, a reporter for Politico, appeared on MSNBC this week and fretted as she explained that Christian Nationalists believe that Americans' rights are granted by God and not Congress or the Supreme Court.

Leaving aside her ridiculous distinctions between Christian Nationalists and other Christians, the rights of Americans DO come from God and not the government, which anyone knows if they have read the country's founding documents.

How is this person even allowed to comment on politics on TV with this level of dishonesty or stupidity? This is a perfect example of why trust in the media is in the gutter.

Transcript via Real Clear Politics:

HEIDI PRZYBYLA: I talked with a lot of experts on this and I have seen it with my reporting, Michael, which is that the base of the Republican Party has shifted. Remember when Trump ran in 2016, a lot of the mainline evangelicals wanted nothing to do with the divorced real estate mogul who cheated on his wife with a porn star, and all of that.

So what happened was that he was surrounded by this more extremist element. We are going to hear words like Christian nationalism, like the ''new apostolic reformation.'' These are groups that you should get very schooled on because they have a lot of power in Trump's circle. And the one thing that unites all of them because there's many different groups orbiting Trump.

But the thing that unites them as Christian nationalists, not Christians because Christian nationalists are very different, is that they believe that our rights as Americans and as all human beings do not come from any Earthly authority. They don't come from Congress, from the Supreme Court, they come from God. The problem with that is that they are determining, men, are determining what God is telling them. In the past, that so-called ''natural law,'' it is a pillar of catholicism for instance, it has been used for good in social justice campaigns. Martin Luther King evoked it in talking about civil rights.

Watch the video:

Here @MSNBC helpfully makes it clear their disdain for Christians in America.

She says that if you believe that your rights come from God, you aren't a Christian, you are a Christian nationalist.

Somehow they seem to not mention that our own founding documents make this'... pic.twitter.com/WTLMqcqTzg

'-- Wade Miller (@WadeMiller_USMC) February 23, 2024

It's just stunning. These are the people who are driving the nation's political news.

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Sat, 24 Feb 2024 04:42

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Sat, 24 Feb 2024 04:33

ROCK HILL, S.C. (AP) '-- Former President Donald Trump said Friday that he would ''strongly support the availability of IVF'' and called on lawmakers in Alabama to preserve access to the treatment that has become a new flashpoint in the 2024 presidential election.

It was his first comment since an Alabama Supreme Court ruling that led some providers in the state to suspend their in vitro fertilization programs and has left Republicans divided over the issue .

Trump, in a post on his Truth Social network, said: ''Under my leadership, the Republican Party will always support the creation of strong, thriving, healthy American families. We want to make it easier for mothers and fathers to have babies, not harder!''

The all-Republican Alabama Supreme Court , among the nation's most conservative judicial panels, ruled that frozen embryos can be considered children under state law. Since then, some Alabama clinics and hospitals, including the University of Alabama at Birmingham health system, have announced pauses on IVF services.

AP correspondent Ed Donahue says the Repblican presidential front runner is speaking out about IVF.

The fallout has deepened divisions among conservatives over abortion and other reproductive services in a campaign year already fraught with debates over whether Republicans should pursue national abortion limits after the U.S. Supreme Court's 2022 ruling that overturned the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision legalizing abortion nationwide. Trump and former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, his last remaining major opponent for the GOP presidential nomination, have both cautioned against an absolute national ban and now have distanced themselves from the Alabama case.

As president, Trump nominated three of the justices who overturned Roe and paved the way for state lawmakers across the country to impose dramatic restrictions on access to abortion.

''Trump cannot run from his record and neither can the millions of women who his actions have hurt,'' said Julie Chavez Rodriguez, President Joe Biden's campaign manager, in a statement.

Trump and Haley were campaigning Friday ahead of Saturday's South Carolina Republican presidential primary, in which the former president is the overwhelming favorite, despite Haley having been twice elected South Carolina governor. The Alabama decision almost certainly will not change GOP primary dynamics, but the conversation carries important implications for the general election as Republicans try to avoid being tagged by Democrats as too extreme on reproductive policy.

Republicans' Senate campaign committee leaders acknowledged the stakes with an open memo Friday warning that the Alabama case ''is fodder for Democrats hoping to manipulate the abortion issue for electoral gain.'' The memo included talking points for Republican Senate candidates, with ''Express Support for IVF'' topping the list of recommendations.

Speaking Friday night in Columbia, South Carolina, Trump acknowledged the tension among Republicans over the issue and said he had received praise for supporting IVF.

''A lot of politicians were very happy because they didn't know how to respond to the decision that came down,'' he said. ''Now they all know how to respond.''

Haley steered clear of the IVF conversation Friday. She said Thursday, after the Alabama ruling, that she views human embryos, which are the earliest form of development after fertilization, as ''babies.'' But she also said she disagrees with the Alabama court and said the state's legislators should ''look at the law.'' Alabama Gov. Kay Ivey and Republican legislative leaders had already started that conversation before the GOP's presidential candidates weighed in.

In his social media post, Trump steered clear of declaring embryos to be distinct humans worthy of legal protection. His statement focused instead on the practical considerations for would-be parents trying to start families. IVF is typically a months-long process for couples or women who have struggled to conceive and maintain a viable pregnancy naturally. The treatments can cost patients tens of thousands of dollars, with no assurances that an implanted embryo will become viable and end with a healthy child.

''I'm pro-family,'' Donald Trump Jr. said Friday in Charleston, campaigning on his father's behalf not long before the elder Trump issued his statement. ''Families should do what they want to be able to make families.''

Trump Jr. said he had not discussed the specifics with his father since the Alabama ruling but said he and his father both know families who have used IVF as a path to having children.

The former president and Haley have found themselves ensnared by abortion and reproductive politics already in the 2024 campaign.

Trump has taken credit for the ruling overturning Roe but also warned Republicans about going too far adopting statutory restrictions on abortions, lest the party lose support from moderate voters. Polling has shown for years that most Americans, even many who think of themselves as ''pro-life,'' want to preserve some access to the procedure.

Nonetheless, anti-abortion advocates have suggested courts should go further to rule embryos are children, though that would sharply ramp up restrictions on treatments like IVF. Specifically, the Alabama ruling raises questions about what would become of frozen embryos that are not used in implantation procedures, what financial responsibility patients might have to maintain them if they could not legally be destroyed and what civil and even criminal liabilities medical providers could face throughout the process.

As she campaigned Friday in Moncks Corner, South Carolina, Haley stuck to her argument that Trump, who has been indicted four times, is too big a risk for Republicans to nominate again. She repeated her pledge to stay in the primary fight at least until the March 5 Super Tuesday primaries, and she again hammered Trump for cozying up to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

''Trump is siding with a dictator who kills his political opponents,'' she said, referring to Russian dissident Alexei Navalny, who died recently in an Arctic prison camp after being jailed by Putin's Kremlin government.

Haley's approach, however, has yet to persuade enough Republican primary voters, with Trump running up wide margins in Iowa, New Hampshire and Nevada. Even in South Carolina, where Haley was once the state's most powerful, popular Republican figure, she has had trouble winning over conservatives.

''I'm assuming that every one of you wants to see a change in our country,'' she said later in Mount Pleasant, drawing chants of ''Nikki! Nikki! Nikki!''

But that crowd of supporters was measured in hundreds. Trump's was measured in thousands.

Jim Schurtz, a 72-year-old retired engineer who came to hear Trump on Friday in Rock Hill, went so far as to say Haley had been ''a terrible governor.'' Sporting a red Trump hat with a giant ''T'' and ''2024'' across the top, Schurtz said he doesn't think Haley would be elected governor if she had to run again.

''All she does is put Trump down,'' he said.

Both Trumps took shots at Haley, saying she's staying in the race to ensure financial windfalls after the campaign. Trump Jr. suggested Haley is running for a post on ''the Raytheon board,'' referring to the defense conglomerate now known as RTX Corp. The former president mused at his rally about a different landing spot: ''Maybe she wants to get a contract at CNN.''

Even if Haley can narrow Trump's expected margins, she could watch him extend his delegate lead nationally. Of South Carolina's 50 delegates, 29 are awarded to the statewide winner. The other 21 are distributed according to the outcome within each of the state's seven congressional districts; each district is worth 3 delegates for the top vote-getter. In 2016, Trump used that system to sweep South Carolina's delegates.

In Rock Hill, Trump spent more time on a string of attacks directed at Biden, former President Barack Obama and Republican Sen. Mitt Romney than he did talking about Haley. But, Trump said mockingly, ''I have an obligation'' to mention Haley before polls open Saturday.

So, he offered a prediction: ''She's going to have a very bad day tomorrow.''

___Pollard reported from Moncks Corner, South Carolina, Kinnard reported from Charleston, South Carolina, and Barrow reported from New York. Associated Press writer Jill Colvin contributed to this report from Columbia, South Carolina.

Pollard is a statehouse reporter based in Columbia, South Carolina. He is a Report for America corps member who also covers inequality.

Price is a national political reporter for The Associated Press. She is based in New York.

Kinnard covers national politics for The Associated Press. She lives in South Carolina.

Bill Barrow covers U.S. politics. He is based in Atlanta.

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Sat, 24 Feb 2024 04:30

MONTGOMERY, Ala. (AP) '-- The Alabama Supreme Court has ruled that frozen embryos can be considered children under state law, a decision critics said could have sweeping implications for fertility treatment in the state.

The decision was issued in a pair of wrongful death cases brought by three couples who had frozen embryos destroyed in an accident at a fertility clinic. Justices, citing anti-abortion language in the Alabama Constitution, ruled that an 1872 state law allowing parents to sue over the death of a minor child ''applies to all unborn children, regardless of their location.''

''Unborn children are 'children' ... without exception based on developmental stage, physical location, or any other ancillary characteristics,'' Justice Jay Mitchell wrote in Friday's majority ruling by the all-Republican court.

Mitchell said the court had previously ruled that fetuses killed while a woman is pregnant are covered under Alabama's Wrongful Death of a Minor Act and nothing excludes ''extrauterine children from the Act's coverage.''

The ruling brought a rush of warnings about the potential impact on fertility treatments and the freezing of embryos, which had previously been considered property by the courts.

''This ruling is stating that a fertilized egg, which is a clump of cells, is now a person. It really puts into question, the practice of IVF,'' Barbara Collura, CEO of RESOLVE: The National Infertility Association, told The Associated Press Tuesday. The group called the decision a ''terrifying development for the 1-in-6 people impacted by infertility'' who need in-vitro fertilization.

She said it raises questions for providers and patients, including if they can freeze future embryos created during fertility treatment or if patients could ever donate or destroy unused embryos.

Sean Tipton, a spokesman with the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, said at least one Alabama fertility clinic has been instructed by their affiliated hospital to pause IVF treatment in the immediate wake of the decision.

Dr. Paula Amato, president of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, said a decision to treat frozen fertilized egg as the legal equivalent of a child or gestating fetus could limit the availability of modern health care.

''By insisting that these very different biological entities are legally equivalent, the best state-of-the-art fertility care will be made unavailable to the people of Alabama. No health care provider will be willing to provide treatments if those treatments may lead to civil or criminal charges,'' Amato said.

Gabby Goidel, 26, who is pursuing IVF treatment in Alabama after three miscarriages, said the court ruling came down on the same day she began daily injections ahead of egg retrieval.

''It just kind of took me by by storm. It was like all I could think about and it was just a very stressful thing to hear. I immediately messaged my clinic and asked if this could potentially halt us. They said we have to take it one day at a time,'' Goidel said.

She said her clinic is continuing to provide treatment for now, but said it will let her know if they have to change course.

Goidel said she turned to IVF and preimplantation genetic testing after the multiple miscarriages related to genetic issues.

''Without IVF, I would have to probably go through several more miscarriages before I even had an option of having a baby that is my own,'' she said.

The plaintiffs in the Alabama case had undergone IVF treatments that led to the creation of several embryos, some of which were implanted and resulted in healthy births. The couples paid to keep others frozen in a storage facility at the Mobile Infirmary Medical Center. A patient in 2020 wandered into the area and removed several embryos, dropping them on the floor and ''killing them,'' the ruling said.

The justices ruled that wrongful death lawsuits by the couples could proceed. The clinic and hospital that are defendants in the case could ask the court to reconsider its decision.

Michael Upchurch, a lawyer for the fertility clinic in the lawsuit, Center for Reproductive Medicine, said they are ''evaluating the consequences of the decision and have no further comment at this time.''

An anti-abortion group cheered the decision. ''Each person, from the tiniest embryo to an elder nearing the end of his life, has incalculable value that deserves and is guaranteed legal protection,'' Lila Rose, president and founder of Live Action said in a statement.

Chief Justice Tom Parker issued a concurring opinion in which he quoted the Bible in discussing the meaning of the phrase ''the sanctity of unborn life'' in the Alabama Constitution.

''Even before birth, all human beings bear the image of God, and their lives cannot be destroyed without effacing his glory,'' Parker said.

Justice Greg Cook, who filed the only full dissent to the majority opinion, said the 1872 law did not define ''minor child'' and was being stretched from the original intent to cover frozen embryos.

''No court '-- anywhere in the country '-- has reached the conclusion the main opinion reaches,'' he wrote, adding the ruling ''almost certainly ends the creation of frozen embryos through in vitro fertilization (IVF) in Alabama.''

The Alabama Supreme Court decision partly hinged on anti-abortion language added to the Alabama Constitution in 2018, stating it is the ''policy of this state to ensure the protection of the rights of the unborn child.''

Supporters at the time said it would have no impact unless states gained more control over abortion access. States gained control of abortion access in 2022.

White House press secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said the Alabama decision reflected the consequences of the Supreme Court overturning Roe v. Wade and blamed Republican elected officials from blocking access to reproductive and emergency care to women.

''This president and this vice president will continue to fight to protect access to reproductive health care and call on Congress to restore the protections of Roe v. Wade in federal law for all women in every state,'' Jean-Pierre told reporters aboard Air Force One.

___Aamer Madhani aboard Air Force One contributed to this report.

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Fri, 23 Feb 2024 22:56

One document drafted by CRA staff and fellows includes a list of top priorities for CRA in a second Trump term. ''Christian nationalism'' is one of the bullet points. Others include invoking the Insurrection Act on Day One to quash protests and refusing to spend authorized congressional funds on unwanted projects, a practice banned by lawmakers in the Nixon era.

CRA's work fits into a broader effort by conservative, MAGA-leaning organizations to influence a future Trump White House. Two people familiar with the plans, who were granted anonymity to discuss internal matters, said that Vought hopes his proximity and regular contact with the former president '-- he and Trump speak at least once a month, according to one of the people '-- will elevate Christian nationalism as a focal point in a second Trump term.

The documents obtained by POLITICO do not outline specific Christian nationalist policies. But Vought has promoted a restrictionist immigration agenda, saying a person's background doesn't define who can enter the U.S., but rather, citing Biblical teachings, whether that person ''accept[ed] Israel's God, laws and understanding of history.''

Vought has a close affiliation with Christian nationalist William Wolfe, a former Trump administration official who has advocated for overturning same-sex marriage, ending abortion and reducing access to contraceptives.

Vought, who declined to comment, is advising Project 2025, a governing agenda that would usher in one of the most conservative executive branches in modern American history. The effort is made up of a constellation of conservative groups run by Trump allies who've constructed a detailed plan to dismantle or overhaul key agencies in a second term. Among other principles, the project's ''Mandate for Leadership'' states that ''freedom is defined by God, not man.''

The Trump campaign has said repeatedly that it alone is responsible for assembling a policy platform and staffing for a future administration. In response to various news articles about how conservatives are preparing for a second Trump term, campaign advisers Susie Wiles and Chris LaCivita said in a memo late last year: ''Despite our being crystal clear, some 'allies' haven't gotten the hint, and the media, in their anti-Trump zeal, has been all-too-willing to continue using anonymous sourcing and speculation about a second Trump administration in an effort to prevent a second Trump administration.''

Trump's campaign declined to comment for this story.

Donald Trump speaks at the Faith and Freedom Road to Majority conference at the Washington Hilton on June 24, 2023, in Washington.|Drew Angerer/Getty Images

Rachel Cauley, CRA's communication director, said ''the so-called reporting from POLITICO in this story is false and we told them so on multiple occasions.''

Trump is not a devout man of faith. But Christian Nationalists have been among his most reliable campaign activists and voting blocs. Trump formed a political alliance with evangelicals during his first run for office, delivered them a six to three conservative majority on the Supreme Court and is now espousing the Christian right's long-running argument that Christians are so severely persecuted that it necessitates a federal response.

In a December campaign speech in Iowa, he said ''Marxists and fascists'' are ''going hard'' against Catholics. ''Upon taking office, I will create a new federal task force on fighting anti-Christian bias to be led by a fully reformed Department of Justice that's fair and equitable'' and that will ''investigate all forms of illegal discrimination.''

On the eve of the Iowa caucuses, Trump promoted on his social media a video that suggests his campaign is, actually, a divine mission from God.

In 2019, Trump's then-secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, set up a federal commission to define human rights based on the precepts Vought describes, specifically ''natural law and natural rights.'' Natural law is the belief that there are universal rules derived from God that can't be superseded by government or judges. While it is a core pillar of Catholicism, in recent decades it's been used to oppose abortion, LGBTQ+ rights and contraception.

Vought sees his and his organization's mission as ''renew[ing] a consensus of America as a nation under God,'' per a statement on CRA's website, and reshaping the government's contract with the governed. Freedom of religion would remain a protected right, but Vought and his ideological brethren would not shy from using their administration positions to promote Christian doctrine and imbue public policy with it, according to both people familiar with the matter, granted anonymity to avoid retaliation. He makes clear reference to human rights being defined by God, not man.

America should be recognized as a Christian nation ''where our rights and duties are understood to come from God,'' Vought wrote two years ago in Newsweek.

''It is a commitment to an institutional separation between church and state, but not the separation of Christianity from its influence on government and society,'' he continued, noting such a framework ''can lead to beneficial outcomes for our own communities, as well as individuals of all faiths.''

He went on to accuse detractors of Christian nationalism of invoking the term to try to scare people. "'Christian nationalism' is actually a rather benign and useful description for those who believe in both preserving our country's Judeo-Christian heritage and making public policy decisions that are best for this country,'' he wrote. ''The term need not be subjected to such intense scorn due to misunderstanding or slander.''

To ingratiate himself in conservative circles '-- and Christian conservative ones '-- Trump has often turned to operatives from them. Among those who helped was Vought.

As OMB director in the Trump administration, Vought became a disciple of the ''America First'' movement. He has been a steadfast proponent of keeping the U.S. out of foreign wars and slashing federal spending.

CRA is already wielding influence on Trump's positions. His thinking on withdrawing the U.S. from NATO and using military force against Mexican drug cartels is partly inspired by separate CRA papers, according to reports by Rolling Stone.

''Russell Vought did a fabulous job in my administration, and I have no doubt he will do a great job in continuing our quest to make America great again,''reads a Trump quote prominently placed on CRA's website.

Trump will have a major platform to convey his vision for Christian policy in a second term when, on Feb. 22, he addresses a National Religious Broadcasters forum in Nashville. The group is the world's largest association of Christian communicators.

Trump is also talking about bringing his former national security adviser Michael Flynn, a vocal proponent of Christian nationalism, back into office. Flynn is currently focused on recruiting what he calls an ''Army of God'' '-- as he barnstorms the country promoting his vision of putting Christianity at the center of American life.

Former national security adviser Michael Flynn speaks during a "rosary rally," Aug. 6, 2023, in Norwood, Ohio.|Darron Cummings/AP

Vought's beliefs over time have been informed by his relationship with Wolfe. The two spent time together at Heritage Action, a conservative policy advocacy group. And Vought has praised their yearslong partnership. ''I'm proud to work with @William_E_Wolfe on scoping out a sound Christian Nationalism,'' he posted on X, then Twitter, in January 2023.

Vought often echoes Wolfe's principles, including on immigration. ''Jesus Christ wasn't an open-borders socialist,'' Wolfe wrote for The Daily Caller in April while a visiting CRA fellow. ''The Bible unapologetically upholds the concept of sovereign nations.''

While speaking in September at American Moment's ''Theology of American Statecraft: The Christian Case for Immigration Restriction'' on Capitol Hill in September, Vought defended the widely-criticized practice of family separation at the border during the Trump years, telling the audience ''the decision to defend the rule of law necessitates the separation of families.''

The Heritage Foundation's Project 2025 offers more visibility into what policy agenda a future Trump administration might pursue. It says policies that support LGBTQ+ rights, subsidize ''single-motherhood'' and penalize marriage should be repealed because subjective notions of ''gender identity'' threaten ''Americans' fundamental liberties.''

It also proposes increasing surveillance of abortion and maternal mortality reporting in the states, compelling the Food and Drug Administration to revoke approval of ''chemical abortion drugs'' and protecting ''religious and moral'' objections for employers who decline contraception coverage for employees. One of the groups that partners with Project 2025, Turning Point USA, is among conservative influencers that health professionals have criticized for targeting young women with misleading health concerns about hormonal birth control. Another priority is defunding Planned Parenthood, which provides reproductive health care to low-income women.

Wolfe, who has deleted several posts on X that detail his views, has a more extreme outlook of what a government led by Christian nationalists should propose. In a December post, he called for ending sex education in schools, surrogacy and no-fault divorce throughout the country, as well as forcing men ''to provide for their children as soon as it's determined the child is theirs'' '-- a clear incursion by the government into Americans' private lives.

''Christians should reject a Christ-less 'conservatism,''' he expanded in another X missive, ''and demand the political movement we are most closely associated with make a return to Christ-centered foundations. Because it's either Christ or chaos, even on the 'Right.'''

Wolfe declined to comment.

The effort to imbue laws with biblical principles is already underway in some states. In Texas, Christian conservative supporters have pressured the legislature to require public schools to display the Ten Commandments in every classroom; targeted prohibitions on churches against direct policy advocacy and organized campaigns around ''culture war'' issues, including curbing LGBTQ+ rights, banning books and opposing gun safety laws.

''There's been a tectonic shift in how the leadership of the religious right operates,'' said Matthew Taylor, a scholar at the Institute for Islamic, Christian and Jewish Studies, who grew up evangelical. ''These folks aren't as interested in democracy or working through democratic systems as in the old religious right because their theology is one of Christian warfare.''

CORRECTION: An earlier version of this report misstated the name of the Institute for Islamic, Christian and Jewish Studies.

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Fri, 23 Feb 2024 22:52

AHA Cybersecurity Advisory February 22, 2024

Change Healthcare, which is one of the largest health care technology companies in the United States, Feb. 21 was hit with a cyberattack that began disrupting a number of its systems and services, according to published reports and a statement posted on Change Healthcare's website.

''Change Healthcare is experiencing a cyber security issue, and our experts are working to address the matter,'' according to the latest Change Healthcare statement posted on its website at 11:32 a.m. ET on Feb. 22. ''Once we became aware of the outside threat, in the interest of protecting our partners and patients, we took immediate action to disconnect our systems to prevent further impact. At this time, we believe the issue is specific to Change Healthcare and all other systems across UnitedHealth Group are operational.''

In 2022, UnitedHealth Group completed its merger of U.S. healthcare services company Optum and Change Healthcare. Optum provides services in technology, data, pharmacy care and direct health care.

The AHA has been in communication with the FBI, Department of Health and Human Services, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency regarding this incident.

WHAT YOU CAN DODue to the sector wide presence and the concentration of mission critical services provided by Optum, the reported interruption could have significant cascading and disruptive effects on revenue cycle, certain health care technologies and clinical authorizations provided by Optum across the health care sector. Based upon the statements from Change Healthcare that they became aware of an ''outside threat'' and disconnected ''in the interest of protecting our partners and patients,'' we recommend that all health care organizations that were disrupted or are potentially exposed by this incident consider disconnection from Optum until it is independently deemed safe to reconnect to Optum. It also is recommended that organizations which utilize Optum's services prepare related downtime procedures and contingency plans should Optum's services remain unavailable for an extended period.

Please send any technical, financial and/or clinical impact or related technical threat intelligence on a confidential basis to Riggi at jriggi@aha.org.

In addition:

Organizations should use this opportunity to test the security, redundancy and resiliency of their network and data backups ensuring they remain offline. AHA recommends backup technology which renders the backups ''immutable'' '-- unable to be deleted, altered or encrypted.Ensure that all high criticality, known and exploited vulnerabilities have been patched, especially any which are internet facing.Review and test cyber incident response plans, ensure they are well coordinated and integrated with emergency management plans. Test callout for activation of incident command structure and backup communications plans should email and VoIP communications fail.Review business and clinical continuity downtime procedures to ensure mission critical and life critical functions could sustain a loss of information, operational and medical technology for up to 30 days.Consider designating clinical downtime ''coaches'' and ''safety officers'' for each shift. These would be individuals who are experienced and adept at working with downtime, manual procedures should there be a loss of access to the EMR and other medical technology, and who could guide and lead other less experienced staff in the implementation of downtime procedures to ensure continuation of safe and quality care.Increase threat hunting and monitoring tools and techniques. Although no specific threat actor has been identified, the joint government agency advisory regarding ''living off the land'' cyber technique serves as a good general guide.ADDITIONAL RESOURCESFor further information on ransomware preparedness see the Stop Ransomware guide.Other resources and alerts may be found at stopransomware.gov.For the latest cyber threat information and alerts visit cisa.gov.To contact local FBI Offices to report suspicious cyber activity visit fbi.gov or ic3.gov.For emergency cyber issues such as ransomware attacks in progress, call 24/7 FBI Cyber Watch command center at (855) 282-3937. Define patient care/safety impact such as ambulance diversions in progress, canceled surgeries, etc. CISA may also be contacted at https://www.cisa.gov/cisa-central. CISA 24/7 Cyber Watch Center is (888) 282-0870. Define same patient care/safety impact protocol as above.FURTHER QUESTIONSIf you have further questions, please contact Riggi at jriggi@aha.org. For the latest cyber threat intelligence and resources, visit www.aha.org/cybersecurity.

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Fri, 23 Feb 2024 22:17

Chinese spy balloon used U.S. internet: report

Chinese spy balloon used U.S. internet provider, report says 04:05 The U.S. is tracking a high-altitude balloon flying over the Western part of the country, U.S. officials told CBS News. Military aircraft have spotted the balloon and determined it is not a threat, but its origin and purpose are still unknown, the officials said.

Sources familiar with the matter who spoke on the condition of anonymity said the balloon was drifting east in the jetstream on Friday at an altitude of more than 40,000 feet. Its presence prompted enough concern that the military sent aircraft to investigate.

One official said the balloon was over Colorado earlier in the day and was expected to be over Georgia by Friday night. The official said the balloon appeared to be made of Mylar and had a small cube-shaped box, about two feet long on each side, hanging below it.

The developments come one year after tensions between the U.S. and China ratcheted to new heights after a Chinese balloon carrying sophisticated spying equipment flew over the continental U.S. for several days.

The Chinese foreign ministry claimed that the balloon was meant to collect weather data and had "deviated far from its planned course" due to high winds. The U.S. military ultimately shot it down off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4, 2023, and recovered the wreckage.

The spy balloon became a political headache for President Biden, who faced criticism from Republicans over his decision to allow it to transit over the U.S. for nearly a week before ordering it shot down. Biden officials said they waited until it was off the coast to minimize the risk to civilians on the ground. But lawmakers questioned why it couldn't have been brought down when it was near Alaska's coast, before crossing the U.S.

Though the Pentagon eventually concluded the balloon did not transmit information back to China, its presence put the U.S. military on high alert for other objects in U.S. airspace. Fighter jets shot down several unidentified objects over the U.S. and Canada over the following weeks.

The military couldn't find any debris from those objects, and the search was called off due to dangerous weather conditions. Mr. Biden said the unidentified objects were not believed to be connected to China's spy balloon program.

"The intelligence community's current assessment is that these three objects were mostly balloons tied to private companies, recreation or research institutions studying weather or conducting other scientific research," the president said .

The Chinese spy balloon became a major diplomatic point of contention between the U.S. and China, prompting Secretary of State Antony Blinken to cancel a trip to Beijing in February 2023. Blinken eventually made the trip in June to try to soothe rising tensions over a number of issues, including the balloon and the Chinese military's assertiveness in the South China Sea.

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Eleanor WatsonEleanor Watson is a CBS News reporter covering the Pentagon.

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Fri, 23 Feb 2024 21:48

''Anyone who isn't confused really doesn't understand the situation.'' Those words, from CBS icon Edward R. Murrow, came to mind this week after I spoke with journalists at the network.

There is trouble brewing at Black Rock, the headquarters of CBS, after the firing of Catherine Herridge, an acclaimed investigative reporter. Many of us were shocked after Herridge was included in layoffs this month, but those concerns have increased after CBS officials took the unusual step of seizing her files, computers and records, including information on privileged sources.

The position of CBS has alarmed many, including the union, as an attack on free press principles by one of the nation's most esteemed press organizations.

I have spoken confidentially with current and former CBS employees who have stated that they could not recall the company ever taking such a step before. One former CBS journalist said that many employees ''are confused why [Herridge] was laid off, as one of the correspondents who broke news regularly and did a lot of original reporting.''

That has led to concerns about the source of the pressure. He added that he had never seen a seizure of records from a departing journalist, and that the move had sent a ''chilling signal'' in the ranks of CBS.

A former CBS manager, who also spoke on condition of anonymity, said that he had ''never heard of anything like this.'' He attested to the fact that, in past departures, journalists took all of their files and office contents. Indeed, the company would box up everything from cups to post-its for departing reporters. He said the holding of the material was ''outrageous'' and clearly endangered confidential sources.

Herridge declined to make any public comments on her departure.

CBS also did not respond to my inquiries about this.

A source within the the union, SAG-AFTRA, confirmed that it has raised this controversy with CBS and remains extremely concerned about the effect of this action on journalistic practices and source confidentiality. The union believes this is ''very unusual'' and goes far beyond this individual case. ''It is a matter of principle,'' a union spokesperson added. ''It is a matter of serious concern. We are considering all of our options.''

For full disclosure, I was under contract twice with CBS as a legal analyst. I cherished my time at the network. I have also known Herridge for years in both legal and journalistic capacities.

CBS is one of the world's premier news organizations, with a legendary history that includes figures from Murrow to Walter Cronkite to Roger Mudd. That is why the hiring of Herridge was so welcomed by many of us. The network was at risk of becoming part of the journalistic herd, an echo-chamber for Democratic and liberal narratives. It had been mired in third place for ages, and it was moving in the wrong direction by alienating half of the country.

Herridge had been a celebrated investigative reporter at Fox News. An old-school investigative journalist, she is viewed as a hard-driving, middle-of-the-road reporter cut from the same cloth as the network's legendary figures.

The timing of Herridge's termination immediately raised suspicions in Washington. She was pursuing stories that were unwelcomed by the Biden White House and many Democratic powerhouses, including the Hur report on Joe Biden's diminished mental capacity, the Biden corruption scandal and the Hunter Biden laptop. She continued to pursue these stories despite reports of pushback from CBS executives, including CBS News President Ingrid Ciprian-Matthews.

Given the other layoffs and declining revenues, the inclusion of Herridge was defended by the network as a painful but necessary measure. But then something strange happened. The network grabbed Herridge's notes and files and informed her that it would decide what, if anything, would be turned over to her. The files likely contain confidential material from both her stints at Fox and CBS. Those records, it suggests, are presumptively the property of CBS News.

For many of us who have worked in the media for decades, this action is nothing short of shocking. Journalists are generally allowed to leave with their files. Under the standard contract, including the one at CBS, journalists agree that they will make files available to the network if needed in future litigation. That presupposes that they will retain control of their files. Such files are crucial for reporters, who use past contacts and work in pursuing new stories with other outlets or who cap their careers with personal memoirs.

The heavy-handed approach to the files left many wondering if it was the result of the past reported tension over stories.

Regardless of motive, the company is dead wrong.

These files may contain sources who were given confidentiality by Herridge. The company is suggesting that the privilege of confidentiality (and the material) rest ultimately with CBS. As a threshold matter, that cannot be the case with regard to files that were generated during Herridge's long stint with Fox News. Yet CBS appears to be retaining those files, too.

When sources accept confidentiality assurances, it is an understanding that rests with the reporter. It is a matter of trust that can take a long time to establish on a personal level between a reporter and a source.

It is certainly understood that the network stands behind that pledge. However, most sources understand that their identity and information will be kept protected by the reporter and only disclosed to a select group of editors or colleagues when necessary. It is the reporter who implicitly promises to go to jail to protect confidentiality '-- and many have done so. Such agreements are less likely to occur if sources are told that any number of unnamed individuals, including non-journalists, could have access or custody of these files.

When ''Deep Throat'' agreed to disclose his identity to Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, he was assured that they would protect it until his death. He would not have been so inclined if he had been told that this was a type of privilege by committee with potential disclosures to corporate, legal and HR personnel. Reporters like Herridge have long served as the primary defenders of privileged sources. Indeed, Herridge is still in court defending confidentiality over a series of stories at Fox News in 2017, even at the risk of being held in contempt.

CBS is suggesting that it will allow unnamed individuals to rifle through Herridge's files to determine what will remain with the network and what will be returned to the reporter. That could fundamentally alter how reporters operate and how willing sources are to trust assurances that they will be protected.

In criminal cases involving privileged information, the government has an elaborate ''filter team'' system to wall off access to information under review. In the court system, judges use in camera and ex parte reviews to protect such information. Ironically, the media itself seems to take a more ad hoc approach. Indeed, CBS seems to have adopted a ''Trust us, we're the media'' approach. However, that could expose these files to the access of unnamed lawyers, tech staff and others who are conducting this inventory and analysis.

CBS should reconsider this move before it does real harm to itself or its reporters. Ironically, it should not want to be the custodian of such records, which can expose the company to production demands in litigation, such as the ongoing fight over the confidentiality of the Fox sources. To store such documents is to invite a storm of subpoenas.

CBS could be forcing a showdown with the union, which must protect not only this journalist but all journalists seeking to maintain control and confidentiality of their files.

The union may have no choice but to go to court to force CBS to protect journalistic values, including a demand for an injunction to force the company to secure these files and bar review until a court has had a chance to consider these questions of confidential and proprietary claims to the files.

Famed CBS anchor Walter Cronkite once said ''our job is only to hold up the mirror '-- to tell and show the public what has happened.'' It now appears that CBS itself will have to look into that mirror and answer some questions of what happened to the confidential records of Catherine Herridge.

Jonathan Turley is the J.B. and Maurice C. Shapiro professor of public interest law at the George Washington University Law School.

Copyright 2024 Nexstar Media Inc. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

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Fri, 23 Feb 2024 21:46

SAG-AFTRA expressed deep concern over the reported actions of CBS News.

The union responsible for broadcast journalists issued a statement on Thursday condemning CBS News' alleged decision to seize the notes and research of investigative reporter Catherine Herridge after her recent layoff.

In a strongly worded statement, the Screen Actors Guild-American Federation of Television and Radio Artists (SAG-AFTRA) expressed deep concern over the reported actions of CBS News, stating that the alleged move to seize Ms. Herridge's reporter notes, which include confidential source information, is not only ''deeply concerning'' but also sets a ''dangerous precedent'' that threatens the core principles of the First Amendment.

Ms. Herridge, an investigative broadcast journalist, was among the CBS News employees laid off earlier this month. In an

op-ed published in The Hill on Thursday, it was claimed that the outlet seized her files, which remain locked in her office.

''It is completely inappropriate for an employer to lay off a reporter and take the very unusual step of retaining and searching the reporter's files, inclusive of confidential source identification and information,'' SAG-AFTRA said in its statement following news reports.

The union said that, from the perspective of the First Amendment, a news media outlet calling a reporter's research and confidential source reporting ''proprietary information'' is both ''shocking and absurd.''

The union urged CBS to promptly return Ms. Herridge's materials, asserting that the retention of a media professional's reporting materials by a former employer constitutes a ''serious break with traditional practices.''

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''We are encouraged by recent outreach by CBS News to SAG-AFTRA on this matter, and we are hopeful that it will be resolved shortly,'' SAG-AFTRA added in its statement.

The Epoch Times contacted CBS News for comment.

Multiple outlets reported that a CBS spokesperson disputed the reports, which were themselves based on unnamed CBS sources, that Ms. Herridge's files had been seized.

''We have respected her request to not go through the files, and out of our concern for confidential sources, the office she occupied has remained secure since her departure,'' the spokesperson said in comments obtained by The New York Post and Deadline.

The CBS spokesperson reportedly said the company is ''prepared to pack up the rest of her files immediately on her behalf, with her representative present as she requested.''

Ms. Herridge has

not officially made a statement in response to the reports of her files being seized. However, on Thursday, she

reposted SAG-AFTRA's statement condemning CBS News' reported actions on X (formerly Twitter).

News of her dismissal garnered criticism from journalists and others, with Michael Shellenberger, an author and journalist,

decrying the reported claims about her reporter notes as a ''gross violation of journalistic ethics.'' In a previous post, he praised Ms. Herridge as a ''hero'' for ''protecting her sources.''

Ms. Herridge, who joined CBS in 2019 as a balanced voice covering both sides of the political spectrum, is a respected investigative reporter. Her departure from CBS has raised questions, particularly given her ongoing legal battle over a 2017 piece she wrote for Fox News.

CBS News recently laid off employees as part of larger cuts by parent company Paramount Global, according to reports.

At the time of her termination, Ms. Herridge, formerly the chief intelligence correspondent for Fox News, was investigating stories related to President Biden's mental state, corruption allegations, and the Hunter Biden laptop scandal.

On Feb. 13, just before she was let go, Ms. Herridge reported that three powerful GOP House panels were concerned that President Biden ''may have retained sensitive documents related to specific countries involving his family's foreign business dealings.''

Her dismissal also comes amid a legal dispute stemming from her 2017 report on an FBI investigation into a Chinese scientist.

Last August, a federal judge appointed by President Barack Obama

ordered Ms. Herridge to disclose her sources for the report. This prompted pushback from press groups.

U.S. District Judge Christopher Cooper ruled that Ms. Herridge must sit for a deposition and answer questions under oath about the identity and intent of the sources.

Lawyers representing Ms. Herridge and Fox, who are paying the legal expenses, argued that the reporter is protected by the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. Ms. Herridge may face charges of contempt of court for refusing to disclose her source in the report, which detailed an investigation into the scientist's alleged provision of false information on immigration forms that related to her work on a Chinese astronaut program.

Ms. Herridge may be subjected to a $5,000 daily penalty for non-compliance with the court's order to reveal her source.

Zack Stieber contributed to this report.

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Fri, 23 Feb 2024 21:44

Google paused its Gemini image generation capabilities after users complained of its inaccurate and offensive output. The online giant has apologized for the gaff and will fix the feature. But meanwhile, it's explaining what happened.

''The Gemini conversational app (formerly known as Bard) is a specific product that is separate from Search, our underlying AI models, and our other products,'' Google senior vice president Prabhakar Raghavan writes in a new post to Google's corporate blog, The Keyword. ''Its image generation feature was built on top of an AI model called Imagen 2.''

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Given the issues we've seen with AI hallucinations and Google's responsible AI stance, it's perhaps not surprising that the company worked to ensure that Gemini's image creation capabilities didn't step over the line with violent or sexually explicit images or depictions of real people. It likewise wanted the service to output results that are as diverse as its global user base, with the people depicted in generated images representing a range of ethnicities.

Unfortunately, this work ''missed the mark'' and ''the feature didn't work well.'' It became too cautious and wrongly interpreted non-sensitive prompts as sensitive, and ''these two things led the model to overcompensate in some cases, and be over-conservative in others, leading to images that were embarrassing and wrong.''

For now, Google is turning off Gemini's image creation capability and is working to improve it before re-enabling it. The firm acknowledges that this functionality will likely never be perfect, as it's been cautioning of AI since Microsoft jump-started the AI push we're still in the midst of.

''I can't promise that Gemini won't occasionally generate embarrassing, inaccurate, or offensive results '-- but I can promise that we will continue to take action whenever we identify an issue,'' Raghavan continues. ''AI is an emerging technology which is helpful in so many ways, with huge potential, and we're doing our best to roll it out safely and responsibly.''

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Fri, 23 Feb 2024 20:00

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) created and maintains the ISO 3166 standard '' Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions.[1] The ISO 3166 standard contains three parts:

ISO 3166-1 '' Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions '' Part 1: Country codes[2] defines codes for the names of countries, dependent territories, and special areas of geographical interest. It defines three sets of country codes:ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 '' two-letter country codes which are also used to create the ISO 3166-2 country subdivision codes and the Internet country code top-level domains.ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 '' three-letter country codes which may allow a better visual association between the codes and the country names than the 3166-1 alpha-2 codes.ISO 3166-1 numeric '' three-digit country codes which are identical to those developed and maintained by the United Nations Statistics Division, with the advantage of script (writing system) independence, and hence useful for people or systems using non-Latin scripts.ISO 3166-2 '' Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions '' Part 2: Country subdivision code[3] defines codes for the names of the principal subdivisions (e.g., provinces, states, departments, regions) of all countries coded in ISO 3166-1.ISO 3166-3 '' Codes for the representation of names of countries and their subdivisions '' Part 3: Code for formerly used names of countries[4] defines codes for country names which have been deleted from ISO 3166-1 since its first publication in 1974.The ISO 3166-1 standard currently comprises 249 countries, 193 of which are sovereign states that are members of the United Nations. Many dependent territories in the ISO 3166-1 standard are also listed as a subdivision of their administering state in the ISO 3166-2 standard.

Current ISO 3166 country codes [ edit ] The sortable table below contains the three sets of ISO 3166-1 country codes for each of its 249 countries, links to the ISO 3166-2 country subdivision codes, and the Internet country code top-level domains (ccTLD) which are based on the ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 standard with the few exceptions noted. See the ISO 3166-3 standard for former country codes.

For user-assigned codes used by certain organizations, see ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 § User-assigned code elements and ISO 3166-1 alpha-3 § User-assigned code elements.

See also [ edit ] Geography portal International Organization for StandardizationISO 3166ISO 3166-1ISO 3166-2ISO 3166-3Country codeComparison of alphabetic country codesList of IOC country codesList of FIFA country codesInternational vehicle registration codeList of aircraft registration prefixesList of GS1 country codesList of country calling codes (International telephone dialing codes)Lists of countries and territoriesSovereign stateList of sovereign statesList of states with limited recognitionDependent territoryTimeline of historical geopolitical changesUnited NationsMember states of the United NationsUnited Nations list of non-self-governing territoriesCountry code top-level domainList of Internet top-level domainsNotes [ edit ] ^ The full names of countries and areas in ISO 3166 often but not always match these official state names. ^ The ISO 3166 country name Antarctica comprises the continent of Antarctica and all land and ice shelves south of the 60th parallel south. ^ The ISO 3166 country name Australia includes the Ashmore and Cartier Islands and the Coral Sea Islands. ^ Although the country code top-level domain .bq is reserved for the Caribbean Netherlands, these islands use the Netherlands country code top-level domain .nl instead. ^ The country code top-level domain .bv has not been implemented. ^ Both the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the United Nations (UN) use the country name Brunei Darussalam for Brunei. ^ Cabo Verde was previously known as Cape Verde. ^ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) uses the United Nations (UN) country name The Congo for the Republic of the Congo. ^ C´te d'Ivoire was previously known as Ivory Coast. ^ Czechia was previously known by its state name Czech Republic. ^ Eswatini was previously known as Swaziland. ^ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) uses the country name The Falkland Islands [Malvinas] for the Falkland Islands. ^ The ISO 3166 country name France includes Clipperton Island. ^ The ISO 3166 country name The French Southern Territories comprises all of the French Southern and Antarctic Lands except Ad(C)lie Land which is included in the ISO 3166 country name Antarctica. ^ The Holy See governs and represents the Vatican City State. ^ Both the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the United Nations (UN) use the full state name The Democratic People's Republic of Korea for North Korea. ^ Both the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the United Nations (UN) use the full state name The Republic of Korea for South Korea. ^ Both the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the United Nations (UN) use the full state name The Lao People's Democratic Republic for Laos. ^ Macao may be spelt either Macao or Macau. ^ Myanmar was previously known as Burma. ^ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) used The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as the country name prior to February 2019 when the naming dispute with Greece was settled. ^ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) uses the United Nations (UN) country name Pitcairn for the Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands. ^ Both the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and the United Nations (UN) use the full state name The Russian Federation for Russia. ^ The country code top-level domain .sj has not been implemented. ^ The Syrian Arab Republic is also known by its common country name Syria. ^ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) uses the country name Taiwan (Province of China) for Taiwan. ^ The Republic of China controls Taiwan. The People's Republic of China claims Taiwan as its Taiwan Province. In deference to the People's Republic of China, the United Nations refers to Taiwan as Taiwan, Province of China. ^ Timor-Leste was previously known as East Timor. ^ T¼rkiye was previously known as Turkey. ^ Although the country code top-level domain .gb is reserved for the United Kingdom, the country uses the .uk country code top-level domain instead. ^ The ISO 3166 country name The United States Minor Outlying Islands comprises Baker Island, Howland Island, Jarvis Island, Johnston Atoll, Kingman Reef, Midway Atoll, Navassa Island, Palmyra Atoll, and Wake Island. ^ The country code top-level domain .um has not been implemented. ^ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) uses the United Nations (UN) country name Viet Nam for Vietnam. ^ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) uses the country name Virgin Islands (British) for the Virgin Islands of the United Kingdom. ^ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) uses the country name Virgin Islands (U.S.) for the Virgin Islands of the United States. ^ The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has designated Western Sahara as the provisional country name for the region of the Maghreb claimed by both the Kingdom of Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. ^ Both the Kingdom of Morocco and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic claim the region known as Western Sahara. Morocco currently (2018) controls most of the coastal region while the Sahrawis control the interior. ^ The country code top-level domain .eh has not been implemented. References [ edit ] External links [ edit ] The International Organization for Standardization (ISO)ISO 3166 Country CodesThe ISO 3166 Maintenance Agency

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Fri, 23 Feb 2024 17:10

A U.S. Appeals court overturned a moratorium on coal leasing from federal lands, potentially leading to future coal sales from public reserves.The ruling was a setback for environmentalists and Democratic officials who sought to limit federal coal leasing.The National Mining Association welcomed the decision, stating it could help advance stalled mining projects like the Black Butte coal mine expansion. Explore further questions using the Ground News AI Assistant for deeper insights.

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Fri, 23 Feb 2024 16:51

On paper, Russian President Vladimir Putin seems like a humble statesman with a modest income.

The Kremlin claims that Putin earns an annual salary of $140,000. His publicly disclosed assets include an 800-square foot apartment, a trailer, and three cars.

But according to some experts, he may be the wealthiest man in the world with assets totaling up to $200 billion.

While that is a ridiculous amount of money for anyone to have, this figure may not be so far-fetched for Putin. Here's why:

Luxury watch collection Putin is often seen sporting high-end luxury watches that are retailed for multiple times his supposed annual income.

He has been pictured wearing Patek Philippe's Perpetual Calendar watch worth $60,000 and allegedly owns a $500,000 A. Lange & Sohne Toubograph, as well as other fancy designs.

$1.4 Billion Black Sea mansionPutin is rumored to be the owner of a beautiful 190,000 square-foot mansion sitting atop a cliff that overlooks the Black Sea. This coastal property is reputed as the largest private residence in the country and serves as his private palace endearingly called ''Putin's Country Cottage''.

The estate is Putin's playland, boasting frescoed ceilings, a marble swimming pool lined with statues of Greek gods, a 27,000 square-foot guest house, spas with traditional hammams, a musical parlor, dressing rooms for all his staff, an amphitheater, a state-of-the-art ice hockey rink, a Vegas-style casino, a nightclub equipped with stripper poles, a barroom showcasing more than $100,000 of wine and spirits, an underground tasting room overlooking the water, and much more.

Most of the mansion is reportedly decorated by an exclusive luxury Italian brand called Citterio Atena including Louis XIV style sofas, $500,000 in dining room furniture, and a $54,000 bar table. It even has decked-out bathrooms with fancy $850 Italian toilet brushes and $1,250 toilet paper holders.

On top of all the extravagant furnishings, an annual $2 million is spent just to maintain the property's landscaping by a 40-person staff.

The Black Sea Mansion was designed by Italian architect Lanfranco Cirillo and cost $1.4 billion to construct. According to a Reuters investigation, the money for this extravagant project was supposedly laundered through the country's 1.3-trillion-ruble national project called ''Health'' in which the state bought expensive medical equipment from a company owned by Putin's friends Shamalov and Gorelov at a much higher rate than the market price. Records show that the two men sent around $56 million to Swiss bank accounts of a Belize company. Then the Belize account transferred approximately $48 million to an account controlled by Medea Investment- a company controlled by Cirillo himself. Moscow Times reports that Shamalov, Gorelov, and Cirillo denied all allegations.

The Kremlin denies Putin's ownership of the palace saying it belongs to a wealthy businessman. But Russian analysts call it a blatant lie, saying that no businessman can have properties guarded by the FSB (Russia's federal security service) with a no-fly zone over it.

Aircraft, helicopters, and carsApart from the Black Sea Mansion and 19 other houses and 700 cars, Putin supposedly has a collection of 58 aircraft and helicopters including a $716 million dollar plane called ''The Flying Kremlin'' that has a toilet made of gold. Not surprising considering his taste for grandiose, neoclassical architecture.

And to keep his options open by land, air, or sea, he also has a $100-million-dollar megayacht designed by a nuclear submarine maker from the Russian navy.

$200 Billion Dollar BlackmailThe $200 billion figure was estimated by financier Bill Browder who, in a testimony to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in 2017, said that Putin amassed most of his wealth after a Moscow court jailed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky in 2003 for fraud and tax evasion:

''After Khodorkovsky's conviction, the other oligarchs went to Putin and asked him what they needed to do to avoid sitting in the same cage as Khodorkovsky. From what followed, it appeared that Putin's answer was, ''50%'' He wasn't saying 50% for the Russian government or the presidential administration of Russia, but 50% for Vladimir Putin personally.''

On top of all this, the famous Panama Papers revealed a network of secret offshore deals and loans worth $2 billion pointing to Putin in 2016.

But of course, Vladimir denies all these allegations, only admitting to a different form of riches:

''I am the wealthiest man, not just in Europe but in the whole world: I collect emotions. I am wealthy in that the people of Russia have twice entrusted me with the leadership of a great nation such as Russia. I believe that is my greatest wealth.''

And despite all the paper trails and testimonies stacked against him, the Russian president continues his charade of being a dutiful bureaucrat with a simple, middle-class lifestyle.

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Archived Version

Fri, 23 Feb 2024 16:51

The war between Russia and Ukraine has been going on for several days. There are constant attacks on Ukraine. Many experts are also seeing the Russo-Ukraine war as a sign of World War III. As the situation worsened in Ukraine after the Russian invasion, nearly 1,20,000 people have fled the country into Poland and other neighbouring countries.

Vladimir Putin, the head of Russia for more than 20 years, takes advantage of his status to modify the constitution in order to increase his power and remain president. Thus, the president will have spent almost 25 years in power when his current term ends in 2024. Currently, the whole world's eyes are on Putin at this time. Putin is also expressing his power in the world through the Russia-Ukraine war. Putin has been counted among the most powerful people in the world even before.

Reuters

California Democrat, Nancy Pelosi condemned Russian President Vladimir Putin as a 'tyrant' and said the Russian leader is 'probably the richest man in the world' and said President Joe Biden will continue to 'follow the money' if Kremlin troops do not immediately cease what the international community has called an invasion.

"Putin is probably the richest man in the world. He has these palatial residences --that's really what got people in trouble in Russia because they showed the arrogance of the wealth, with which he lived," Pelosi said

Also Read: International Judo Federation Kicks Out Putin As Honorary President Over Ukraine Invasion

69-year-old Putin's critics claim that he is the richest man in the world. The 'richest' is not known, but Putin is often in the headlines for his wealth. According to his political critics, Putin has four yachts including a $100 million superyacht, 43 planes, 700 cars, 15 helicopters including a luxury jet with a gold toilet.

Becoming the President of RussiaA former KGB agent, he first rose to a position of power in 1999 - eight years after the fall of the Soviet Union - when he became Russian prime minister, rising to the president the following year following the resignation of Boris Yeltsin. In 2008, not being able to assume a third term in the presidency, as this is not allowed in the Constitution, he would appoint the then prime minister Medvedev as his successor, who would later appoint him to that role. Four years later he would become president again, a role in which he remains to this day. Contrary to what happened in 2008, a constitutional reform passed in 2020 allowed him to serve a third consecutive term (fifth in total) in the presidency.

Secretly one of the richest people in the world? AFP

Many media reports claim that he's the world's richest man with a secret £160 billion (around $285 billion) fortune and lives like a king on his extraordinary wealth that's 60 times richer than former US President Donald Trump, however, he refused and said that his modest spending habits reportedly run only to driving a Lada, owning a bachelor flat and takes home a modest state salary of around £100,000 (Around $178,000) a year.

Lavish housesPutin owns 20 luxury homes and one of them is the $1.4 Billion Black Sea coastal palace, the residence called ''Putin's Country Cottage'' but the Kremlin has always denied that the Russian leader owns the residence. It has a marble swimming pool, which is decorated with statues of Greek gods. A wine cellar, a theatre and a club-like place for pole dancing are also in this palace. However, Putin denied owning the palace himself. According to The Richest, Putin spends at least $2 million per year on a staff of 40 landscapers and gardeners.

Also Read: This Man Predicted Russia-Ukraine War In 2015: The West Is Leading Ukraine Down The Primrose Path

A tour of the first floor of the palace includes a music room, gym, dining room featuring $500,000 in Pozzoli, Italian luxury furniture and a $54,000 bar table. There are six bedrooms, also adorned with luxury Italian furniture.

Youtube/Alexei Navalny

A barroom contains more than $100,000 of wine and spirits and leads to a luxurious auditorium, spanning two floors in height.

It has also been claimed in media reports that he has 19 more houses. Along with this, Putin also has a collection of 58 aircraft and helicopters, 700 cars and dozens of expensive watches that value up to Rs 3 crore. He is also fond of keeping exotic pets, including a tiger named Boris, which he released into the wild on live TV in 2015.

Also Read: Viral Video Shows Ukrainian Man Offering To Tow Russian Troops Back To Their Country After Their Tank Breaks Dow

Speaking to The Washington Post, former Hermitage Capital Management CEO, Bill Browder estimated Putin's wealth to be around $200 billion. There are such facilities in his palace which are hardly available in any other house. However, the mystery remains about how much Putin's net worth actually is.

Many reports claim that In 2017, Putin had bought himself a lavish house with gold-plated tiles in the swimming pool just a few miles from Russia's border with the West.

Luxurious flying jetWhen Putin is going somewhere while flying in the sky, he likes a special aircraft designed in the neoclassical style. According to news.com.au, this plane is worth $716 million. The Ilyushin Il-96-300PU has been named 'Flying Kremlin', which means 'Flying Office of the President of Russia'. The plane has a toilet made of gold, which alone is worth more than Rs 35 lakh.

Getty Image

This aircraft is a flying fort and can fly up to 900km/h. Apart from the gym, bar, and three bedrooms, it has all the facilities, with the help of which Putin can control the army while travelling. The jet is equipped with an advanced communication system that allows it to act as a management centre capable of commanding troops during combat.

Putin's Superyacht Youtube

Putin is always in discussion about his luxury lifestyle. According to reports, the President of Russia has a superyacht named 'Graceful' worth $100 million. It has been designed by Sevmash, a nuclear submarine maker for the Russian Navy, and the interior exterior has been made by H2 Yachts Design. Facilities like a helipad, dining area, and cocktail bar are available on this superyacht. The superyacht has 400 bottles of the most luxurious wines from around the world In its cellar. It was parked in Germany for some time, but it had already left Germany in anticipation of sanctions after the attack.

Gold worth £95 billion As we all know that Russia is one of the advanced gold buyers in the world that helps them to face Western sanctions. According to Forbes, Russia had gold reserves of £1.4 billion (Rs 152 billion) in 1995. But today Putin has gold reserves of £95 billion (152 billion. This gold is kept under tight security at mysterious places, Hindustan News Hub reported.

Watch collection Reuters

According to political critic Boris Nemtsov, Putin has a watch collection worth some £500,000 (around $891,500) '' including one that is £300,000 (around $535,000) alone. Putin bought multiple properties in recent years '' with some saying he now owns homes worth more than £1 billion (A$1.78 billion).

Top agent of KGBNot many know that before entering politics, Putin had been a top agent of the KGB, the notorious intelligence agency of the time of the Soviet Union and studied law at Leningrad State University, graduating in 1975. He has long military experience and has also carried out many secret missions. He also keeps on making his military prowess public every day. Earlier his pictures of piloting a submarine and diving into the depths of the ocean in the Gulf of Finland in the Sea-Explorer 3.11 submersible submarine. He was leading a search operation for the Soviet Shchuka-Class Submarine Shch-308 submarine that had sunk during World War II.

Business Insider

According to celebritynetworth.com , Putin once told a journalist, "I am the wealthiest man, not just in Europe but in the whole world: I collect emotions. I am wealthy in that the people of Russia have twice entrusted me with the leadership of a great nation such as Russia. I believe that is my greatest wealth."

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Fri, 23 Feb 2024 15:53

22 February 2024

By Ulrich Bindseil and J¼rgen Schaaf

Bitcoin has failed on the promise to be a global decentralised digital currency and is still hardly used for legitimate transfers. The latest approval of an ETF doesn't change the fact that Bitcoin is not suitable as means of payment or as an investment.

On 10 January, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) approved spot exchange-traded funds (ETFs) for Bitcoin. For disciples, the formal approval confirms that Bitcoin investments are safe and the preceding rally is proof of an unstoppable triumph. We disagree with both claims and reiterate that the fair value of Bitcoin is still zero. For society, a renewed boom-bust cycle of Bitcoin is a dire perspective. And the collateral damage will be massive, including the environmental damage and the ultimate redistribution of wealth at the expense of the less sophisticated.

A post on The ECB Blog in November 2022 debunked the false promises of Bitcoin and warned of the social dangers if not effectively addressed.

We argued that Bitcoin has failed to fulfil its original promise to become a global decentralised digital currency. We also showed that Bitcoin's second promise to be a financial asset, the value of which would inevitably continue to rise, was equally wrong. We warned about the risks to society and the environment if the Bitcoin lobby managed to re-launch a bubble with the unintended help of legislators, who could give a perceived blessing where a ban would be required (Bindseil, Schaaf and Papsdorf, 2022).

Alas, all these risks have materialised.

Today, Bitcoin transactions are still inconvenient, slow, and costly. Outside the darknet, the hidden part of the internet used for criminal activities, it is hardly used for payments at all. The regulatory initiatives to combat the large-scale use of the Bitcoin network by criminals have not been successful yet. Even the full sponsoring by the government in El Salvador which granted it legal tender status and tried hard to kick off network effects through an initial Bitcoin gift of $30 in free bitcoin to citizens could not establish it as successful means of payment. Likewise, Bitcoin is still not suitable as an investment. It does not generate any cash flow (unlike real estate) or dividends (stocks), cannot be used productively (commodities), and offers no social benefit (gold jewellery) or subjective appreciation based on outstanding abilities (works of art). Less financially knowledgeable retail investors are attracted by the fear of missing out, leading them to potentially lose their money. And the mining of Bitcoin using the proof of work mechanism continues to pollute the environment on the same scale as entire countries, with higher Bitcoin prices implying higher energy consumption as higher costs can be covered by miners.But although this was all known, and the reputation of the entire crypto scene has been harmed by a long and growing list of further scandals,[1] Bitcoin has recovered big time since late December 2022 from just under $17,000 to more than $52,000. Small investors are easing back into crypto, although not yet rushing in headfirst as they did three years ago (Bloomberg, 2024).

Chart 1Market capitalisation of Bitcoin, billion USD

Source: IntoTheBlock

So why is this dead cat bouncing so high?

For many, the rally in the autumn of 2023 was initiated by the prospect of an imminent turnaround in the US Federal Reserve's interest rate policy, the halving of the BTC mining rewards in spring and later the approval of the Bitcoin spot ETF by the SEC.

Lower interest rates would have increased the risk appetite of investors[2] and the spot ETF approval would have opened the floodgates to Wall Street for Bitcoin. Both promised large inflows of funds '' the only effective fuel in a speculative bubble.

Still, this could turn out to be a flash in the pan. While in the short run the inflowing money can have a large impact on prices irrespective of fundamentals, prices will eventually return to their fundamental values in the long run (Gabaix and Koijen, 2022). And without any cash flow or other returns, the fair value of an asset is zero. Detached from economic fundamentals every price is equally (im)plausible '' a fantastic condition for snake oil salesmen.

Likewise, the use of ETFs as financing vehicles does not change the fair value of the underlying assets. An ETF with only one asset turns its actual financial logic on its head (although there are others in the United States). ETFs normally aim to diversify risk by holding many individual securities in a market. Why would anybody pay fees to an asset manager for the custody service of only one asset '' instead of using the custodian directly, which is in most cases one huge crypto exchange, or even holding the coins for free without any intermediary? Moreover, there were already other easy ways to gain listed exposure to Bitcoin or to buy Bitcoins without any intermediation. The problem has never been a lack of possibilities to speculate using Bitcoin '' but rather that it is only about speculation (Cohan, 2024). Finally, it is incredibly ironic that the crypto unit that had set out to overcome the demonised established financial system should need conventional intermediaries to spread to a broader group of investors.

The halving of the BTC mining rewards will take place in mid-April. After the bitcoin network mines 210,000 blocks, roughly every four years, the block reward given to Bitcoin miners for processing transactions is cut in half. The current limit of 900 BTC per day will then be cut to 450. Halving reduces the bitcoin rewards for mining, even though it remains costly. In the past such halvings were followed by rising prices. But if this was a reliable pattern, the rise would already be fully priced in (some say that this was the case).

While the current rally is fuelled by temporary factors, there are three structural reasons that may explain its seeming resilience: the ongoing manipulation of the ''price" in an unregulated market without oversight and without fair value, the growing demand for the ''currency of crime'', and shortcomings in the authorities' judgments and measures.

Price manipulation since the start of Bitcoin The history of Bitcoin has been characterised by price manipulation and other types of fraud. This may not be very surprising for an asset that has no fair value. Crypto exchanges were shut down and operators were prosecuted because of scams during the very first cycles.[3] And pricing has remained dubious in last year's upswing. One analysis (Forbes, 2022) of 157 crypto exchanges found that 51% of the daily bitcoin trading volume being reported is likely bogus.[4]

Manipulation may have become more effective as the trading volumes diminished significantly during the recent marked downturn called ''crypto winter'' as market interference has more of an impact when liquidity is low. According to one estimate the average trading volume of Bitcoin between 2019 and 2021 was about 2 million Bitcoins, compared to a meagre 500,000 in 2023 (Athanassakos and Seeman, 2024).

The currency of crime: financing evilAs critiques often point out: a key utility offered by crypto is the financing of terrorism and crimes like money laundering and ransomware. The demand for this infamous benefit is large '' and growing.

Despite the market downturn, the volume of illicit transactions has continued to rise. The range of possible applications is broad.

Bitcoin remains the top choice for money laundering in the digital world, with illicit addresses transferring $23.8 billion in crypto in 2022, marking a 68.0% increase from the previous year. Approximately half of these funds were funnelled through mainstream exchanges, which, despite having compliance measures, serve as conduits for converting illicit crypto into cash. (Chainanalysis, 2024).[5]Furthermore, crypto continues to be the preferred means for ransomware payments, with attacks on hospitals, schools, and government offices yielding $1.1 billion in 2023, compared to $567 million in 2022 (Reuters, 2024b).Misjudgment by authorities? The international community initially acknowledged Bitcoin's lack of positive social benefits. Legislators hesitated to concretise regulations due to the abstract nature of guidelines and concerns over Bitcoin's divergence from traditional financial assets. However, pressure from well-funded lobbyists and social media campaigns prompted compromises, having been understood as a partial approval of Bitcoin investments (The Economist, 2021).

In Europe, the Markets in Crypto Assets Regulation (MiCA) of June 2023 aimed to curb fraudulent issuers and traders of crypto units with - despite the initial intentions towards genuine crypto assets - , an eventual focus on stablecoins and service providers, although without regulating and constraining Bitcoin per se. At the same time, less informed outsiders might have the false impression that with MiCA in place, Bitcoin would be also regulated and safe.

In the USA, the SEC's approach to Bitcoin ETFs initially involved compromises, favouring futures ETFs due to their perceived lower volatility and lower risk of price manipulation. However, a court ruling in August 2023 compelled the SEC to authorise spot ETFs, leading to a significant market rally.[6]

Neither the United States nor the EU have so far taken any effective steps to address Bitcoin's energy consumption, despite evidence of its huge negative environmental impact.

The decentralised nature of Bitcoin presents challenges for authorities, sometimes leading to unnecessary regulatory fatalism. But Bitcoin transactions offer pseudonymity rather than complete anonymity, as each transaction is linked to a unique address on the public blockchain. Therefore, Bitcoin has been a cursed tool for anonymity, facilitating illicit activities and leading to legal action against offenders by the tracing of transactions (Greenberg, 2024).

Moreover, it seems wrong that Bitcoin should not be subject to strong regulatory intervention, up to practically forbidding it. The belief that one is protected from the effective access of law enforcement authorities can be quite deceptive, even for decentralised autonomous organisation (DAO). DAOs are member-owned digital communities, without central leadership, that are based on blockchain technology. A recent case involved BarnBridge DAO, which was fined more than $1.7 million by the SEC for failing to register the offer and sale of crypto securities. Despite claiming autonomy, the DAO settled following SEC pressure on its founders. When administrators of decentralised infrastructures are identified, authorities can effectively prosecute them, highlighting the limitations of claimed autonomy.

This principle also applies to Bitcoin. The Bitcoin network has a governance structure in which roles are assigned to identified individuals. Authorities could decide that these should be prosecuted in view of the large scale of illegal payments using Bitcoin. Decentralised finance can be regulated as forcefully as the legislator considers necessary.

Recent developments, such as increased fines for lax controls (Noonan and Smith, 2024). and the EU's agreement to strengthen anti-money laundering rules for crypto-assets[7], suggest a growing recognition of the need for tighter regulation in the crypto unit space.

ConclusionBitcoin's price level is not an indicator of its sustainability. There are no economic fundamental data, there is no fair value from which serious forecasts can be derived. There is no ''proof of price'' in a speculative bubble. Instead, a reflation of the speculative bubble shows the effectiveness of the Bitcoin lobby. The ''market'' capitalisation quantifies the overall social damage that will occur when the house of cards collapses. It is important for authorities to be vigilant and protect society from money laundering, cyber and other crimes, financial losses for the financially less educated, and extensive environmental damage. This job has not been done yet.

References

Athanassakos, G. and B. Seeman (2024), ''Here's what's really behind bitcoin's recent rally'', Globe and Mail, 4 January.

Bindseil, U., P. Papsdorf and J. Schaaf (2022), ''The encrypted threat: Bitcoin's social cost and regulatory responses'', SUERF Policy Note, No. 262, 7 January.

Bloomberg (2024), ''Mom-and-Pop Investors Are Starting to Tip-Toe Back Into Crypto''., by O. Kharif and Y. Yang, Bloomberg News, 18 February.

Chainanalysis (2024), ''2024 Crypto Crime Trends: Illicit Activity Down as Scamming and Stolen Funds Fall, But Ransomware and Darknet Markets See Growth'', 18 January.

Cohan, W. (2024), ''Bitcoin ETFs miss the point'', in Financial Times, 6 January

Cong, W. et al. (2023), ''Crypto Wash Trading'', 69 Mgmt. Sci. 6427.

Dunn, W. (2021), ''Bitcoin's gold rush was always an illusion'', in: The New Statesman, 20 July.

Forbes (2022), ''More Than Half Of All Bitcoin Trades Are Fake'', 26 August.

Gabaix, X. and R.S.J. Koijen (2022), ''In Search of the Origins of Financial Fluctuations: The Inelastic Markets Hypothesis'', Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 20-91, posted 23 October 2020; last revised: 13 May.

Gandal, N., J.T. Hamrick, T. Moore and T. Obermana (2018), ''Price manipulation in the Bitcoin ecosystem'', Journal of Monetary Economics, Volume 95, May 2018, Pages 86-96.

Greenberg, A. (2024), ''Child abusers are getting better at using crypto to cover their tracks'', Wired, 11 January.

Griffin, J. M. and A. Shams (2020), ''Is Bitcoin Really Un-Tethered?'', 15 June.

New York Times (2024), ''Bitcoin E.T.F.s Come With Risks. Here's What You Should Know'', by Tara Siegel Bernard, published 19 January, updated 21 January.

Noonan, L. and A. Smith (2024), ''Crypto and fintech groups fined USD 5.8 bn in global crackdown on illicit money'', 9 January.

Reuters (2024), ''SEC account hack renews spotlight on X's security concerns'', by Zeba Siddiqui and Raphael Satter, 10 January.

Reuters (2024a), ''Tougher EU money laundering rules target cryptoassets and dealers in luxury cars'', by Huw Jones, published 18 January.

Reuters (2024b), ''Crypto ransom attack payments hit record $1 billion in 2023 '' Chainalysis'', by Medha Singh, 7 February.

Rosen, P. (2024), ''BlackRock chief Larry Fink sees crypto ETFs as 'stepping stones to tokenization'', Business Insider, 12 January.

The Economist (2021), ''Crypto lobbying is going ballistic '' As regulators toughen up, companies hope to influence where the rules end up'', 12 December.

UNODC (2024), ''Casinos and cryptocurrency: major drivers of money laundering, underground banking, and cyberfraud in East and Southeast Asia'', Regional Office for Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok (Thailand), 15 January.

The views expressed in each blog entry are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem.

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Sun, 25 Feb 2024 13:24

The UK's Office of National Statistics (ONS) announced yesterday that they are changing the way they calculate ''excess deaths'' across the country.

''Deaths above expected'' or ''excess deaths'' is a statistic indicating mortality trends. Roughly speaking, it is calculated by estimating how many people die per year (based on previous years), then subtracting that number from the actual number of registered deaths.

A negative number means fewer people died than expected, a positive number means more. It's more complicated than that, obviously, there are numerous factors that go into the modelling, but that's essentially it.

''Excess deaths'' came to public prominence during the height of the Covid ''pandemic'', becoming one of those scary red statistics everyone was bandying about.

'...and now the ONS is changing the way they calculate it.

We've led the development of a new method for estimating the number of excess deaths across UK countries.

Julie Stanborough talks us through the data released today and how this new method will give us a better understanding in this complex area 'ž¸ https://t.co/RnY81qjxtp pic.twitter.com/uJPB3r5G2s

'-- Office for National Statistics (ONS) (@ONS) February 20, 2024

Why? We don't know, but there are few hints.

What changed?Basically, excess deaths used to be based on a five year rolling average of registered deaths, and it's now a rather more arcane mystery. (If you want to really dig into the method, they go into excruciating detail on their website).

Most importantly, we should note that the ''old method'' totally removed the ''Covid'' years from the modelling, while the ''new method'' only excludes a few months or weeks of 2020:

Individual weeks and months that were substantially affected by the immediate mortality impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic are removed from the data when estimating expected deaths in subsequent periods, whereas the current approach involves removing data for the whole of 2020.

Note that by ''current'' they confusingly mean the old method prior to the new changes.

What's the impact?The newly released data (downloadable here) goes all the way back to 2011, re-defining 100,000s of excess deaths, but we're just going to focus on 2019-present:

As you can see, the ''new method'' completely reverses the story of 2019, wiping it from 6000 excess deaths to over 34,000 deaths fewer than expected.

(While we're looking at these numbers, it's interesting how much of an outlier 2019 always was in terms of mortality, one wonders if there was some statistical prep-work being done to fudge deaths for the upcoming pandemic year.)

In the post-pandemic years (2021-23), by adding some of 2020 back into the modelling mix they have increased the number of expected deaths, and therefore greatly reduced excess deaths.

The end result is that, from 2020 onwards, excess mortality has been cut by ~15%. Over 30,000 ''excess deaths'' have been wiped off the records, over 20,000 from 2023 alone, and the vast majority since the vaccine rollout.

What was the point?That's a good question, we don't know enough to form a solid conclusion yet '' and I haven't really dived into the numbers or methods to see if there's any chicanery going on.

But we do know that statistics are a tool for opinion control and narrative management, and when they adjust official measures like this it can be an early warning sign. And by switching from a simple 5-year average to a highly complex multi-faceted model they have given themselves room to maneuver and manipulate the data in general.

It should be noted that the ''new method'' massively reduced excess mortality in 2019, but barely touched it in 2020, meaning the ''pandemic'' looks more dramatic.

It's also possible that they are attempting to stall the appearance of Covid ''vaccine'' harms by re-jigging the number of excess deaths downwards. Effectively hiding potential vaccine-related deaths by re-labelling them ''expected''.

The third option is that it's laying groundwork for a future event, ''the next pandemic'' or something similar. By reducing the excess deaths now they can make room to exaggerate excess deaths in the future.

It could be some combination of any or all of these, it could be something we haven't thought of yet, or it could be nothing at all.

We'll just have to wait and see.

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A ruling from the Alabama Supreme Court that frozen embryos are considered children under state law sent shockwaves well beyond the southern state's borders, and concern is high among Massachusetts women.The Alabama court's ruling last week stemmed from wrongful death lawsuits brought by couples whose frozen embryos were accidentally destroyed.Lawmakers began scrambling for ways to protect Alabama's in vitro fertilization services after multiple providers paused services in the wake of a state Supreme Court ruling that frozen embryos could be considered children under a state law."Having someone who does not have any medical or health care background making arbitrary rules about their frozen embryos had to be absolutely devastating," Heidi Fantasia, a registered nurse and chair of the UMass Lowell Solomon School of Nursing, said.Fantasia says IVF families in Massachusetts are safe for now. Gov. Maura Healey reiterated on Thursday to protect reproductive rights. Fantasia worries about what's next. "Where people live will determine the quality of health care that they get," Fantasia said. "A case like it could go all the way up to the Supreme Court, and that's what really puts the future of fertility care at risk," Kate Weldon LeBlanc with Resolve New England said.LeBlanc heads up an infertility support group. Her own daughter Sophie was born through IVF. She says calls it an intensely personal and emotional journey between an individual and their doctor, not politicians and judges.Facing a wave of shock and anger from the decision, Alabama legislators are now preparing separate proposals in the House and Senate that would seek to prevent a fertilized egg from being recognized as a human life or an unborn child under state laws until it is implanted in a woman's uterus.Alabama Attorney General Marshall does not intend to prosecute IVF providers or families based on the state Supreme Court ruling, Chief Counsel Katherine Robertson said in a statement.The court's ruling, treating the embryos the same as a child or gestating fetus under the wrongful death statute, raised questions about what legal liabilities clinics could face during IVF processes, including the freezing, testing and disposal of embryos. Three IVF providers in Alabama paused their services in the aftermath of the ruling.Justices ruled last week that three couples who had frozen embryos destroyed in a mishap at a storage facility could pursue wrongful death claims for their "extrauterine children." Justices cited sweeping language that the GOP-controlled Legislature and voters added to the Alabama Constitution in 2018, saying that the state recognizes the "rights of the unborn child."The Alabama ruling raises questions about what would become of frozen embryos that are not used in implantation procedures, what financial responsibility patients might have to maintain them if they could not legally be destroyed and what civil and even criminal liabilities medical providers could face throughout the process.The issue has become a flashpoint on the presidential campaign trail. Former President Donald Trump said Friday that he would ''strongly support the availability of IVF" and called on lawmakers in Alabama to preserve access to the treatment that has become a new flashpoint in the 2024 presidential election.Trump and former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, his last remaining major opponent for the GOP presidential nomination, have both cautioned against an absolute national ban and now have distanced themselves from the Alabama case."Trump cannot run from his record, and neither can the millions of women who his actions have hurt,'' said Julie Chavez Rodriguez, President Joe Biden's campaign manager, in a statement.Information from the Associated Press was used in this report.

LOWELL, Mass. '--A ruling from the Alabama Supreme Court that frozen embryos are considered children under state law sent shockwaves well beyond the southern state's borders, and concern is high among Massachusetts women.

The Alabama court's ruling last week stemmed from wrongful death lawsuits brought by couples whose frozen embryos were accidentally destroyed.

Lawmakers began scrambling for ways to protect Alabama's in vitro fertilization services after multiple providers paused services in the wake of a state Supreme Court ruling that frozen embryos could be considered children under a state law.

"Having someone who does not have any medical or health care background making arbitrary rules about their frozen embryos had to be absolutely devastating," Heidi Fantasia, a registered nurse and chair of the UMass Lowell Solomon School of Nursing, said.

Fantasia says IVF families in Massachusetts are safe for now. Gov. Maura Healey reiterated on Thursday to protect reproductive rights.

Fantasia worries about what's next.

"Where people live will determine the quality of health care that they get," Fantasia said.

"A case like it could go all the way up to the Supreme Court, and that's what really puts the future of fertility care at risk," Kate Weldon LeBlanc with Resolve New England said.

LeBlanc heads up an infertility support group. Her own daughter Sophie was born through IVF. She says calls it an intensely personal and emotional journey between an individual and their doctor, not politicians and judges.

Facing a wave of shock and anger from the decision, Alabama legislators are now preparing separate proposals in the House and Senate that would seek to prevent a fertilized egg from being recognized as a human life or an unborn child under state laws until it is implanted in a woman's uterus.

Alabama Attorney General Marshall does not intend to prosecute IVF providers or families based on the state Supreme Court ruling, Chief Counsel Katherine Robertson said in a statement.

The court's ruling, treating the embryos the same as a child or gestating fetus under the wrongful death statute, raised questions about what legal liabilities clinics could face during IVF processes, including the freezing, testing and disposal of embryos.

Three IVF providers in Alabama paused their services in the aftermath of the ruling.

Justices ruled last week that three couples who had frozen embryos destroyed in a mishap at a storage facility could pursue wrongful death claims for their "extrauterine children." Justices cited sweeping language that the GOP-controlled Legislature and voters added to the Alabama Constitution in 2018, saying that the state recognizes the "rights of the unborn child."

The Alabama ruling raises questions about what would become of frozen embryos that are not used in implantation procedures, what financial responsibility patients might have to maintain them if they could not legally be destroyed and what civil and even criminal liabilities medical providers could face throughout the process.

The issue has become a flashpoint on the presidential campaign trail.

Former President Donald Trump said Friday that he would ''strongly support the availability of IVF" and called on lawmakers in Alabama to preserve access to the treatment that has become a new flashpoint in the 2024 presidential election.

Trump and former U.N. Ambassador Nikki Haley, his last remaining major opponent for the GOP presidential nomination, have both cautioned against an absolute national ban and now have distanced themselves from the Alabama case.

"Trump cannot run from his record, and neither can the millions of women who his actions have hurt,'' said Julie Chavez Rodriguez, President Joe Biden's campaign manager, in a statement.

Information from the Associated Press was used in this report.

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